IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
20 February 2022
Easwar Vivek Mangipudi, Aniket Kate
16 February 2022
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany
You will be a member of the KASTEL Security Research Labs (https://zentrum.kastel.kit.edu) and the Topic "Engineering Secure Systems" of the Helmholtz Association. Your research is dealing with cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving computations, e.g., applied to mobility or production systems. It will result in both theoretical security concepts (protocol designs, security proofs, etc.) and their practical implementation (e.g., a demonstrator) for some application domain. The contract will initially be limited to 1 year, but can be extended.
If you are interested, please send an email including your CV and a list of publications to andy.rupp@rub.de. Applications will be reviewed continuously until the positions are filled.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Andy Rupp (andy.rupp@rub.de)
Qualcomm Sophia Antipolis (France)
Snapdragon processors are used in different types of devices ranging from mobile phones to televisions, cars, ultra-book laptops etc. Our processors are designed to meet security requirements ranging from content protection to enterprise security, using virtualization, HW security enclaves, factory key provisioning, and secure updates.
In this position you will perform the following tasks:
- Define HW crypto security requirements (functional, performance, security etc)
- Define HW/SW partitioning to address next challenges in cryptography such as PQC and Crypto Agility
- Define crypto and HW blocks that contribute to the overall SoC Security Architecture
- Design of mechanisms thwarting side channel attacks
- Monitor evaluation of crypto IP resistance and robustness
- Competitive analysis of security IPs and features
- Investigate future/roadmap security related technologies,
- Participation in academic conference and industrial/research security working groups.
- Cryptographic primitives, cryptographic protocols and their implementation
- Design of HW/SW security blocks such as HW cryptographic engines
- HW/SW threat analysis, security analysis or/and risk analysis
- Smart Card and secure HW technologies
- Security certifications: process and requirements.
- Academic and industry research (publications, conferences)
- Leadership & management background
- Excellent communication and teamwork skills are required
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Nicolas Courtois
14 February 2022
Port Dickson, Malaysia, 26 July - 28 July 2022
Submission deadline: 15 March 2022
Notification: 25 May 2022
Virtual event, Anywhere on Earth, 10 July - 16 July 2022
Submission deadline: 1 April 2022
Notification: 15 May 2022
Ikebukuro, Japan, 31 August - 2 September 2022
Submission deadline: 26 March 2022
Notification: 30 May 2022
National Research Council Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Human Resources at: NRC.NRCHiring-EmbaucheCNRC.CNRC@nrc-cnrc.gc.ca
More information: https://recruitment-recrutement.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/job-invite/15641
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
- tool aided cryptanalysis, such as MILP, CP, STP, and SAT
- machine learning aided cryptanalysis and designs
- privacy-preserving friendly symmetric-key designs
- quantum cryptanalysis
- provable security
- cryptanalysis against SHA-2, SHA-3, and AES
- threshold cryptography
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Jian Guo, guojian@ntu.edu.sg, with subject [IACR-CATF]
More information: https://team.crypto.sg
Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Morocco
The project is jointly conducted between Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Morocco, and EPFL Switzerland.
To apply, please send your cv with your list of publications.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Mehdi Amhoud, email : elmehdi.amhoud(at)um6p.ma
Protocol Labs
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Apply here- https://boards.greenhouse.io/protocollabs/jobs/4283969004
More information: https://boards.greenhouse.io/protocollabs/jobs/4283969004
13 February 2022
Instructions for authors and the link to submission server can be found here https://crypto.iacr.org/2022/papersubmission.php.
12 February 2022
Pascal Giorgi, Bruno Grenet, Armelle Perret du Cray, Daniel S. Roche
George-Mircea Grosu, Silvia-Elena Nistor, Emil Simion
Olivier Bronchain, Gaëtan Cassiers
Yanxue Jia, Shi-Feng Sun, Hong-Sheng Zhou, Jiajun Du, Dawu Gu
In this work, we take shuffling technique as a key to design $\mathsf{PSU}$ protocols for the first time. By shuffling receiver's set, we put forward the first protocol, denoted as $\Pi_{\mathsf{PSU}}^{\mathsf{receiver}}$, that eliminates the expensive operations in previous works, such as additive homomorphic encryption and repeated operations on the receiver's set. It outperforms the state-of-the-art design by Kolesnikov et al. (ASIACRYPT 2019) in both efficiency and security; the unnecessary leakage in Kolesnikov et al.'s design, can be avoided in our design.
We further extend our investigation to the application scenarios in which both players may hold unbalanced input datasets. We propose our second protocol $\Pi_{\mathsf{PSU}}^{\mathsf{sender}}$, by shuffling the sender's dataset. This design can be viewed as a dual version of our first protocol, and it is suitable in the cases where the sender's input size is much smaller than the receiver's.
Finally, we implement our protocols $\Pi_{\mathsf{PSU}}^{\mathsf{receiver}}$ and $\Pi_{\mathsf{PSU}}^{\mathsf{sender}}$ in C++ on big datasets, and perform a comprehensive evaluation in terms of both scalability and parallelizability. The results demonstrate that our design can obtain a $4$-$5 \times$ improvement over the state-of-the-art by Kolesnikov et al. with a single thread in WAN/LAN settings.
Benjamin Chan, Cody Freitag, Rafael Pass
Our notion of cosmic security considers a reduction-based notion of security that models attackers as arbitrary unbounded stateful algorithms; we also consider a more relaxed notion of cosmic security w.r.t. weakly-restartable adversaries which makes additional restrictions on the attacker’s behavior. We present both impossibility results and general feasibility results for our notions, indicating that extended Church-Turing hypotheses may not be needed for a well-founded theory of Cryptography.