IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
01 April 2023
Joshua Gancher, Sydney Gibson, Pratap Singh, Samvid Dharanikota, Bryan Parno
ePrint ReportWe propose a new approach based on a novel use of information flow and refinement types for sound cryptographic proofs. Our framework, Owl, allows type-based modular descriptions of security protocols, wherein disjoint subprotocols can be programmed and automatically proved secure separately.
We give a formal security proof for Owl via a core language which supports standard symmetric and asymmetric primitives, Diffie-Hellman operations, and hashing via random oracles. We also implement a type checker for Owl along with a prototype extraction mechanism to Rust, and evaluate it on 14 case studies, including (simplified forms of) SSH key exchange and Kerberos.
Roi Bar-Zur, Danielle Dori, Sharon Vardi, Ittay Eyal, Aviv Tamar
ePrint ReportToi Tomita, Junji Shikata
ePrint ReportHugo Beguinet, Céline Chevalier, David Pointcheval, Thomas Ricosset, Mélissa Rossi
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we propose two new generic and natural constructions proven in the Universal Composability (UC) model to transform, in a black-box manner, a KEM into a PAKE with very limited performance overhead: one or two extra symmetric encryptions. Behind the simplicity of the designs, establishing security proofs in the UC model is actually non-trivial and requires some additional properties on the underlying KEM like fuzziness and anonymity. Luckily, post-quantum KEM protocols often enjoy these two extra properties. As a demonstration, we prove that it is possible to apply our transformations to Crystals-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum KEM that will soon be standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
In a nutshell, this work opens up the possibility to securely include post-quantum cryptography in PAKE-based real-world protocols.
Martin R. Albrecht, Lenka Mareková, Kenneth G. Paterson, Igors Stepanovs
ePrint ReportTuğberk KOCATEKİN, Cafer ÇALIŞKAN
ePrint ReportDeevashwer Rathee, Anwesh Bhattacharya, Divya Gupta, Rahul Sharma, Dawn Song
ePrint Report31 March 2023
Department of Information Security and Communication Technology at NTNU in Trondheim, Norway
Job PostingThe NIST Post Quantum Cryptography Standardization is expected to end in 2024, and post-quantum cryptography will be required to secure all sensitive information in the years to come shortly after, e.g., in protocols such as TLS, SSH, FIDO and other systems. Additionally, NIST has announced a new call for quantum secure digital signature algorithms.
This project aims to conduct research on lightweight post-quantum protocols and primitives, including symmetric key primitives, and improve upon the frameworks used today regarding communication size, computation complexity and secure and efficient implementation of long-term security cryptographic primitives.
The postdoc will be part of the NTNU Applied Cryptology Lab, a multidisciplinary research group consisting of members from the Department of Information Security and Communication Technology and the Department of Mathematical Sciences at NTNU.
A list of possible, but not limited to, post-quantum cryptography research topics for the postdoctoral position are:
- Usability of lightweight primitives and protocols
- Low communication key exchange and encryption
- Lightweight ZKP and digital signatures
- Efficient implementations in HW and SW
- Side-channel security analysis
Your hosts will be Professor Danilo Gligoroski, Professor Stig Frode Mjølsnes and/or Associate Professor Tjerand Silde at the Department of Information Security and Communication Technology.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Tjerand Silde (email: tjerand.silde@ntnu.no)
More information: https://www.jobbnorge.no/en/available-jobs/job/243244/postdoctoral-fellow-in-lightweight-post-quantum-cryptography
TU Darmstadt
Job PostingYour profile:
- Completed Master's degree (or equivalent) with excellent grades in computer science, mathematics, or a similar area.
- Strong mathematical and/or algorithmic/theoretical CS background
- Good knowledge in one of the topics mentioned above is a plus.
- Fluent in English
TU Darmstadt is a top research university for IT Security, Cryptography, and Computer Science in Europe. We offer an excellent working environment in the heart of the Frankfurt Metropolitan Area, which is internationally well-known for its high quality of life. The review of applications starts immediately until the position is filled.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Sebastian Faust (sebastian.faust@tu-darmstadt.de)
Sarvar Patel, Joon Young Seo, Kevin Yeo
ePrint ReportDeepraj Soni, Negar Neda, Naifeng Zhang, Benedict Reynwar, Homer Gamil, Benjamin Heyman, Mohammed Nabeel Thari Moopan, Ahmad Al Badawi, Yuriy Polyakov, Kellie Canida, Massoud Pedram, Michail Mani ...
ePrint ReportJohannes Blömer, Jan Bobolz, Laurens Porzenheim
ePrint ReportWe present the first generic construction of a reputation system from basic building blocks, namely digital signatures, encryption schemes, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and linking indistinguishable tags. We then show the security of the reputation system in a strong security model. Among others, we instantiate the generic construction with building blocks based on lattice problems, leading to the first module lattice-based reputation system.
Benjamin Y Chan, Rafael Pass
ePrint ReportWe next present a new and simple consensus protocol in the partially synchronous setting, tolerating $f \leq n/3$ byzantine faults; in our eyes, this protocol is essentially as simple to describe as the simplest known protocols, but it also enjoys an even simpler security proof, while matching and, even improving, the efficiency of the state-of-the-art (according to our theoretical framework).
As with the state-of-the-art protocols, our protocol assumes a (bare) PKI, a digital signature scheme, collision-resistant hash functions, and a random leader election oracle, which may be instantiated with a random oracle (or a CRS).
Sebastian Hasler, Toomas Krips, Ralf Küsters, Pascal Reisert, Marc Rivinius
ePrint ReportDebranjan Pal, Upasana Mandal, Abhijit Das, Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury
ePrint ReportQinglan Zhao, Mengran Li, Zhixiong Chen, Baodong Qin, Dong Zheng
ePrint ReportMoshe Avital, Itamar Levi
ePrint ReportNir Bitansky, Omer Paneth, Dana Shamir, Tomer Solomon
ePrint ReportPratish Datta, Tapas Pal
ePrint ReportNick Frymann, Daniel Gardham, Mark Manulis, Hugo Nartz
ePrint ReportIn this paper we define a generic approach for building ARKG schemes which can be applied to a wide range of pairing-based cryptosystems. This construction is based on a new building block which we introduce and call Asymmetric Key Generation (AKG) along with its extension $\phi$-AKG where $\phi$ is a suitable mapping for capturing different key structures and types of pairings. We show that appropriate choice of $\phi$ allows us to create a secure ARKG scheme compatible with any key pair that is secure under the Uber assumption (EUROCRYPT 2004).
To demonstrate the extensive range of our general approach, we construct ARKG schemes for a number of popular pairing-based primitives: Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (JoC 2004), Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CRYPTO 2004), Pointcheval-Sanders (CT-RSA 2016), Waters (EUROCRYPT 2005) signatures and structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (ASIACRYPT 2014). For each scheme we give an implementation and provide benchmarks that show the feasibility of our techniques.