International Association
for Cryptologic Research

The emergence of hardware trojans as significant threats in various aspects of hardware design, including Firmware, open-source IP, and PCB design, has raised serious concerns. Simultaneously, AI technologies have been employed to simplify the complexity of Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Due to the increasing risk posed by these threats, it becomes essential to test hardware by considering all possible attack vectors. This paper aims to propose a black box attack using side channel analysis with the aid of hardware trojan insertion. The objective is to emphasize the necessity of side channel-based testing to defend against such attacks. The proposed attack can be executed in FPGA, ASIC, and microcontroller designs. The paper is primarily focused on Verilog design based hardware trojan insertion, and a small example demonstration is provided to illustrate this attack. Keywords:

$\Sigma$-protocols, a class of interactive two-party protocols, which are used as a framework to instantiate many other authentication schemes, are automatically a proof of knowledge (PoK) given that they satisfy the "special-soundness" property. This fact provides a convenient method to compose $\Sigma$-protocols and PoKs for complex relations. However, composing in this manner can be error-prone. While they must satisfy special-soundness, this is unfortunately not the case for many recently proposed composed practical schemes. Here we explore two schemes: ZKAttest from Faz-Hernández et al. and the ones from Agrawal et al., and show that their $\Sigma$-protocol's suffer from several security misdesigns which invalidate their security proofs, and state a practical cheap attack on ZKAttest's implementation. By exploring and resolving their misdesigns, we propose CDLS, a sound and secure variant of their protocols.

Using secure multi-party computation (MPC) to generate noise and add this noise to a function output allows individuals to achieve formal differential privacy (DP) guarantees without needing to trust any third party or sacrifice the utility of the output. However, securely generating and adding this noise is a challenge considering real-world implementations on finite-precision computers, since many DP mechanisms guarantee privacy only when noise is sampled from continuous distributions requiring infinite precision.

We introduce efficient MPC protocols that securely realize noise sampling for several plaintext DP mechanisms that are secure against existing precision-based attacks: the discrete Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms, the snapping mechanism, and the integer-scaling Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms. Due to their inherent trade-offs, the favorable mechanism for a specific application depends on the available computation resources, type of function evaluated, and desired (epsilon,delta)-DP guarantee.

The benchmarks of our protocols implemented in the state-of-the-art MPC framework MOTION (Braun et al., TOPS'22) demonstrate highly efficient online runtimes of less than 32 ms/query and down to about 1ms/query with batching in the two-party setting. Also the respective offline phases are practical, requiring only 51 ms to 5.6 seconds/query depending on the batch size.

Over the past few years, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) emerged as a compelling alternative to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), due to its feasibility from an array of standard assumptions and its potential efficiency benefits. However, all known HSS schemes, with the exception of schemes built from FHE or indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), can only support two or four parties.

In this work, we give the first construction of a multi-party HSS scheme for a non-trivial function class, from an assumption not known to imply FHE. In particular, we construct an HSS scheme for an arbitrary number of parties with an arbitrary corruption threshold, supporting evaluations of multivariate polynomials of degree $\log / \log \log$ over arbitrary finite fields. As a consequence, we obtain a secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol for any number of parties, with (slightly) sub-linear per-party communication of roughly $O(S / \log \log S)$ bits when evaluating a layered Boolean circuit of size $S$.

Our HSS scheme relies on the Sparse Learning Parity with Noise assumption, a standard variant of LPN with a sparse public matrix that has been studied and used in prior works. Thanks to this assumption, our construction enjoys several unique benefits. In particular, it can be built on top of any linear secret sharing scheme, producing noisy output shares that can be error-corrected by the decoder. This yields HSS for low-degree polynomials with optimal download rate. Unlike prior works, our scheme also has a low computation overhead in that the per-party computation of a constant degree polynomial takes $O(M)$ work, where $M$ is the number of monomials.

We show that the key agreement scheme [Quantum Inf. Process., 20:188, 2021] is flawed. (1) It requires that the quantum channel must be intact so as to keep the transferred photon sequences complete and undamaged, even if the channel is tapped. But this is unrealistic because of quantum non-cloning theorem. (2) The user's capability is artificially assumed, who can measure a hybrid photon sequence only with $Z$-basis, unable to measure with $X$-basis. (3) It requires an authenticated classical channel for the negotiation between Alice and Server$_B$. If such a channel is available, the scheme can be greatly simplified using the mechanism in BB84 protocol.

Consider the recently introduced notion of \emph{probabilistic time-bounded Kolmogorov Complexity}, pK^t (Goldberg et al, CCC'22), and let MpK^tP denote the language of pairs (x,k) such that pK^t(x) \leq k. We show the equivalence of the following: - MpK^{poly}P is (mildly) hard-on-average w.r.t. \emph{any} samplable distribution D; - MpK^{poly}P is (mildly) hard-on-average w.r.t. the \emph{uniform} distribution; - Existence of one-way functions. As far as we know, this yields the first natural class of problems where hardness with respect to any samplable distribution is equivalent to hardness with respect to the uniform distribution.

Under standard derandomization assumptions, we can show the same result also w.r.t. the standard notion of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, K^t.

This paper presents practicable single trace attacks against the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) Key Encapsulation Mechanism. These attacks are the first Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA) against code-based cryptography. We mount SASCA based on Belief Propagation (BP) on several steps of HQC's decapsulation process. Firstly, we target the Reed-Solomon (RS) decoder involved in the HQC publicly known code. We perform simulated attacks under Hamming weight leakage model, and reach excellent accuracies (superior to $0.9$) up to a high noise level ($\sigma = 3$), thanks to a re-decoding strategy. In a real case attack scenario, on a STM32F407, this attack leads to a perfect success rate. Secondly, we conduct an analogous attack against the RS encoder used during the re-encryption step required by the Fujisaki-Okamoto-like transform. Both in simulation and practical instances, results are satisfactory and this attack represents a threat to the security of HQC. Finally, we analyze the strength of countermeasures based on masking and shuffling strategies. In line with previous SASCA literature targeting Kyber, we show that masking HQC is a limited countermeasure against BP attacks, as well as shuffling countermeasures adapted from Kyber. We evaluate the ``full shuffling'' strategy which thwarts our attack by introducing sufficient combinatorial complexity. Eventually, we highlight the difficulty of protecting the current RS encoder with a shuffling strategy. A possible countermeasure would be to consider another encoding algorithm for the scheme to support a full shuffling. Since the encoding subroutine is only a small part of the implementation, it would come at a small cost.

The Department of Mathematics within the College of Science (COS) at Florida Atlantic University invites applications for a tenure-track Assistant Professor in Cryptology.

The candidate will conduct research in cryptography/cryptanalysis. Strong candidates from all areas of cryptology are encouraged to apply. Preference will be given to candidates with several broad areas of interest including, but not limited to, symmetric and public-key cryptography, post-quantum cryptography, quantum algorithms in cryptography, mathematical cryptography, or a closely related area. The candidate should have a strong record of research accomplishments, demonstrated potential for extramural funding, and a commitment to excellence in education. FAU possesses a culture that fosters internal collaboration and innovation as well as partnerships with local, national, and international agencies, and thus candidates must display strong collaborative potential and the ability to conduct transformative externally funded research within their area of specialization.

The Department of Mathematical Sciences is a collegial and research-active department demonstrating excellence in teaching, research, and service. The department has an established national and international reputation for research innovation through our Center for Cryptology and Information Security (CCIS). FAU is also recognized as a National Center of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity for Cyber Research (CAE-R) for academic years 2012-2024. More information about the department can be found at: http://www.math.fau.edu/

Application Deadline: 2024-01-03.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Informal inquiries can be made to Shi Bai (sbai@fau.edu), formal applications must be submitted through: https://fau.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/FAU/job/Boca-Raton/Assistant-Professor--Cryptology_REQ17017

More information: https://fau.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/FAU/job/Boca-Raton/Assistant-Professor--Cryptology_REQ17017

Position Summary: We are expanding the team by recruiting talented, highly motivated senior researchers in post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and standardization. Candidates should have solid knowledge in cryptographic algorithms and security protocols, particular in PQC, a passion in researching problems with real-world potential and impact, and rich experience of standardizing cryptographic algorithms and/or security protocols in international bodies (IETF, ISO, IEEE etc). Successful candidates will join a team of cryptographic experts to conduct world-class research in applied cryptography. Duties & Responsibilities: • Formulate research problems based on real-world security requirements and independently conduct high-quality research. • Standardize cryptographic algorithms and security protocols at international bodies. • Work on intellectual property. • Develop collaborations with industry peers and academia. Desired Skills & Experience: • Hold M.Sc or Ph.D. degree in Mathematics, Cryptography, Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or similar fields. • Have 5 or more years of work experience in areas related to information security and/or applied cryptography. • Rich standardization experience in international bodies, like IETF, ISO, IEEE, ETSI. • Solid skills in at least one programming language, like C, C++, Java, Python, or shell scripts. • Excellent written and verbal communication skills in English. • Self-motivated with strong sense of responsibility. • Strong interpersonal and problem solving skills. • Solid knowledge in PQC and security protocols.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Houda Labiod (houda.labiod@huawei.com) and Dr. Guilin Wang (wang.guilin@huawei.com)

The Department of Mathematics & Statistics of the University of South Florida seeks to fill a nine-month, full-time and tenure-earning Assistant Professor position in Applied Algebra to begin August 7, 2024. A Ph.D. in Mathematics or a closely-related field is required, with preference for applications of algebra to Cryptography, Coding Theory, and Quantum Computing.

The Department is home to the USF Center for Cryptographic Research (usf-crypto.org), which is run in collaboration with the Department of Computer Science & Engineering. The Department of Mathematics & Statistics offers vertically-integrated programs in Applied Algebra at all levels: postdoctoral supervision in Applied Algebra, a graduate sequence in Applied Algebra, an undergraduate certificate in Cryptography, a Research Undergraduate Experience ( REU Site : usf-crypto.org/reu-program) program in Cryptography and Coding Theory, as well as a K–12 summer program in cybersecurity (codebreakhers.org).

Applications from individuals who are ABD will be accepted, but the degree must be conferred by the start date of the appointment. We seek applicants with a strong record of research productivity, the potential to secure external funding, and experience teaching university undergraduates. Special consideration will be given to candidates who possess experience beyond the Ph.D. level and the potential for excellence in teaching at the graduate level. Applications from women and minorities are encouraged. Salary is negotiable. To receive consideration, applications must be submitted no later than November 15, 2023.

To apply, please follow the instructions on the Mathjob advertisement for this position: https://www.mathjobs.org/jobs/list/23078

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Jean-François Biasse

More information: https://www.mathjobs.org/jobs/list/23078

We propose a new framework to homomorphically evaluate Boolean functions using the Torus Fully Homomorphic Encryption (TFHE) scheme. Compared to previous approaches focusing on Boolean gates, our technique can evaluate more complex Boolean functions with several inputs using a single bootstrapping. This allows us to greatly reduce the number of bootstrapping operations necessary to evaluate a Boolean circuit compared to previous works, thus achieving significant improvements in terms of performances. We define theoretically our approach which consists in adding an intermediate homomorphic layer between the plain Boolean space and the ciphertext space. This layer relies on so-called $p$-encodings embedding bits into $\mathbb{Z}_p$. We analyze the properties of these encodings to enable the evaluation of a given Boolean function and provides a deterministic algorithm (as well as an efficient heuristic) to find valid sets of encodings for a given function. We also propose a method to decompose any Boolean circuit into Boolean functions which are efficiently evaluable using our approach. We apply our framework to homomorphically evaluate various cryptographic primitives, and in particular the AES cipher. Our implementation results show significant improvements compared to the state of the art.

Blind signatures allow the issuing of signatures on messages chosen by the user so that they ensure $\mathit{blindness}$ of the message against the signer. Moreover, a malicious user cannot output $\ell+1$ signatures while only finishing $\ell$ signing sessions. This notion, called $\mathit{one}$-$\mathit{more}$ unforgeability, comes in two flavors supporting either $\mathit{sequential}$ or $\mathit{concurrent}$ sessions.

In this paper, we investigate the security of a class of blind signatures constructed from Sigma-protocols with small challenge space $\mathcal{C}_{\Sigma}$ (i.e., polynomial in the security parameter), using $k$ repetitions of the protocol to decrease the chances of a cheating prover. This class of schemes includes, among others, the Schnorr blind signature scheme with bit challenges and the recently proposed isogeny-based scheme CSI-Otter (Crypto'23), as well as potential blind signatures designed from assumptions with the well-known Sigma-protocol for the graph-isomorphism problem (e.g., Lattice Isomorphism Problem).

For this class of blind signatures, we show a $\mathit{polynomial}$-$\mathit{time}$ attack that breaks one-more unforgeability for any $\ell \geq k$ concurrent sessions in time $O(k \cdot |\mathcal{C}_{\Sigma}|)$. Contrary to the ROS attack, ours is generic and does not require any particular algebraic structure. We also propose a computational trade-off, where, for any $t \leq k$, our attack works for $\ell = \frac{k}{t}$ in time $O(\frac{k}{t} \cdot |\mathcal{C}_{\Sigma}|^t)$.

The consequences of our attack are as follows. Schemes in the investigated class of blind signatures should not be used concurrently without applying specific transformations to boost the security to support more signing sessions. Moreover, for the parameters proposed for CSI-Otter ($k=128$ and $|\mathcal{C}_{\Sigma}|=2$), the scheme becomes forgeable after 128 concurrent signing sessions for the basic attack and with only eight sessions in our optimized attack. We also show that for those parameters, it is even possible to compute two signatures in around 10 minutes with just one signing session using the computation power of the Bitcoin network. Thus, we show that, for sequential security, the parameter $k$ must be at least doubled in the security parameter for any of the investigated schemes.

Last year CRYSTALS-Kyber was chosen by NIST as a new, post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanism to be standardized. This makes it important to assess the resistance of CRYSTALS-Kyber implementations to physical attacks. Pure side-channel attacks on post-quantum cryptographic algorithms have already been well-explored. In this paper, we present an attack on a masked and shuffled software implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber that combines fault injection with side-channel analysis. First, a voltage fault injection is performed to bypass the shuffling. We found settings that consistently glitch the desired instructions without crashing the device. After the successful fault injection, a deep learning-assisted profiled power analysis based on the Hamming weight leakage model is used to recover the message (shared key). We propose a partial key enumeration method that allows us to significantly increase the success rate of message recovery (from 0.122 without enumeration to 0.887 with 32 enumerated bits).

We present new lower and upper bounds on the number of communication rounds required for asynchronous Crusader Agreement (CA) and Binding Crusader Agreement (BCA), two primitives that are used for solving binary consensus. We show results for the information theoretic and authenticated settings. In doing so, we present a generic model for proving round complexity lower bounds in the asynchronous setting.

In some settings, our attempts to prove lower bounds on round complexity fail. Instead, we show new, tight, rather surprising round complexity upper bounds for Byzantine fault tolerant BCA with and without a PKI setup.

This paper centers around a simple yet crucial question for everyday users: How should one choose their delegated validators within proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols, particularly in the context of Ethereum 2.0? This has been a long-overlooked gap, as existing studies have primarily focused on inter-committee (validator set) behaviors and activities, while neglecting the dynamic formation of committees, especially for individual stakeholders seeking reliable validators. Our study bridges this gap by diving into the delegation process (normal users delegate their small-value tokens to delegatees who later act as validators) before entering an actual consensus phase.

We propose a Bayesian model to quantify normal users' trust in delegatees, which we further incorporate into a game-theoretical model to simulate users' reactions against a set of critical factors identified through extensive research (including 10+ staking service providers as well as 30+ PoS blockchains). Our results reveal that users tend to choose their delegatees and utilize their tokens by carefully weighing the delegation cost, the behaviors of other users, and the reputation of delegatees, ultimately reaching a Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, the collective trend significantly increases the likelihood of token concentration on a small number of delegatees.

The study of garbling arithmetic circuits is initiated by Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [FOCS'11], which can be naturally extended to mixed circuits. The basis of mixed circuits includes Boolean operations, arithmetic operations over a large ring and bit-decomposition that converts an arithmetic value to its bit representation. We construct efficient garbling schemes for mixed circuits.

In the random oracle model, we construct two garbling schemes: $\bullet$ The first scheme targets mixed circuits modulo some $N\approx 2^b$. Addition gates are free. Each multiplication gate costs $O(\lambda \cdot b^{1.5})$ communication. Each bit-decomposition costs $O(\lambda \cdot b^{2} / \log{b})$. $\bullet$ The second scheme targets mixed circuit modulo some $N\approx 2^b$. Each addition gate and multiplication gate costs $O(\lambda \cdot b \cdot \log b / \log \log b)$. Every bit-decomposition costs $O(\lambda \cdot b^2 / \log b)$. Our schemes improve on the work of Ball, Malkin, and Rosulek [CCS'16] in the same model.

Additionally relying on the DCR assumption, we construct in the programmable random oracle model a more efficient garbling scheme targeting mixed circuits over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^b}$, where addition gates are free, and each multiplication or bit-decomposition gate costs $O(\lambda_{\text{DCR}} \cdot b)$ communication. We improve on the recent work of Ball, Li, Lin, and Liu [Eurocrypt'23] which also relies on the DCR assumption.

Suppose a user wants to broadcast an encrypted message to $K$ recipients. With public-key encryption, the sender would construct $K$ different ciphertexts, one for each recipient. The size of the broadcasted message then scales linearly with $K$. A natural question is whether the sender can encrypt the message with a ciphertext whose size scales sublinearly with the number of recipients.

Broadcast encryption offers one solution to this problem, but at the cost of introducing a central trusted party who issues keys to different users (and correspondingly, has the ability to decrypt all ciphertexts). Recently, several works have introduced notions like distributed broadcast encryption and flexible broadcast encryption, which combine the decentralized, trustless model of traditional public-key encryption with the efficiency guarantees of broadcast encryption. In the specific case of a flexible broadcast encryption scheme, users generate their own public/private keys and can then post their public key in any public-key directory. Subsequently, a user can encrypt to an arbitrary set of user public keys with a ciphertext whose size scales polylogarithmically with the number of public keys in the broadcast set. A distributed broadcast encryption scheme is a more restrictive primitive where each public key is also associated with an index, and one can only encrypt to a set of public keys corresponding to different indices.

In this work, we introduce a generic compiler that takes any distributed broadcast encryption scheme and produces a flexible broadcast encryption scheme. Moreover, whereas existing concretely-efficient constructions of distributed broadcast encryption have public keys whose size scales with the maximum number of users in the system, our resulting flexible broadcast encryption scheme has the appealing property that the size of each public key scales with the size of the maximum broadcast set.

We provide an implementation of the flexible broadcast encryption scheme obtained by applying our compiler to the distributed broadcast encryption scheme of Kolonelos, Malavolta, and Wee (ASIACRYPT 2023). With our scheme, a sender can encrypt a 128-bit symmetric key to a set of over 1000 recipients (from a directory with a million users) with a 2 KB ciphertext. This is 16$\times$ smaller than separately encrypting to each user using standard ElGamal encryption. The cost is that the user public keys in flexible broadcast encryption are much larger (50 KB) compared to standard ElGamal public keys (32 bytes). Compared to the similarly-instantiated distributed broadcast encryption scheme, we achieve a 32$\times$ reduction in the user's public key size (50 KB vs. 1.6 MB) without changing the ciphertext size. Thus, flexible broadcast encryption provides an efficient way to encrypt messages to large groups of users at the cost of larger individual public keys (relative to vanilla public-key encryption).

Time-Lock Puzzles (TLPs) are a powerful tool for concealing messages until a predetermined point in time. When solving multiple puzzles, it becomes crucial to have the ability to "batch-solve" puzzles, i.e., simultaneously open multiple puzzles while working to solve a "single one". Unfortunately, all previously known TLP constructions equipped for batch solving rely on super-polynomially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, making them impractical.

In light of this challenge, we present novel TLP constructions that offer batch-solving capabilities without using heavy cryptographic hammers. Our proposed schemes are simple and concretely efficient, and they can be constructed based on well-established cryptographic assumptions based on pairings or learning with errors (LWE). Along the way, we introduce new constructions of puncturable key-homomorphic PRFs both in the lattice and in the pairing setting, which may be of independent interest. Our analysis leverages an interesting connection to Hall's marriage theorem and incorporates an optimized combinatorial approach, enhancing the practicality and feasibility of our TLP schemes.

Furthermore, we introduce the concept of "rogue-puzzle attacks", where maliciously crafted puzzle instances may disrupt the batch-solving process of honest puzzles. We then propose constructions of concrete and efficient TLPs designed to prevent such attacks.

Cryptographers rely on visualization to effectively communicate cryptographic constructions with one another. Visual frameworks such as constructive cryptography (TOSCA 2011), the joy of cryptography (online book) and state-separating proofs (SSPs, Asiacrypt 2018) are useful to communicate not only the construction, but also their proof visually by representing a cryptographic system as graphs.

One SSP core feature is the re-use of code, e.g., a package of code might be used in a game and be part of the description of a reduction as well. Thus, in a proof, the linear structure of a paper either requires the reader to turn pages to find definitions or writers to re-state them, thereby interrupting the visual flow of the game hops that are defined by a sequence of graphs.

We present an interactive proof viewer for state-separating proofs (SSPs) which addresses the limitations and perform three case studies: The equivalence between simulation-based and game-based notions for symmetric encryption, the security proof of the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction of a pseudorandom function from a pseudorandom generator, and Brzuska's and Oechsner's SSP formalization of the proof for Yao's garbling scheme.

In this paper, we explore the cost of vectorization for polynomial multiplication with coefficients in Zq for an odd prime q. If there is a large power of two dividing q−1, we can apply radix-2 Cooley–Tukey fast Fourier transforms to multiply polynomials in Zq[x]. The radix-2 nature admits efficient vectorization. Conversely, if 2 is the only power of two dividing q−1, we can apply Schönhage’s and Nussbaumer’s FFTs to craft radix-2 roots of unity, but these double the number of coefficients. We show how to avoid this doubling while maintaining vectorization friendliness with Good–Thomas, Rader’s, and Bruun’s FFTs. In particular, we exploit the existing Fermat-prime factor of q − 1 for Rader’s FFT and the power-of-two factor of q + 1 for Bruun’s FFT. We implement these ideas for the NTRU Prime instances ntrulpr761/sntrup761, operating over the coefficient ring Z4591 on a Cortex-A72. sntrup761 is currently used in OpenSSH 9.0 by default. Our polynomial multiplication outperforms the state-of-the-art vector-optimized implementation by 6.1×. For ntrulpr761, our keygen, encap, and decap are 2.98×, 2.79×, and 3.07× faster than the state-of-the-art vector-optimized implementation. For sntrup761, we outperform the reference implementation significantly.