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29 July 2022
SUTD, Singapore
Job PostingWe are looking for postdocs / research fellows with expertise on cybersecurity in general and CPS security in particular. The candidates should have track record of strong R&D capability, with publications at leading security conferences. The candidates familiar with shipboard OT systems will be considered with the priority. Candidate working in the current position less than one year will not be considered (unless due to the end of contract). Fresh PhD graduates are welcome.
We are also looking for research assistants who should be 1) familiar with scripting languages like Python; 2) with knowledge on threat modelling and vulnerability assessment - to conduct vulnerability scan of the systems and analyse the threats; 3) familiar with tools like Wireshark, Metasploit, Ettercap, Nmap - to monitor network traffic, launch MITM attacks, scan for ports; 4) with hands on experience of Linux OS to execute commands and run scripts.
Only short-listed candidates will be contacted for interview. Successful candidates will be offered internationally competitive remuneration.
Interested candidates please send your CV to Prof. Jianying Zhou (http://jianying.space/).
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Jianying Zhou. Email: jianying_zhou@sutd.edu.sg
More information: http://jianying.space/
28 July 2022
Vitaly Kiryukhin
ePrint ReportTaiga Hiroka, Tomoyuki Morimae, Ryo Nishimaki, Takashi Yamakawa
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we introduce certified everlasting FE. In this primitive, the receiver with the ciphertext of a message $m$ and the functional decryption key of a function $f$ can obtain $f(m)$ and nothing else. The security holds even if the adversary becomes computationally unbounded after issuing a valid certificate. We, first, construct certified everlasting FE for P/poly circuits where only a single key query is allowed for the adversary. We, then, extend it to $q$-bounded one for NC1 circuits where $q$-bounded means that $q$ key queries are allowed for the adversary with an a priori bounded polynomial $q$. For the construction of certified everlasting FE, we introduce and construct certified everlasting versions of secret-key encryption, public-key encryption, receiver non-committing encryption, and a garbling scheme, which are of independent interest.
Giuseppe D'Alconzo
ePrint ReportAlessandro Barenghi, Jean-Francois Biasse, Edoardo Persichetti, Paolo Santini
ePrint ReportEdoardo Persichetti, Tovohery Randrianarisoa
ePrint ReportNicolai Müller, Amir Moradi
ePrint ReportAndre Esser, Sergi Ramos-Calderer, Emanuele Bellini, José Ignacio Latorre, Marc Manzano
ePrint ReportIn this work we overcome this issue by presenting the first hybrid ISD algorithms that allow to tailor the required qubits to any available amount while still providing quantum speedups of the form $T^\delta$, $0.5<\delta <1$, where $T$ is the running time of the purely classical procedure. Interestingly, when constraining the width of the circuit instead of its depth we are able to overcome previous optimality results on constraint quantum search.
Further we give an implementation of the fully-fledged quantum ISD procedure and the classical co-processor using the quantum simulation library Qibo and SageMath.
Sengim Karayalcin, Stjepan Picek
ePrint ReportThis work explores how residual neural networks (ResNets) perform in side-channel analysis and how to construct deeper ResNets capable of working with larger input sizes and requiring minimal tuning. The resulting architectures obtained by following our guidelines are significantly deeper than commonly seen in side-channel analysis, require minimal hyperparameter tuning for specific datasets, and offer competitive performance with state-of-the-art methods across several datasets. Additionally, the results indicate that ResNets work especially well when the number of profiling traces and features in a trace is large.
Hiroaki Anada, Masayuki Fukumitsu, Shingo Hasegawa
ePrint ReportZhaokang Lu, Jianzhu Lu
ePrint ReportDouglas W. Jones, Sunoo Park, Ronald L. Rivest, Adam Sealfon
ePrint ReportWe present three rescan audit protocols and analyze their statistical guarantees. We first present a simple scheme illustrating our basic idea in a simplified two-candidate setting. We then extend this scheme to allow (1) more than two candidates; (2) processing of ballots in batches; and (3) tolerating imperfect scanners, as long as scanning errors are too infrequent to affect the election outcome. Finally, we propose and discuss an alternate scheme that reduces the trust assumptions placed on the shuffling mechanism at the expense of adding an additional scan. Our proposals require manual handling or inspection of 10–100 ballots per batch in a variety of settings, in contrast to existing techniques that require hand inspecting many more ballots in close elections. Unlike prior techniques that depend on the *relative* margin of victory, our protocols are to our knowledge the first to depend on the *absolute* margin, and give meaningful guarantees even for extremely close elections: e.g., absolute margins of tens or hundreds of votes.
Matilda Backendal, Miro Haller, Kenneth G. Paterson
ePrint ReportWe provide a detailed analysis of MEGA’s use of cryptography in such a malicious server setting. We present five distinct attacks against MEGA, which together allow for a full compromise of the confidentiality of user files. Additionally, the integrity of user data is damaged to the extent that an attacker can insert malicious files of their choice which pass all authenticity checks of the client. We built proof-of-concept versions of all the attacks. Four of the five attacks are eminently practical. They have all been responsibly disclosed to MEGA and remediation is underway.
Taken together, our attacks highlight significant shortcomings in MEGA’s cryptographic architecture. We present immediately deployable countermeasures, as well as longer-term recommendations. We also provide a broader discussion of the challenges of cryptographic deployment at massive scale under strong threat models.
Oguzhan Ersoy, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Stefanie Roos
ePrint ReportWe introduce Bailout, the first protocol that allows intermediary parties in a multi-hop payment to unlock their coins before the payment completes by re-routing the payment over an alternative path. We achieve this by creating a circular payment route starting from the intermediary party in the opposite direction of the original payment. Once the circular payment is locked, both payments are canceled for the intermediary party, which frees the coins of the corresponding channels. This way, we create an alternative route for the ongoing multi-hop payment without involving the sender or receiver. The parties on the alternative path are incentivized to participate through fees.
We prove the security of our protocol in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Furthermore, we evaluate the utility of our protocol using a real-world Lightning Network snapshot. Bailouts may fail due to insufficient balance in alternative paths used for re-routing. We find that attempts of a node to bailout typically succeed with a probability of more than 94% if at least one alternative path exists.
Jim Posen, Assimakis A. Kattis
ePrint ReportJunhao Huang, Jipeng Zhang, Haosong Zhao, Zhe Liu, Ray C. C. Cheung, Çetin Kaya Koç, Donglong Chen
ePrint ReportAndrea Caforio, Daniel Collins, Subhadeep Banik, Francesco Regazzoni
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we fill this gap regarding efficient field arithmetic in bit- serial circuits, and propose a lightweight circuit for GIFT-COFB that occupies less than 1500 GE, making it the to-date most area-efficient implementation of this construction. In a second step, we demonstrate how the additional operations in the mode can be executed concurrently with GIFT itself so that the total latency is significantly reduced whilst incurring only a modest area increase. Finally, we propose a first-order threshold implementation of GIFT-COFB, which we experimentally verify resists first-order side-channel analysis.
Harishma Boyapally, Sikhar Patranabis, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
ePrint Report24 July 2022
Kolkata, India, 11 December - 14 December 2022
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 1 September 2022
Notification: 15 October 2022
TU Darmstadt
Job PostingTopics of particular interest include (but are not limited to):
- Leakage/tamper resilient cryptography
- Cryptography for blockchains and cryptocurrencies
- Multiparty computation & threshold cryptography
- Completed Master's degree (or equivalent) with excellent grades in computer science, mathematics or a similar area.
- Strong mathematical and/or algorithmic/theoretical CS background
- Good knowledge of cryptography. Knowledge in concepts of provable security is a plus.
- Fluent written and verbal communication skills in English
Review of applications starts immediately until the position is filled. For further information please visit: https://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/cac/cac/index.en.jsp
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Sebastian Faust (office.cac@cysec.de)