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21 February 2023
Yong Liu, Zejun Xiang, Siwei Chen, Shasha Zhang, Xiangyong Zeng
The Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) is a common method of searching for impossible differentials (IDs). However, the optimality of the distinguisher should be confirmed by an exhaustive search of all input and output differences, which is clearly computationally infeasible due to the huge search space.
In this paper, we propose a new technique that uses two-dimensional binary variables to model the input and output differences and characterize contradictions with constraints. In our model, the existence of IDs can be directly obtained by checking whether the model has a solution. In addition, our tool can also detect any contradictions between input and output differences by changing the position of the contradictions. Our method is confirmed by applying it to several block ciphers, and our results show that we can find 6-, 13-, and 12-round IDs for Midori-64, CRAFT, and SKINNY-64 within a few seconds, respectively. Moreover, by carefully analyzing the key schedule of Midori-64, we propose an equivalent key transform technique and construct a complete MILP model for an 11-round impossible differential attack (IDA) on Midori-64 to search for the minimum number of keys to be guessed. Based on our automatic technique, we present a new 11-round IDA on Midori-64, where 23 nibbles of keys need to be guessed, which reduces the time complexity compared to previous work. The time and data complexity of our attack are $2^{116.59}$ and $2^{60}$, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the best IDA on Midori-64 at present.
In this paper, we propose a new technique that uses two-dimensional binary variables to model the input and output differences and characterize contradictions with constraints. In our model, the existence of IDs can be directly obtained by checking whether the model has a solution. In addition, our tool can also detect any contradictions between input and output differences by changing the position of the contradictions. Our method is confirmed by applying it to several block ciphers, and our results show that we can find 6-, 13-, and 12-round IDs for Midori-64, CRAFT, and SKINNY-64 within a few seconds, respectively. Moreover, by carefully analyzing the key schedule of Midori-64, we propose an equivalent key transform technique and construct a complete MILP model for an 11-round impossible differential attack (IDA) on Midori-64 to search for the minimum number of keys to be guessed. Based on our automatic technique, we present a new 11-round IDA on Midori-64, where 23 nibbles of keys need to be guessed, which reduces the time complexity compared to previous work. The time and data complexity of our attack are $2^{116.59}$ and $2^{60}$, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the best IDA on Midori-64 at present.
Chun Guo, Lei Wang, Dongdai Lin
Virtually all modern blockciphers are iterated. In this paper, we ask: to construct a secure iterated blockcipher "non-trivially", how many calls to random functions and permutations are necessary?
When security means indistinguishability from a random permutation, optimality is achieved by the Even-Mansour scheme using 1 call to a public permutation. We seek for the arguably strongest security indifferentiability from an ideal cipher, a notion introduced by Maurer et al. (TCC 2004) and popularized by Coron et al. (JoC, 2014).
We provide the first generic negative result/lower bounds: when the key is not too short, no iterated blockcipher making 3 calls is (statistically) indifferentiable. This proves optimality for a 4-call positive result of Guo et al. (Eprint 2016). Furthermore, using 1 or 2 calls, even indifferentiable iterated blockciphers with polynomial keyspace are impossible.
To prove this, we develop an abstraction of idealized iterated blockciphers and establish various basic properties, and apply Extremal Graph Theory results to prove the existence of certain (generalized) non-random properties such as the boomerang and yoyo.
When security means indistinguishability from a random permutation, optimality is achieved by the Even-Mansour scheme using 1 call to a public permutation. We seek for the arguably strongest security indifferentiability from an ideal cipher, a notion introduced by Maurer et al. (TCC 2004) and popularized by Coron et al. (JoC, 2014).
We provide the first generic negative result/lower bounds: when the key is not too short, no iterated blockcipher making 3 calls is (statistically) indifferentiable. This proves optimality for a 4-call positive result of Guo et al. (Eprint 2016). Furthermore, using 1 or 2 calls, even indifferentiable iterated blockciphers with polynomial keyspace are impossible.
To prove this, we develop an abstraction of idealized iterated blockciphers and establish various basic properties, and apply Extremal Graph Theory results to prove the existence of certain (generalized) non-random properties such as the boomerang and yoyo.
20 February 2023
Andrea Basso
An oblivious pseudorandom function, or OPRF, is an important primitive that is used to build many advanced cryptographic protocols. Despite its relevance, very few post-quantum solutions exist.
In this work, we propose a novel OPRF protocol that is post-quantum, verifiable, round-optimal, and moderately compact. Our protocol is based on a previous SIDH-based construction by Boneh, Kogan, and Woo, which was later shown to be insecure due to an attack on its one-more unpredictability. We first propose an efficient countermeasure against this attack by redefining the PRF function to use irrational isogenies. This prevents a malicious user from independently evaluating the PRF. The SIDH-based construction by Boneh, Kogan, and Woo is also vulnerable to the recent attacks on SIDH. We thus demonstrate how to efficiently incorporate the countermeasures against such attacks to obtain a secure OPRF protocol. To achieve this, we also propose the first proof of isogeny knowledge that is compatible with masked torsion points, which may be of independent interest. Lastly, we design a novel non-interactive proof of knowledge of parallel isogenies, which reduces the number of communication rounds of the OPRF to the theoretically-optimal two. Putting everything together, we obtain the most compact post-quantum verifiable OPRF protocol.
In this work, we propose a novel OPRF protocol that is post-quantum, verifiable, round-optimal, and moderately compact. Our protocol is based on a previous SIDH-based construction by Boneh, Kogan, and Woo, which was later shown to be insecure due to an attack on its one-more unpredictability. We first propose an efficient countermeasure against this attack by redefining the PRF function to use irrational isogenies. This prevents a malicious user from independently evaluating the PRF. The SIDH-based construction by Boneh, Kogan, and Woo is also vulnerable to the recent attacks on SIDH. We thus demonstrate how to efficiently incorporate the countermeasures against such attacks to obtain a secure OPRF protocol. To achieve this, we also propose the first proof of isogeny knowledge that is compatible with masked torsion points, which may be of independent interest. Lastly, we design a novel non-interactive proof of knowledge of parallel isogenies, which reduces the number of communication rounds of the OPRF to the theoretically-optimal two. Putting everything together, we obtain the most compact post-quantum verifiable OPRF protocol.
Shiduo Zhang, Xiuhan Lin, Yang Yu, Weijia Wang
Falcon is one of the three post-quantum signature schemes selected for standardization by NIST. Due to its low bandwidth and high efficiency, Falcon is seen as an attractive option for quantum-safe embedded systems. In this work, we study Falcon's side-channel resistance by analysing its Gaussian samplers. Our results are mainly twofold.
The first result is an improved key recovery exploiting the leakage within the base sampler investigated by Guerreau et al. (CHES 2022). Instead of resorting to the fourth moment as in former parallelepiped-learning attacks, we work with the second order statistics covariance and use its spectral decomposition to recover the secret information. Our approach substantially reduces the requirement for measurements and computation resources: $220\,000$ traces is sufficient to recover the secret key of Falcon 512 within half an hour with a probability of $\approx 25\%$. As a comparison, even with $10^6$ traces, the former attack still needs about 1000 hours CPU time of lattice reduction for a full key recovery. In addition, our approach is robust to inaccurate leakage classification, which is another advantage over parallelepiped-learning attacks.
Our second result is a practical power analysis targeting the integer Gaussian sampler of Falcon. The analysis relies on the leakage of random sign flip within the integer Gaussian sampling. This leakage was exposed in 2018 by Kim and Hong, but it is not considered in Falcon's implementation and unexploited for side channel analysis until now. We identify the leakage within the reference implementation of Falcon on an ARM Cortex-M4 STM32F407IGT6 microprocessor. We also show that this single bit of leakage is in effect enough for practical key recovery: with $170\,000$ traces one can fully recover the key of Falcon-512 within half an hour. Furthermore, combining the sign leakage and the aforementioned leakage, one can recover the key with only $45\,000$ signature measurements in a short time.
As a by-product, we also extend our power analysis to Mitaka which is a recent variant of Falcon. The same leakages exist within the integer Gaussian samplers of Mitaka, and they can also be used to mount key recovery attacks. Nevertheless, the key recovery in Mitaka requires much more traces than it does in Falcon, due to their different lattice Gaussian samplers.
The first result is an improved key recovery exploiting the leakage within the base sampler investigated by Guerreau et al. (CHES 2022). Instead of resorting to the fourth moment as in former parallelepiped-learning attacks, we work with the second order statistics covariance and use its spectral decomposition to recover the secret information. Our approach substantially reduces the requirement for measurements and computation resources: $220\,000$ traces is sufficient to recover the secret key of Falcon 512 within half an hour with a probability of $\approx 25\%$. As a comparison, even with $10^6$ traces, the former attack still needs about 1000 hours CPU time of lattice reduction for a full key recovery. In addition, our approach is robust to inaccurate leakage classification, which is another advantage over parallelepiped-learning attacks.
Our second result is a practical power analysis targeting the integer Gaussian sampler of Falcon. The analysis relies on the leakage of random sign flip within the integer Gaussian sampling. This leakage was exposed in 2018 by Kim and Hong, but it is not considered in Falcon's implementation and unexploited for side channel analysis until now. We identify the leakage within the reference implementation of Falcon on an ARM Cortex-M4 STM32F407IGT6 microprocessor. We also show that this single bit of leakage is in effect enough for practical key recovery: with $170\,000$ traces one can fully recover the key of Falcon-512 within half an hour. Furthermore, combining the sign leakage and the aforementioned leakage, one can recover the key with only $45\,000$ signature measurements in a short time.
As a by-product, we also extend our power analysis to Mitaka which is a recent variant of Falcon. The same leakages exist within the integer Gaussian samplers of Mitaka, and they can also be used to mount key recovery attacks. Nevertheless, the key recovery in Mitaka requires much more traces than it does in Falcon, due to their different lattice Gaussian samplers.
Chris Peikert, Jiayu Xu
Verifiable random functions (VRFs) are essentially pseudorandom
functions for which selected outputs can be proved correct and unique,
without compromising the security of other outputs. VRFs have numerous
applications across cryptography, and in particular they have recently
been used to implement committee selection in the Algorand protocol.
Elliptic Curve VRF (ECVRF) is an elegant construction, originally due to Papadopoulos et al., that is now under consideration by the Internet Research Task Force. Prior work proved that ECVRF possesses the main desired security properties of a VRF, under suitable assumptions. However, several recent versions of ECVRF include changes that make some of these proofs inapplicable. Moreover, the prior analysis holds only for *classical* attackers, in the random-oracle model (ROM); it says nothing about whether any of the desired properties hold against *quantum* attacks, in the quantumly accessible ROM. We note that certain important properties of ECVRF, like uniqueness, do *not* rely on assumptions that are known to be broken by quantum computers, so it is plausible that these properties could hold even in the quantum setting.
This work provides a multi-faceted security analysis of recent versions of ECVRF, in both the classical and quantum settings. First, we motivate and formally define new security properties for VRFs, like non-malleability and binding, and prove that recent versions of ECVRF satisfy them (under standard assumptions). Second, we identify a subtle obstruction in proving that recent versions of ECVRF have *uniqueness* via prior indifferentiability definitions and theorems, even in the classical setting. Third, we fill this gap by defining a stronger notion called *relative indifferentiability*, and extend prior work to show that a standard domain extender used in ECVRF satisfies this notion, in both the classical and quantum settings. This final contribution is of independent interest and we believe it should be applicable elsewhere.
Elliptic Curve VRF (ECVRF) is an elegant construction, originally due to Papadopoulos et al., that is now under consideration by the Internet Research Task Force. Prior work proved that ECVRF possesses the main desired security properties of a VRF, under suitable assumptions. However, several recent versions of ECVRF include changes that make some of these proofs inapplicable. Moreover, the prior analysis holds only for *classical* attackers, in the random-oracle model (ROM); it says nothing about whether any of the desired properties hold against *quantum* attacks, in the quantumly accessible ROM. We note that certain important properties of ECVRF, like uniqueness, do *not* rely on assumptions that are known to be broken by quantum computers, so it is plausible that these properties could hold even in the quantum setting.
This work provides a multi-faceted security analysis of recent versions of ECVRF, in both the classical and quantum settings. First, we motivate and formally define new security properties for VRFs, like non-malleability and binding, and prove that recent versions of ECVRF satisfy them (under standard assumptions). Second, we identify a subtle obstruction in proving that recent versions of ECVRF have *uniqueness* via prior indifferentiability definitions and theorems, even in the classical setting. Third, we fill this gap by defining a stronger notion called *relative indifferentiability*, and extend prior work to show that a standard domain extender used in ECVRF satisfies this notion, in both the classical and quantum settings. This final contribution is of independent interest and we believe it should be applicable elsewhere.
Samed Düzlü, Juliane Krämer, Thomas Pöppelmann, Patrick Struck
In this work we present a lightweight lattice-based identification protocol based on the CPA-secured public key encryption scheme Kyber. It is designed as a replacement for existing classical ECC- or RSA-based identification protocols in IoT, smart card applications, or for device authentication. The proposed protocol is simple, efficient, and implementations are supposed to be easy to harden against side-channel attacks. Compared to standard constructions for identification protocols based on lattice-based KEMs, our construction achieves this by avoiding the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform and its impact on implementation security.
Moreover, contrary to prior lattice-based identification protocols or standard constructions using signatures, our work does not require rejection sampling and can use more efficient parameters than signature schemes. We provide a generic construction from CPA-secured public key encryption schemes to identification protocols and give a security proof of the protocol in the ROM. Moreover, we instantiate the generic construction with Kyber, for which we use the proposed parameter sets for NIST security levels I, III, and V. To show that the protocol is suitable for constrained devices, we implemented one selected parameter set on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. As the protocol is based on existing algorithms for Kyber, we make use of existing SW components (e.g., fast NTT implementations) for our implementation.
Kevin Choi, Arasu Arun, Nirvan Tyagi, Joseph Bonneau
We introduce Bicorn, an optimistically efficient distributed randomness protocol with strong robustness under a dishonest majority. Bicorn is a "commit-reveal-recover" protocol. Each participant commits to a random value, which are combined to produce a random output. If any participants fail to open their commitment, recovery is possible via a single time-lock puzzle which can be solved by any party. In the optimistic case, Bicorn is a simple and efficient two-round protocol with no time-lock puzzle. In either case, Bicorn supports open, flexible participation, requires only a public bulletin board and no group-specific setup or PKI, and is guaranteed to produce random output assuming any single participant is honest. All communication and computation costs are (at most) linear in the number of participants with low concrete overhead.
Julia Hesse, Stanislaw Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk, Christopher Wood
OPAQUE is an Asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocol being standardized by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) as a more secure alternative to the traditional ``password-over-TLS'' mechanism prevalent in current practice. OPAQUE defends against a variety of vulnerabilities of password-over-TLS by dispensing with reliance on PKI and TLS security, and ensuring that the password is never visible to servers or anyone other than the client machine where the password is entered. In order to facilitate the use of OPAQUE in practice, integration of OPAQUE with TLS is needed. The main proposal for standardizing such integration uses the Exported Authenticators (TLS-EA) mechanism of TLS 1.3 that supports post-handshake authentication and allows for a smooth composition with OPAQUE. We refer to this composition as TLS-OPAQUE and present a detailed security analysis for it in the Universal Composability (UC) framework.
Our treatment is general and includes the formalization of components that are needed in the analysis of TLS-OPAQUE but are of wider applicability as they are used in many protocols in practice. Specifically, we provide formalizations in the UC model of the notions of post-handshake authentication and channel binding. The latter, in particular, has been hard to implement securely in practice, resulting in multiple protocol failures, including major attacks against prior versions of TLS. Ours is the first treatment of these notions in a computational model with composability guarantees.
We complement the theoretical work with a detailed discussion of practical considerations for the use and deployment of TLS-OPAQUE in real-world settings and applications.
Our treatment is general and includes the formalization of components that are needed in the analysis of TLS-OPAQUE but are of wider applicability as they are used in many protocols in practice. Specifically, we provide formalizations in the UC model of the notions of post-handshake authentication and channel binding. The latter, in particular, has been hard to implement securely in practice, resulting in multiple protocol failures, including major attacks against prior versions of TLS. Ours is the first treatment of these notions in a computational model with composability guarantees.
We complement the theoretical work with a detailed discussion of practical considerations for the use and deployment of TLS-OPAQUE in real-world settings and applications.
Knud Ahrens
In the isogeny-based track of post-quantum cryptography the signature scheme SQISign relies on primes $p$ such that $p\pm1$ is smooth. In 2021 a new approach to find those numbers was discovered using solutions to the Prouhet-Tarry-Escott (PTE) problem. With these solutions one can sieve for smooth integers $A$ and $B$ with a difference of $|A-B|=C$ fixed by the solution. Then some $2A/C$ and $2B/C$ are smooth integers hopefully enclosing a prime. They took many different PTE solutions and combined them into a tree to process them more efficiently. But for bigger numbers there are fewer promising PTE solutions so their advantage over the naive approach (checking a single solution at a time) fades.
For a single PTE solution the search can be optimised for the corresponding $C$ and allows to only sieve those integers that are divisible by $C$. In this work we investigate such optimisations and show a significant speed-up compared to the naive approach.
Nathalie Lang, Stefan Lucks
We study the post-quantum security of authenticated encryption (AE)schemes, designed with classical security in the mind. Under superposition attacks, many CBC-MAC variants have been broken, and AE modes employing those variants, such as EAX and GCM, thus fail at authenticity. As we show, the same modes are IND-qCPA insecure, i.e., fail to provide privacy under superposition attacks. However, a constrained version of GCM is IND-qCPA secure, and a nonce-based variant of the CBC-MAC is secure under superposition queries. Further, the combination of classical authenticity and classical chosen-plaintext privacy thwarts attacks with superposition chosen-ciphertext and classical chosen-plaintext queries -a security notion that we refer to as IND-qdCCA. And nonce-based key derivation allows to generically turn an IND-qdCCA secure scheme into an IND-qCCA secure scheme.
Charlotte Lefevre
The sponge construction is a popular method for hashing. Quickly after its introduction, the sponge was proven to be tightly indifferentiable from a random oracle up to $ \approx 2^{c/2}$ queries, where $c$ is the capacity. However, this bound is not tight when the number of message blocks absorbed is restricted to $\ell <\lceil \frac{c}{2(b-c)}\rceil + 1$ (but still an arbitrary number of blocks can be squeezed). In this work, we show that this restriction leads to indifferentiability from a random oracle up to $\approx \min \left\{2^{b/2}, \max\left\{2^{c/2}, 2^{b- \ell \times (b-c)} \right\}\right\}$ queries, where $b>c$ is the permutation size. Depending on the parameters chosen, this result allows to have enhanced security or to absorb at a larger rate for applications that require a fixed-length input hash function.
Yashvanth Kondi, Claudio Orlandi, Lawrence Roy
Schnorr signatures are a popular choice due to their simplicity, provable security, and linear structure that enables relatively easy threshold signing protocols. The deterministic variant of Schnorr (where the nonce is derived in a stateless manner using a PRF from the message and a long term secret) is widely used in practice since it mitigates the threats of a faulty or poor randomness generator (which in Schnorr leads to catastrophic breaches of security). Unfortunately, threshold protocols for the deterministic variant of Schnorr have so far been quite inefficient, as they make non black-box use of the PRF involved in the nonce generation.
In this paper, we present the first two-party threshold protocol for Schnorr signatures, where signing is stateless and deterministic, and only makes black-box use of the underlying cryptographic algorithms.
We present a protocol from general assumptions which achieves covert security, and a protocol that achieves full active security under standard factoring-like assumptions. Our protocols make crucial use of recent advances within the field of pseudorandom correlation functions (PCFs). As an additional benefit, only two-rounds are needed to perform distributed signing in our protocol, connecting our work to a recent line of research on the trade-offs between round complexity and cryptographic assumptions for threshold Schnorr signatures.
In this paper, we present the first two-party threshold protocol for Schnorr signatures, where signing is stateless and deterministic, and only makes black-box use of the underlying cryptographic algorithms.
We present a protocol from general assumptions which achieves covert security, and a protocol that achieves full active security under standard factoring-like assumptions. Our protocols make crucial use of recent advances within the field of pseudorandom correlation functions (PCFs). As an additional benefit, only two-rounds are needed to perform distributed signing in our protocol, connecting our work to a recent line of research on the trade-offs between round complexity and cryptographic assumptions for threshold Schnorr signatures.
José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Jean-Christophe Léchenet, Tiago Oliveira, Hugo Pacheco, Miguel Quaresma, Peter Schwabe, Antoine Séré, Pier ...
In this paper we present the first formally verified implementations of Kyber and, to the best of our knowledge, the first such implementations of any post-quantum cryptosystem. We give a (readable) formal specification of Kyber in the EasyCrypt proof assistant, which is syntactically very close to the pseudocode description of the scheme as given in the most recent version of the NIST submission. We present high-assurance open-source implementations of Kyber written in the Jasmin language, along with machine-checked proofs that they are functionally correct with respect to the EasyCrypt specification. We describe a number of improvements to the EasyCrypt and Jasmin frameworks that were needed for this implementation and verification effort, and we present detailed benchmarks of our implementations, showing that our code achieves performance close to existing hand-optimized implementations in C and assembly.
Joakim Brorsson, Martin Gunnarsson
Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) schemes are efficient protocols for distributed data analytics. In a PSA scheme, a set of data producers can encrypt data for a central party so that it learns the sum of all (encrypted) values, but nothing about each individual value. Due to this ability to efficiently enable central data analytics without leaking individual user data, PSA schemes are often used for IoT data analytics scenarios where privacy is important, such as smart metering. However, all known PSA schemes require a trusted party for key generation, which is undesirable from a privacy standpoint. Further, even though the main benefit of PSA schemes over alternative technologies such as Functional Encryption is that they are efficient enough to run on IoT devices, there exists no evaluation of the efficiency of existing PSA schemes on realistic IoT devices.
In this paper, we address both these issues. We first evaluate the efficiency of the state of the art PSA schemes on realistic IoT devices. We then propose, implement and evaluate a DIstributed setup PSA scheme for Use in Constrained Environments (DIPSAUCE). DIPSAUCE is the first PSA scheme that does not rely on a trusted party. Our security and efficiency evaluation shows that it is indeed possible to construct an efficient PSA scheme without a trusted central party. Surprisingly, our results also show that, a side effect, our method for distributing the setup procedure also makes the encryption procedure more efficient than the state of the art PSA schemes which rely on trusted parties.
In this paper, we address both these issues. We first evaluate the efficiency of the state of the art PSA schemes on realistic IoT devices. We then propose, implement and evaluate a DIstributed setup PSA scheme for Use in Constrained Environments (DIPSAUCE). DIPSAUCE is the first PSA scheme that does not rely on a trusted party. Our security and efficiency evaluation shows that it is indeed possible to construct an efficient PSA scheme without a trusted central party. Surprisingly, our results also show that, a side effect, our method for distributing the setup procedure also makes the encryption procedure more efficient than the state of the art PSA schemes which rely on trusted parties.
Suvradip Chakraborty, Dennis Hofheinz, Ueli Maurer, Guilherme Rito
Deniable Authentication is a highly desirable property for secure messaging protocols: it allows a sender Alice to authentically transmit messages to a designated receiver Bob in such a way that only Bob gets convinced that Alice indeed sent these messages. In particular, it guarantees that even if Bob tries to convince a (non-designated) party Judy that Alice sent some message, and even if Bob gives Judy his own secret key, Judy will not be convinced: as far as Judy knows, Bob could be making it all up!
In this paper we study Deniable Authentication in the setting where Judy can additionally obtain Alice's secret key. Informally, we want that knowledge of Alice's secret key does not help Judy in learning whether Alice sent any messages, even if Bob does not have Alice's secret key and even if Bob cooperates with Judy by giving her his own secret key. This stronger flavor of Deniable Authentication was not considered before and is particularly relevant for Off-The-Record Group Messaging as it gives users stronger deniability guarantees. Our main contribution is a scalable ``MDRS-PKE'' (Multi-Designated Receiver Signed Public Key Encryption) scheme---a technical formalization of Deniable Authentication that is particularly useful for secure messaging for its confidentiality guarantees---that provides this stronger deniability guarantee. At its core lie new MDVS (Multi-Designated Verifier Signature) and PKEBC (Public Key Encryption for Broadcast) scheme constructions: our MDVS is not only secure with respect to the new deniability notions, but it is also the first to be tightly secure under standard assumptions; our PKEBC---which is also of independent interest---is the first with ciphertext sizes and encryption and decryption times that grow only linearly in the number of receivers. This is a significant improvement upon the construction given by Maurer et al. (EUROCRYPT '22), where ciphertext sizes and encryption and decryption times are quadratic in the number of receivers.
In this paper we study Deniable Authentication in the setting where Judy can additionally obtain Alice's secret key. Informally, we want that knowledge of Alice's secret key does not help Judy in learning whether Alice sent any messages, even if Bob does not have Alice's secret key and even if Bob cooperates with Judy by giving her his own secret key. This stronger flavor of Deniable Authentication was not considered before and is particularly relevant for Off-The-Record Group Messaging as it gives users stronger deniability guarantees. Our main contribution is a scalable ``MDRS-PKE'' (Multi-Designated Receiver Signed Public Key Encryption) scheme---a technical formalization of Deniable Authentication that is particularly useful for secure messaging for its confidentiality guarantees---that provides this stronger deniability guarantee. At its core lie new MDVS (Multi-Designated Verifier Signature) and PKEBC (Public Key Encryption for Broadcast) scheme constructions: our MDVS is not only secure with respect to the new deniability notions, but it is also the first to be tightly secure under standard assumptions; our PKEBC---which is also of independent interest---is the first with ciphertext sizes and encryption and decryption times that grow only linearly in the number of receivers. This is a significant improvement upon the construction given by Maurer et al. (EUROCRYPT '22), where ciphertext sizes and encryption and decryption times are quadratic in the number of receivers.
Madhav Nair, Rajat Sadhukhan, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) based systems to automatically generate hardware systems has gained an impulse that aims to accelerate the hardware design cycle with no human intervention. Recently, the striking AI-based system ChatGPT from OpenAI has achieved a momentous headline and has gone viral within a short span of time since its launch. This chatbot has the capability to interactively communicate with the designers through a prompt to generate software and hardware code, write logic designs, and synthesize designs for implementation on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC). However, an unvetted ChatGPT prompt by a designer with an aim to generate hardware code may lead to security vulnerabilities in the generated code. In this work, we systematically investigate the necessary strategies to be adopted by a designer to enable ChatGPT to recommend secure hardware code generation. To perform this analysis, we prompt ChatGPT to generate code scenarios listed in Common Vulnerability Enumerations (CWEs) under the hardware design (CWE-1194) view from MITRE. We first demonstrate how a ChatGPT generates insecure code given the diversity of prompts. Finally, we propose techniques to be adopted by a designer to generate secure hardware code. In total, we create secure hardware code for $10$ noteworthy CWEs under hardware design view listed on MITRE site.
Gyeongju Song, Kyungbae Jang, Hwajeong Seo
To build an efficient security system in the post-quantum era, it is possible to find the minimum security parameters for defending a fault-tolerant quantum computer by estimating the quantum resources required for an quantum attack. In a fault-tolerant quantum computer, errors must reach an acceptable level through error detection and error correction, which additionally uses quantum resources. As the depth of the quantum circuit increases, the computation time per qubit increases, and errors in quantum computers increases. Therefore, in terms of errors in quantum circuits, it is appropriate to reduce the depth by increasing the number of qubits. This paper proposes an low-depth quantum circuit implementations of SHA3 for fault-tolerant quantum computers to reduce errors. The proposed SHA3 quantum circuit is implemented in the direction of reducing the quantum circuit depth through a trade-off between the number of qubits, quantum gate, and quantum depth in each function. Compared to the-state-of-art works, proposed method decreased T-depth and Full-depth by 30.3\% and 80.05\%, respectively. We expect that this work will contribute to the establishment of minimum security parameters for SHA3 in the quantum era.
Reo Eriguchi, Kaoru Kurosawa, Koji Nuida
A $b$-error-correcting $m$-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol enables a client to privately retrieve a data item of a database from $m$ servers even in the presence of $b$ malicious servers. List-decodable PIR is a generalization of error-correcting PIR to achieve a smaller number of servers at the cost of giving up unique decoding. Previous constructions of error-correcting and list-decodable PIR have exponential computational complexity in $m$ or cannot achieve sub-polynomial communication complexity $n^{o(1)}$, where $n$ is the database size. Recently, Zhang, Wang and Wang (ASIACCS 2022) presented a non-explicit construction of error-correcting PIR with $n^{o(1)}$ communication and polynomial computational overhead in $m$. However, their protocol requires the number of servers to be larger than the minimum one $m=2b+1$ and they left it as an open problem to reduce it. As for list-decodable PIR, there is no construction with $n^{o(1)}$ communication.
In this paper, we propose new generic constructions of error-correcting and list-decodable PIR from any one-round regular PIR. Our constructions increase computational complexity only by a polynomial factor in $m$ while the previous generic constructions incur $\binom{m}{b}$ multiplicative overheads. Instantiated with the best-known protocols, our construction provides for the first time an explicit error-correcting PIR protocol with $n^{o(1)}$ communication, which reduces the number of servers of the protocol by Zhang, Wang and Wang (ASIACCS 2022). For sufficiently large $b$, we also show the existence of $b$-error-correcting PIR with $n^{o(1)}$ communication achieving the minimum number of servers, by allowing for two rounds of interaction. Furthermore, we show an extension to list-decodable PIR and obtain for the first time a protocol with $n^{o(1)}$ communication. Other instantiations improve the communication complexity of the state-of-the-art $t$-private protocols in which $t$ servers may collude. Along the way, we formalize the notion of \textit{locally surjective map families}, which generalize perfect hash families and may be of independent interest.
In this paper, we propose new generic constructions of error-correcting and list-decodable PIR from any one-round regular PIR. Our constructions increase computational complexity only by a polynomial factor in $m$ while the previous generic constructions incur $\binom{m}{b}$ multiplicative overheads. Instantiated with the best-known protocols, our construction provides for the first time an explicit error-correcting PIR protocol with $n^{o(1)}$ communication, which reduces the number of servers of the protocol by Zhang, Wang and Wang (ASIACCS 2022). For sufficiently large $b$, we also show the existence of $b$-error-correcting PIR with $n^{o(1)}$ communication achieving the minimum number of servers, by allowing for two rounds of interaction. Furthermore, we show an extension to list-decodable PIR and obtain for the first time a protocol with $n^{o(1)}$ communication. Other instantiations improve the communication complexity of the state-of-the-art $t$-private protocols in which $t$ servers may collude. Along the way, we formalize the notion of \textit{locally surjective map families}, which generalize perfect hash families and may be of independent interest.
Lichao Wu, Guilherme Perin, Stjepan Picek
Deep learning-based profiling side-channel analysis is widely adopted in academia and industry thanks to the ability to reveal secrets protected with countermeasures. To leverage its capability, the adversary needs to have access to a clone of an attack device to obtain the profiling measurements. Moreover, the adversary needs to know secret information to label these measurements. Non-profiling attacks avoid those constraints by not relying on secret information to label data but rather by trying all key guesses and taking the most successful one. Deep learning approaches also form the basis of several non-profiling attacks. Unfortunately, such approaches suffer from high computational complexity and low generality when applied in practice.
This paper proposes a novel non-profiling deep learning-based side-channel analysis technique. Our approach relies on the fact that there is (commonly) a bijective relationship between known information, such as plaintext and ciphertext, and secret information. We use this fact to label the leakage measurement with the known information and then mount attacks. Our results show that we reach at least $3\times$ better attack performance with negligible computational effort than existing non-profiling methods. Moreover, our non-profiling approach rivals the performance of state-of-the-art deep learning-based profiling attacks.
This paper proposes a novel non-profiling deep learning-based side-channel analysis technique. Our approach relies on the fact that there is (commonly) a bijective relationship between known information, such as plaintext and ciphertext, and secret information. We use this fact to label the leakage measurement with the known information and then mount attacks. Our results show that we reach at least $3\times$ better attack performance with negligible computational effort than existing non-profiling methods. Moreover, our non-profiling approach rivals the performance of state-of-the-art deep learning-based profiling attacks.
Sai Deng, Bo Du
We present zkTree, a general description of a tree constructed by recursively verifying children's zero-knowledge (zk) proofs (ZKPs) in a parent ZKP node with the ability to fetch a membership proof of user supplied zk proofs. We also describe a construction pipeline such that zkTree can be built and verified on chain with constant gas cost and low data processing pipeline cost. zkTree makes ZKP on-chain verification cost effective by aggregating a large number of user proofs into one root proof. Once the root proof is verified, all user proofs can be verified by providing merkle membership proofs.
zkTree can be implemented using Plonky2, the combination of PLONK and FRI, and its root proof is recursively proved in Groth16.
We also demonstrate how to utilize zkTree to verify the default signature scheme of Tendermint consensus by verifying ed25519 signatures in a single proof in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).