IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
09 September 2022
Francesco D'Amato, Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
Tokyo, Japan, 26 March -
Submission deadline: 19 November 2022
Notification: 25 January 2023
Garching bei München, Germany, 3 April - 4 April 2023
Submission deadline: 28 November 2022
Notification: 23 January 2023
Passau, Germany, 6 October - 7 October 2022
Submission deadline: 12 September 2022
Notification: 13 September 2022
The Department of Mathematical Sciences at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
The position is funded by the Norwegian Research Council in the project: “OffPAD - Optimizing balance between high security and usability. An innovative approach to endpoint security”.
The NIST Post Quantum Cryptography Standardization is expected to end in 2024, and post-quantum cryptography will be required to secure all sensitive information in the years to come shortly after, e.g., in protocols such as TLS, SSH, FIDO and other systems. Additionally, NIST have announced a new call for quantum secure digital signature algorithms.
The goal of this project is to conduct research on post-quantum authentication protocols and improve upon the frameworks used today when it comes to long-term security.
The postdoc will be part of the NTNU Applied Cryptology Lab, a multidisciplinary research group consisting of members from the Department of Mathematical Sciences and the Department of Information Security and Communication Technology.
A list of possible, but not limited, research topics for the postdoctoral position are:
Your main supervisor will be Associate Professor Tjerand Silde at the Department of Information Security and Communication Technology.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Tjerand Silde (tjerand.silde@ntnu.no)
More information: https://www.jobbnorge.no/en/available-jobs/job/231938/postdoctoral-fellow-in-cryptography-focusing-on-post-quantum-authentication-protocols
Giesecke+Devrient GmbH, Munich, Germany
Giesecke+Devrient is looking for a Cryptography Engineer (m/f/d) for its Cryptology department at its Munich Headquarters as soon as possible
Job Description:
- Secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms and security relevant OS components for smart cards in assembler
- Optimization regarding run time and memory consumption
- Design and implementation of countermeasures to defend against hardware related attacks against smart cards
- Analysis of the results of side-channel attacks and derivation of effective countermeasures
- Background in mathematics, computer science or electronic engineering
- Ideally PhD in cryptography or 3+ years experience in cryptography or related area
- Programming skills in assembler for embedded microcontrollers
- Ideally experience in embedded security and side-channel-attacks
- High level of responsibility and exciting projects
- Working in an international security technology company
- Very flexible working hours and home office possibilities
- Wide range of training and further education opportunities
- Attractive family benefits such as a summer holiday camp for children
- Other benefits such as an own sports club and a canteen subsidized by the employer
https://careers.gi-de.com/job/Munich-Kryptologen-%28mfd%29-81677/723297801/
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Dr. Harald Vater (Harald.Vater (at) gi-de.com)
Sovereign Systems, Santa Monica/Remote
We’re a small team with a big mission and we’re looking for our Founding Cryptographic Software Engineer. Sovereign Systems was founded on the premise that personal data is valuable, and so are privacy and security. Historically, this premise has represented a paradox, as users and organizations have been forced to trade one for the other. Sovereign Systems is providing a solution to this paradox.
This is an opportunity to get in on the ground floor and shape the technical vision and strategy. You’ll work directly alongside the CEO and Chief Data Scientist with the support of an all-star team of A-list and highly active advisors. You’ll start by doing, rolling your sleeves up, and cranking out code. As we grow, you’ll help to build our technical team and collaborate with key stakeholders on the processes and frameworks that will allow the company to run both joyfully and efficiently.
In this role, you will have the opportunity to:
- You will have the chance to craft solutions and develop software for millions of users around the world.
- You'll be part of a company whose commitment to user privacy is at the heart of everything.
- You'll be surrounded by the most creative, passionate, and talented engineers in the industry, constantly being challenged to go beyond the norm to find new, innovative ways of solving problems and to make software safer, easier, and more fun to use.
Key qualifications :
- Passion for creating effective and pragmatic cryptographic schemes.
- MS/Ph.D. in Computer Science or CSE or equivalent experience. 5+ years building cloud-based and distributed systems.
- Understanding of fundamental cryptographic algorithms and the underlying mathematics, such as finite field arithmetic.
- Experience implementing privacy-preserving cryptographic primitives and protocols like fully homomorphic and oblivious encryption, and garbled circuits, and using libraries such as Zama, Microsoft SEAL, HELayers.
- Experience implementing high-performance cryptographic protocols in languages like Rust, Java, Go, Python, or C/C++.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Jackie Peters
Cybersecurity Group, TU Delft, The Netherlands
For PhD: candidates are required to hold a MSc in math, computer science or related subject (preferably with some related backgrounds on cryptography). Further, they should provide sufficient English skills, e.g., International English test certificate.
For Post-doc: candidates must hold a PhD in mathematics or computer science with expertise on cryptography, and they are expected to have great backgrounds on UC or lattice-base crypto, and/or cryptography in general. Candidates must have a strong track record, academic writing and communication ability.
All the positions may have flexible starting date. Please prepare a detailed resume (including a list of publications if have), bachelor and MSc transcripts (for the PhD position), 1 page motivation letter, International English certificate (if have), and two references (names and contact emails).
Please contact shihui.fu@tudelft.nl for further questions.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Dr. S. Fu (shihui.fu@tudelft.nl)
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
More information: https://vacatures.uva.nl/UvA/job/PhD-Position-in-Energy-and-Security-of-Machine-Learning-Applications-in-the-Cloud-to-Edge-Continuum/745019702/
Closing date for applications:
Contact: dr. Ana Oprescu (a.m.oprescu at uva.nl)
More information: https://vacatures.uva.nl/UvA/job/PhD-Position-in-Energy-and-Security-of-Machine-Learning-Applications-in-the-Cloud-to-Edge-Continuum/745019702/
07 September 2022
Giuseppe D'Alconzo, Andrea Gangemi
Bin Hu, Zongyang Zhang, Han Chen, You Zhou, Huazu Jiang, Jianwei Liu
Shweta Agrawal, Rishab Goyal, Junichi Tomida
Stronger Security: In the typical formulation of MIFE security, an attacker is allowed to either corrupt all or none of the users who can encrypt the data. In this work, we study MIFE security in a stronger and more natural model where we allow an attacker to corrupt any subset of the users, instead of only permitting all-or-nothing corruption. We formalize the model by providing each user a unique encryption key, and letting the attacker corrupt all non-trivial subsets of the encryption keys, while still maintaining the MIFE security for ciphertexts generated using honest keys. We construct a secure MIFE system for quadratic functions in this fine-grained corruption model from bilinear maps. Our construction departs significantly from the existing MIFE schemes as we need to tackle a more general class of attackers.
Broader Functionality: The notion of multi-client functional encryption, MCFE, is a useful extension of MIFE. In MCFE, each encryptor can additionally tag each ciphertext with appropriate metadata such that ciphertexts with only matching metadata can be decrypted together. In more detail, each ciphertext is now annotated with a unique label such that ciphertexts encrypted for different slots can now only be combined together during decryption as long as the associated labels are an exact match for all individual ciphertexts. In this work, we upgrade our MIFE scheme to also support ciphertext labelling. While the functionality of our scheme matches that of MCFE for quadratic functions, our security guarantee falls short of the general corruption model studied for MCFE. In our model, all encryptors share a secret key, therefore this yields a secret-key version of quadratic MCFE, which we denote by SK-MCFE. We leave the problem of proving security in the general corruption model as an important open problem.
Youngjin Bae, Jung Hee Cheon, Wonhee Cho, Jaehyung Kim, Taekyung Kim
In this paper, we propose a new bootstrapping algorithm of the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme to use a known bootstrapping algorithm repeatedly, so called { Meta-BTS}. By repeating the original bootstrapping operation twice, one can obtain another bootstrapping with its precision essentially doubled; it can be generalized to be $k$-fold bootstrapping operations for some $k>1$ while the ciphertext size is large enough. Our algorithm overcomes the precision limitation given by the rescale operation.
Wenshuo Guo, Fang-Wei Fu
06 September 2022
Christopher Battarbee, Delaram Kahrobaei, Ludovic Perret, Siamak F. Shahandashti
Thomas Pornin
Yuanyuan Zhou, Joop van de Pol, Yu Yu, François-Xavier Standaert
Motivated by the above, we extend the PKE attack of May et al. to CRT-RSA with additive exponent blinding. While admitting $r_pe\in(0,N^{\frac{1}{4}})$, our extended PKE works ideally when $r_pe \approx N^{\frac{1}{12}}$, in which case the entire private key can be recovered using only $\frac{1}{3}$ known MSBs or LSBs of the blinded CRT exponents $d^{\prime}_p$ and $d^{\prime}_q$. Our extended PKE follows their novel two-step approach to first compute the key-dependent constant $k^{\prime}$ ($ed^{\prime}_p = 1 + k^{\prime}(p-1)$, $ed^{\prime}_q = 1 + l^{\prime}(q-1)$), and then to factor $N$ by computing the root of a univariate polynomial modulo $k^{\prime}p$. We extend their approach as follows. For the MSB case, we propose two options for the first step of the attack, either by obtaining a single estimate $k^{\prime}l^{\prime}$ and calculating $k^{\prime}$ via factoring, or by obtaining multiple estimates $k^{\prime}l^{\prime}_1,\ldots,k^{\prime}l^{\prime}_z$ and calculating $k^{\prime}$ probabilistically via GCD.
For the LSB case, we extend their approach by constructing a different univariate polynomial in the second step of the LSB attack. A formal analysis shows that our LSB attack runs in polynomial time under the standard Coppersmith-type assumption, while our MSB attack either runs in sub-exponential time with a reduced input size (the problem is reduced to factor a number of size $e^2r_pr_q\approx N^{\frac{1}{6}}$) or in probabilistic polynomial time under a novel heuristic assumption. Under the settings of the most common key sizes (1024-bit, 2048-bit, and 3072-bit) and blinding factor lengths (32-bit, 64-bit, and 128-bit), our experiments verify the validity of the Coppersmith-type assumption and our own assumption, as well as the feasibility of the factoring step.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first PKE on CRT-RSA with experimentally verified effectiveness against 128-bit unknown exponent blinding factors. We also demonstrate an application of the proposed PKE attack using real partial side-channel key leakage targeting a Montgomery Ladder exponentiation CRT implementation.