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24 October 2023
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
A PhD scholarship is available for a strong candidate interested in doing a PhD in privacy-preserving machine learning at Monash University, a world top 50 university located in Melbourne (frequently ranked among the 10 most liveable cities in the world).
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Rafael Dowsley Email: rafael.dowsley@monash.edu
23 October 2023
Orestis Chardouvelis, Vipul Goyal, Aayush Jain, Jiahui Liu
In this work, we consider the problem of secure key leasing, also known as revocable cryptography (Agarwal et. al. Eurocrypt' 23, Ananth et. al. TCC' 23), as a strengthened security notion of its predecessor put forward in Ananth et. al. Eurocrypt' 21. This problem aims to leverage unclonable nature of quantum information to allow a lessor to lease a quantum key with reusability for evaluating a classical functionality. Later, the lessor can request the lessee to provably delete the key and then the lessee will be completely deprived of the capability to evaluate the function.
In this work, we construct a secure key leasing scheme to lease a decryption key of a (classical) public-key, homomorphic encryption scheme from standard lattice assumptions. Our encryption scheme is exactly identical to the (primal) version of Gentry-Sahai-Waters homomorphic encryption scheme with a carefully chosen public key matrix. We achieve strong form of security where:
* The entire protocol (including key generation and verification of deletion) uses merely classical communication between a classical leaser (client) and a quantum lessee (server).
* Assuming standard assumptions, our security definition ensures that every computationally bounded quantum adversary could only simultaneously provide a valid classical deletion certificate and yet distinguish ciphertexts with at most negligible probability.
Our security relies on the hardness of learning with errors assumption. Our scheme is the first scheme to be based on a standard assumption and satisfying the two properties mentioned above.
The main technical novelty in our work is the design of an FHE scheme that enables us to apply elegant analyses done in the context of classically verifiable proofs of quantumness from LWE (Brakerski et. al.(FOCS'18, JACM'21) and its parallel amplified version in Radian et. al.(AFT'21)) to the setting of secure leasing. This connection leads to a modular construction and arguably simpler proofs than previously known. An important technical component we prove along the way is an amplified quantum search-to-decision reduction: we design an extractor that uses a quantum distinguisher (who has an internal quantum state) for decisional LWE, to extract secrets with success probability amplified to almost one. This technique might be of independent interest.
* The entire protocol (including key generation and verification of deletion) uses merely classical communication between a classical leaser (client) and a quantum lessee (server).
* Assuming standard assumptions, our security definition ensures that every computationally bounded quantum adversary could only simultaneously provide a valid classical deletion certificate and yet distinguish ciphertexts with at most negligible probability.
Our security relies on the hardness of learning with errors assumption. Our scheme is the first scheme to be based on a standard assumption and satisfying the two properties mentioned above.
The main technical novelty in our work is the design of an FHE scheme that enables us to apply elegant analyses done in the context of classically verifiable proofs of quantumness from LWE (Brakerski et. al.(FOCS'18, JACM'21) and its parallel amplified version in Radian et. al.(AFT'21)) to the setting of secure leasing. This connection leads to a modular construction and arguably simpler proofs than previously known. An important technical component we prove along the way is an amplified quantum search-to-decision reduction: we design an extractor that uses a quantum distinguisher (who has an internal quantum state) for decisional LWE, to extract secrets with success probability amplified to almost one. This technique might be of independent interest.
Tingfei Feng
This paper re-analyzes the algorithm proposed by Guedes, Assis, and Lula in 2012, which they claimed that the algorithm can break Blum-Micali Pseudorandom number generator in polynomial time. We used a 5×5 transformation matrix instead of the original 2×2 transformation matrix, which can include terms that they missed in their analysis. We proved that their proposed algorithm cannot break the pseudorandom number generator, because during the amplitude amplification process, two iterations of the circuit is the same as an identity gate. To solve this problem, we proposed a corrected algorithm based on Grover’s Search Algorithm for NP-complete problems, which breaks the Blum-Micali Pseudorandom number generator in \(\mathcal{O}(n^4 2^{n/2})\). We conclude that the Blum-Micali Pseudorandom number generator is still quantum resistant. This study indicates that the discrete logarithm problem and prime factorization could still be the foundations of quantum-resistant cryptographical applications.
Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, David J. Wu
In this short note, we show that under a mild number-theoretic conjecture, recovering an integer from its Jacobi signature modulo $N = p^2q$, for primes $p$ and $q$, is as hard as factoring $N$.
Han-Ting Chen, Yi-Hua Chung, Vincent Hwang, Bo-Yin Yang
The lattice-based post-quantum cryptosystem NTRU is used by Google for protecting Google’s internal communication. In NTRU, polynomial multiplication is one of bottleneck. In this paper, we explore the interactions between polynomial multiplication, Toeplitz matrix–vector product, and vectorization with architectural insights. For a unital commutative ring $R$, a positive integer $n$, and an element $\zeta \in R$, we reveal the benefit of vector-by-scalar multiplication instructions while multiplying in $R[x] / \langle x^n - \zeta \rangle$.
We aim at designing an algorithm exploiting no algebraic and number–theoretic properties of $n$ and $\zeta$. An obvious way is to multiply in $R[x]$ and reduce modulo $x^n - \zeta$. Since the product in $R[x]$ is a polynomial of degree at most $2n − 2$, one usually chooses a polynomial modulus $g$ such that (i) $deg(g) \geq 2n − 1$, and (ii) there exists a well-studied fast polynomial multiplication algorithm f for multiplying in $R[x] / \langle g \rangle$.
We deviate from common approaches and point out a novel insight with dual modules and vector-by-scalar multiplications. Conceptually, we relate the module-theoretic dual of $R[x] / \langle x^n - \zeta \rangle$ and $R[x] / \langle g \rangle$ with Toeplitz matrix-vector products, and demonstrate the benefit of Toeplitz matrix-vector products with vector-by-scalar multiplication instructions. It greatly reduces the register pressure, and allows us to multiply with essentially no permutation instructions that are commonly used in vectorized implementation.
We implement the ideas for the NTRU parameter sets ntruhps2048677 and ntruhrss701 on a Cortex-A72 implementing the Armv8.0-A architecture with the single-instruction-multiple-data (SIMD) technology Neon. For polynomial multiplications, our implementation is 2.18× and 2.23× for ntruhps2048677 and ntruhrsss701 than the state-of-the-art optimized implementation. We also vectorize the polynomial inversions and sorting network by employing existing techniques and translating AVX2-optimized implementations into Neon. Compared to the state-of-the-art optimized implementation, our key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation for ntruhps2048677 are 7.67×, 2.48×, and 1.77× faster, respectively. For ntruhrss701, our key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation are 7.99×, 1.47×, and 1.56× faster, respectively.
Meng Hao, Weiran Liu, Liqiang Peng, Hongwei Li, Cong Zhang, Hanxiao Chen, Tianwei Zhang
Circuit-based Private Set Intersection (circuit-PSI) enables two parties, a client and a server, with their input sets $X$ and $Y$ respectively, to securely compute a function $f$ on the intersection $X \cap Y$, while keeping $X \cap Y$ secret from both parties. Although several computationally efficient circuit-PSI protocols have been proposed recently, they most focus on the balanced scenario where $|X|$ is similar to $|Y|$. However, in many realistic scenarios, a circuit-PSI protocol may be performed in the unbalanced case where $|X|$ is remarkably smaller than $|Y|$ (e.g., the client is a constrained device holding a small set, while the server is a service provider holding a large set). Directly applying existing protocols to this scenario will lead to significant efficiency issues because the communication complexity of the protocols scales at least linearly with the size of the larger set, i.e., $\max(|X|, |Y|)$.
In this work, we put forth efficient constructions for unbalanced circuit-PSI with sublinear communication complexity in the size of the larger set. The main insight is that we formalize unbalanced circuit-PSI as obliviously retrieving values corresponding to keys from a set of key-value pairs. To this end, we present a new functionality called Oblivious Key-Value Retrieval (OKVR) and design the OKVR protocol from a new notion called sparse Oblivious Key-Value Stores (sparse OKVS). We conduct extensive experiments and the results show that our constructions remarkably outperform the state-of-the-art circuit-PSI schemes (EUROCRYPT'19, PETs'22, CCS'22), i.e., $1.84 \sim 48.86 \times$ communication improvement and $1.50 \sim39.81 \times$ faster computation. Very recently, Son and Jeong (AsiaCCS'23) also present unbalanced circuit-PSI protocols, and our constructions outperform them by $1.18 \sim 15.99 \times$ and $1.22 \sim 10.44 \times$ in communication and computation overhead, respectively, depending on set sizes and network environments.
In this work, we put forth efficient constructions for unbalanced circuit-PSI with sublinear communication complexity in the size of the larger set. The main insight is that we formalize unbalanced circuit-PSI as obliviously retrieving values corresponding to keys from a set of key-value pairs. To this end, we present a new functionality called Oblivious Key-Value Retrieval (OKVR) and design the OKVR protocol from a new notion called sparse Oblivious Key-Value Stores (sparse OKVS). We conduct extensive experiments and the results show that our constructions remarkably outperform the state-of-the-art circuit-PSI schemes (EUROCRYPT'19, PETs'22, CCS'22), i.e., $1.84 \sim 48.86 \times$ communication improvement and $1.50 \sim39.81 \times$ faster computation. Very recently, Son and Jeong (AsiaCCS'23) also present unbalanced circuit-PSI protocols, and our constructions outperform them by $1.18 \sim 15.99 \times$ and $1.22 \sim 10.44 \times$ in communication and computation overhead, respectively, depending on set sizes and network environments.
Michele Orrù, Stefano Tessaro, Greg Zaverucha, Chenzhi Zhu
We consider the problem of creating, or issuing, zero-knowledge proofs obliviously. In this setting, a prover interacts with a verifier to produce a proof, known only to the verifier. The resulting proof is transferable and can be verified non-interactively by anyone. Crucially, the actual proof cannot be linked back to the interaction that produced it.
This notion generalizes common approaches to designing blind signatures, which can be seen as the special case of proving "knowledge of a signing key", and extends the seminal work of Camenisch and Stadler ('97). We propose a provably secure construction of oblivious proofs, focusing on discrete-logarithm representation equipped with AND-composition.
We also give three applications of our framework. First, we give a publicly verifiable version of the classical Diffie-Hellman based Oblivious PRF. This yields new constructions of blind signatures and publicly verifiable anonymous tokens. Second, we show how to "upgrade" keyed-verification anonymous credentials (Chase et al., CCS'14) to also be concurrently secure blind signatures on the same set of attributes. Crucially, our upgrade maintains the performance and functionality of the credential in the keyed-verification setting, we only change issuance. We observe that the existing issuer proof that the credential is well-formed may be verified by anyone; creating it with our framework makes it a blind signature, adding public verifiability to the credential system. Finally, we provide a variation of the U-Prove credential system that is provably one-more unforgeable with concurrent issuance sessions. This constitutes a fix for the attack illustrated by Benhamouda et al. (EUROCRYPT'21).
Beyond these example applications, as our results are quite general, we expect they may enable modular design of new primitives with concurrent security, a goal that has historically been challenging to achieve.
This notion generalizes common approaches to designing blind signatures, which can be seen as the special case of proving "knowledge of a signing key", and extends the seminal work of Camenisch and Stadler ('97). We propose a provably secure construction of oblivious proofs, focusing on discrete-logarithm representation equipped with AND-composition.
We also give three applications of our framework. First, we give a publicly verifiable version of the classical Diffie-Hellman based Oblivious PRF. This yields new constructions of blind signatures and publicly verifiable anonymous tokens. Second, we show how to "upgrade" keyed-verification anonymous credentials (Chase et al., CCS'14) to also be concurrently secure blind signatures on the same set of attributes. Crucially, our upgrade maintains the performance and functionality of the credential in the keyed-verification setting, we only change issuance. We observe that the existing issuer proof that the credential is well-formed may be verified by anyone; creating it with our framework makes it a blind signature, adding public verifiability to the credential system. Finally, we provide a variation of the U-Prove credential system that is provably one-more unforgeable with concurrent issuance sessions. This constitutes a fix for the attack illustrated by Benhamouda et al. (EUROCRYPT'21).
Beyond these example applications, as our results are quite general, we expect they may enable modular design of new primitives with concurrent security, a goal that has historically been challenging to achieve.
Jelle Don, Serge Fehr, Yu-Hsuan Huang, Patrick Struck
The BUFF transform is a generic transformation for digital signature schemes, with the purpose of obtaining additional security properties beyond standard unforgeability, e.g., exclusive ownership and non-resignability. In the call for additional post-quantum signatures, these were explicitly mentioned by the NIST as ``additional desirable security properties'', and some of the submissions indeed refer to the BUFF transform with the purpose of achieving them, while some other submissions follow the design of the BUFF transform without mentioning it explicitly.
In this work, we show the following negative results regarding the non-resignability property in general, and the BUFF transform in particular. In the plain model, we observe by means of a simple attack that any signature scheme for which the message has a high entropy given the signature does not satisfy the non-resignability property (while non-resignability is trivially not satisfied if the message can be efficiently computed from its signature). Given that the BUFF transform has high entropy in the message given the signature, it follows that the BUFF transform does not achieve non-resignability whenever the random oracle is instantiated with a hash function, no matter what hash function.
When considering the random oracle model (ROM), the matter becomes slightly more delicate since prior works did not rigorously define the non-resignability property in the ROM. For the natural extension of the definition to the ROM, we observe that our impossibility result still holds, despite there having been positive claims about the non-resignability of the BUFF transform in the ROM. Indeed, prior claims of the non-resignability of the BUFF transform rely on faulty argumentation.
On the positive side, we prove that a salted version of the BUFF transform satisfies a slightly weaker variant of non-resignability in the ROM, covering both classical and quantum attacks, if the entropy requirement in the (weakened) definition of non-resignability is statistical; for the computational variant, we show yet another negative result.
In this work, we show the following negative results regarding the non-resignability property in general, and the BUFF transform in particular. In the plain model, we observe by means of a simple attack that any signature scheme for which the message has a high entropy given the signature does not satisfy the non-resignability property (while non-resignability is trivially not satisfied if the message can be efficiently computed from its signature). Given that the BUFF transform has high entropy in the message given the signature, it follows that the BUFF transform does not achieve non-resignability whenever the random oracle is instantiated with a hash function, no matter what hash function.
When considering the random oracle model (ROM), the matter becomes slightly more delicate since prior works did not rigorously define the non-resignability property in the ROM. For the natural extension of the definition to the ROM, we observe that our impossibility result still holds, despite there having been positive claims about the non-resignability of the BUFF transform in the ROM. Indeed, prior claims of the non-resignability of the BUFF transform rely on faulty argumentation.
On the positive side, we prove that a salted version of the BUFF transform satisfies a slightly weaker variant of non-resignability in the ROM, covering both classical and quantum attacks, if the entropy requirement in the (weakened) definition of non-resignability is statistical; for the computational variant, we show yet another negative result.
Yang Li, Wei Wang, Dawei Zhang, Xu Han
Ring signature (RS) allows users to demonstrate to verifiers their membership within a specified group (ring) without disclosing their identities. Based on this, RS can be used as a privacy protection technology for users' identities in blockchain. However, there is currently a lack of RS schemes that are fully applicable to the blockchain applications: Firstly, users can only spend a UTXO once, and the current RS schemes are not yet perfect in a one-time manner. At the same time, the current RS schemes are not sufficiently developed in terms of regulation. Secondly, the size of the current RS is mostly linearly related to the number of ring members. When there are many members, the transaction processing speed is slow.
We propose a one-time and revocable ring signature with logarithmic size in blockchain based on the Sigma-Protocols. Our scheme compresses the RS size and enables users to sign in the blockchain transactions. The scheme allows two RS generated with the same private key for a same UTXO to be linked together. Additionally, it allows regulatory authority to recover the signer's identity at any time. A security model was presented, and its security properties, namely, unforgeability, anonymity, one-time, revocability, and non-slanderability were proven in the random oracle model.
Our scheme compresses the RS size to where is the number of ring users, enabling blockchain transactions to have better processing speeds. And it can prevent double-spending attacks in blockchain and allows regulatory authority to recover the identity of the signer.
Samuele Andreoli, Enrico Piccione, Lilya Budaghyan, Pantelimon Stănică, Svetla Nikova
The algebraic degree of a vectorial Boolean function is one of the main parameters driving the cost of its hardware implementation.
Thus, finding decompositions of functions into sequences of functions of lower algebraic degrees has been explored to reduce the cost of implementations. In this paper, we consider such decompositions of permutations over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.
We prove the existence of decompositions using quadratic and linear power permutations for all permutations when $2^n-1$ is a prime, and we prove the non-existence of such decompositions for power permutations of differential uniformity strictly lower than $16$ when $4|n$.
We also prove that any permutation admits a decomposition into quadratic power permutations and affine permutations of the form $ax+b$ if $4 \nmid n$.
Furthermore, we prove that any permutation admits a decomposition into cubic power permutations and affine permutations.
Finally, we present a decomposition of the PRESENT S-Box using the power permutation $x^7$ and affine permutations.
Zuodong Wu, Dawei Zhang, Yong Li, Xu Han
Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) is a stronger PIR protocol that ensures both client and server privacy. In many cases, the client needs authorization from the data subject before querying data. However, this also means that the server can learn the identity of the data subject. To solve such problems, we propose a new SPIR primitive, called authorized symmetric keyword information retrieval protocol (ASKPIR). Specifically, we designed an efficient DID identification algorithm based on the Pedersen Commitment, which is used to solve the identity management and privacy problems of data subject when data is shared by multiple parties in a distributed environment. Then, we present a novel authorization algorithm combining NIZK proof and DID, which can preserve client privacy. Finally, to improve the efficiency of client retrieval, our protocol constructs PSI-Payload with mqRPMT and OTE so as to support batch keyword searches. In addition, we provide a formal security analysis for the anonymity and unforgeability of the protocol and demonstrate that ASKPIR can achieve malicious security under the UC framework. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the ASKPIR protocol is more efficient than other related works and solves the problem of incompatibility between data subject authorization and client privacy.
Rei Ueno, Hiromichi Haneda, Naofumi Homma, Akiko Inoue, Kazuhiko Minematsu
This study presents an efficient persistent memory encryption mechanism, named Crystalor, which efficiently realizes a secure persistent/non-volatile memory based on an authentication tree with structural optimization, such as the split counter (SC). Crystalor can completely exploit the advantage of metadata compression techniques, whereas existing mechanisms are incompatible with such optimization. Meanwhile, Crystalor incurs almost no latency overhead under the nominal operation conditions for realizing the crash consistency/recoverability. We implement Crystalor with a state-of-the-art parallelizable authentication tree instance, namely ELM (IEEE TIFS 2022), and evaluate the effectiveness by both algorithmic analyses and system-level simulation in comparison with the existing state-of-the-art ones (e.g., SCUE in HPCA 2023). For protecting a 4 TB memory, Crystalor requires 29–62% fewer clock cycles per memory read/write operation than SCUE owing to the compatibility with the SC. In addition, Crystalor and SCUE require 312GB and 554GB memory overheads for metadata, respectively, which indicates that Crystalor achieves a reduction of memory overhead by 44%. The result of the system-level simulation using the gem5 simulator indicates that Crystalor achieves a reduction of the workload execution time by up to 11.5% from SCUE. Moreover, Crystalor can offer a lazy recovery, which makes recovery several thousand times faster than SCUE.
Zhengjun Cao, Lihua Liu
We show that the Xu et al.'s authentication and key agreement scheme [IEEE Trans. Ind. Informatics, 18(10), 7118-7127, 2022] is flawed. (1) It confused some operations for bilinear maps and presented some inconsistent computations. (2) It failed to keep
anonymity, not as claimed. The adversary can use any device's public key stored in the blockchain to test some verification equations so as to reveal the identity of a target device.
Xiuhan Lin, Moeto Suzuki, Shiduo Zhang, Thomas Espitau, Yang Yu, Mehdi Tibouchi, Masayuki Abe
The Peregrine signature scheme is one of the candidates in the ongoing Korean post-quantum cryptography competition. It is proposed as a high-speed variant of Falcon, which is a hash-and-sign signature scheme over NTRU lattices and one of the schemes selected by NIST for standardization. To this end, Peregrine replaces the lattice Gaussian sampler in the Falcon signing procedure with a new sampler based on the centered binomial distribution. While this modification offers significant advantages in terms of efficiency and implementation, it does not come with a provable guarantee that signatures do not leak information about the signing key. Unfortunately, lattice-based signature schemes in the hash-and-sign paradigm that lack such a guarantee (such as GGH, NTRUSign or DRS) have generally proved insecure.
In this paper, we show that Peregrine is no exception, by demonstrating a practical key recovery attack against it. We observe that the support of Peregrine signatures is a hidden transformation of some public distribution and still leaks information about the signing key. By adapting the parallelepiped-learning technique of Nguyen and Regev (Eurocrypt 2006), we show that the signing key can be recovered from a relatively small number of signatures. The learning technique alone yields an approximate version of the key, from which we can recover the exact key using a decoding technique due to Thomas Prest (PKC 2023).
For the reference implementation (resp. the official specification version) of Peregrine-512, we fully recover the secret key with good probability in a few hours given around 25,000 (resp. 11 million) signature samples.
In this paper, we show that Peregrine is no exception, by demonstrating a practical key recovery attack against it. We observe that the support of Peregrine signatures is a hidden transformation of some public distribution and still leaks information about the signing key. By adapting the parallelepiped-learning technique of Nguyen and Regev (Eurocrypt 2006), we show that the signing key can be recovered from a relatively small number of signatures. The learning technique alone yields an approximate version of the key, from which we can recover the exact key using a decoding technique due to Thomas Prest (PKC 2023).
For the reference implementation (resp. the official specification version) of Peregrine-512, we fully recover the secret key with good probability in a few hours given around 25,000 (resp. 11 million) signature samples.
20 October 2023
The IACR strongly condemns the atrocities perpetrated by Hamas against Israel. We are outraged and horrified by this dreadful assault on civilians: Israelis of all religions, ages, and backgrounds; tourists; and foreign workers. We stand in solidarity with the people of Israel.
Our heartfelt sympathy and support go out to our members everywhere who are affected by that attack, and to all those who are suffering its ongoing consequences.
Approved by the IACR board of directors, October 18, 2023
Prasanna Ravi, Thales Paiva, Dirmanto Jap, Jan-Pieter D'Anvers, Shivam Bhasin
In an effort to circumvent the high cost of standard countermeasures against side-channel attacks in post-quantum cryptography, some works have developed low-cost detection-based countermeasures. These countermeasures try to detect maliciously generated input ciphertexts and react to them by discarding the ciphertext or secret key. In this work, we take a look at two previously proposed low-cost countermeasures: the ciphertext sanity check and the decapsulation failure check, and demonstrate successful attacks on these schemes. We show that the first countermeasure can be broken with little to no overhead, while the second countermeasure requires a more elaborate attack strategy that relies on valid chosen ciphertexts. Thus, in this work, we propose the first chosen-ciphertext based side-channel attack that only relies on valid ciphertexts for key recovery. As part of this attack, a third contribution of our paper is an improved solver that retrieves the secret key from linear inequalities constructed using side-channel leakage from the decryption procedure. Our solver is an improvement over the state-of-the-art Belief Propagation solvers by Pessl and Prokop, and later Delvaux. Our method is simpler, easier to understand and has lower computational complexity, while needing less than half the inequalities compared to previous methods.
Thales Paiva, Prasanna Ravi, Dirmanto Jap, Shivam Bhasin
HQC is a code-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that was selected to move to the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum standardization process. While this scheme was previously targeted by side-channel assisted chosen-ciphertext attacks for key recovery, we notice that all of these attacks use malformed ciphertexts, which can be easily detected since they cause a decapsulation failure. In this case, designers may chose as a countermeasure to refresh the key whenever a failure occurs, making these previous attacks ineffective. In this work, we present the first side-channel assisted chosen-ciphertext attacks using valid ciphertexts which can be carried out in a stealthy manner for key recovery. Our attacks target side-channel leakage from two different operations within the Reed-Muller decoder used for decryption, and can recover the secret key with 100% success rate, even in the presence of errors in side-channel information. All our experiments are performed on the open-source implementation of HQC KEM taken from the pqm4 library, with our attacks validated using both the power and EM side-channel. We also demonstrate novel key recovery attacks which also work on shuffled implementations, and discuss applicability of our attack to masking countermeasures. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of a side-channel protected design for HQC KEM, and thus we believe our work stresses the need towards more research on secure and efficient masking and hiding countermeasures for HQC KEM.
Ziyu Wang, Yaoling Ding, An Wang, Yuwei Zhang, Congming Wei, Shaofei Sun, Liehuang Zhu
Power analysis of public-key algorithms is a well-known approach in the community of side-channel analysis. We usually classify operations based on the differences in power traces produced by different basic operations (such as modular exponentiation) to recover secret information like private keys. The more accurate the segmentation of power traces, the higher the efficiency of their classification. There exist two commonly used methods: one is equidistant segmentation, which requires a fixed number of basic operations and similar trace lengths for each type of operation, leading to limited application scenarios; the other is peak-based segmentation, which relies on personal experience to configure parameters, resulting in insufficient flexibility and poor universality.
In this paper, we propose an automated power trace segmentation method based on reinforcement learning algorithms, which is applicable to a wide range of common implementation of public-key algorithms. Reinforcement learning is an unsupervised machine learning technique that eliminates the need for manual label collection. For the first time, this technique is introduced into the field of side-channel analysis for power trace processing. By using prioritized experience replay optimized Deep Q-Network algorithm, we reduce the number of parameters required to achieve accurate segmentation of power traces to only one, i.e. the key length. We also employ various techniques to improve the segmentation effectiveness, such as clustering algorithm, enveloped-based feature enhancement and fine-tuning method. We validate the effectiveness of the new method in nine scenarios involving hardware and software implementations of different public-key algorithms executed on diverse platforms such as microcontrollers, SAKURA-G, and smart cards. Specifically, one of these implementations is protected by time randomization countermeasures. Experimental results show that our method has good robustness on the traces with varying segment lengths and differing peak heights. After employ the clustering algorithm, our method achieves an accuracy of over 99.6% in operations recovery. Besides, power traces collected from these devices have been uploaded as databases, which are available for researchers engaged in public-key algorithms to conduct related experiments or verify our method.
In this paper, we propose an automated power trace segmentation method based on reinforcement learning algorithms, which is applicable to a wide range of common implementation of public-key algorithms. Reinforcement learning is an unsupervised machine learning technique that eliminates the need for manual label collection. For the first time, this technique is introduced into the field of side-channel analysis for power trace processing. By using prioritized experience replay optimized Deep Q-Network algorithm, we reduce the number of parameters required to achieve accurate segmentation of power traces to only one, i.e. the key length. We also employ various techniques to improve the segmentation effectiveness, such as clustering algorithm, enveloped-based feature enhancement and fine-tuning method. We validate the effectiveness of the new method in nine scenarios involving hardware and software implementations of different public-key algorithms executed on diverse platforms such as microcontrollers, SAKURA-G, and smart cards. Specifically, one of these implementations is protected by time randomization countermeasures. Experimental results show that our method has good robustness on the traces with varying segment lengths and differing peak heights. After employ the clustering algorithm, our method achieves an accuracy of over 99.6% in operations recovery. Besides, power traces collected from these devices have been uploaded as databases, which are available for researchers engaged in public-key algorithms to conduct related experiments or verify our method.
Charmaine Ndolo, Florian Tschorsch
The Lightning network (LN) addresses Bitcoin’s scalability issues by providing fast and private payment processing. In order to mitigate failures caused by insufficient channel capacities, LN introduced multi-path payments. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of multi-path payments remains unclear. In this paper, we therefore study the impact of multi-path payments on performance and privacy. We identify metrics quantifying the aforementioned properties and utilise them to
evaluate the impact of multi-path payments. To this end, we develop a simulator implementing pathfinding in LN using single and multi-path payments as well as various pathfinding algorithms. We find that, while the success rate of multi-path payments is up to 20% higher, the impact of multi-path payments on performance otherwise remains within limits. On the other hand, the impact on privacy appears to be greater, e.g., multi-path payments are more likely to encounter an on-path adversary and the relationship anonymity is more likely to be compromised by colluding intermediate hops. However, multi-path payments are less likely to be deanonymised based on the path lengths.
Shi Bai, Maya-Iggy van Hoof, Floyd B. Johnson, Tanja Lange, Tran Ngo
Lattice reduction algorithms such as BKZ (Block-Korkine-Zolotarev) play a central role in estimating the security of lattice-based cryptography. The subroutine in BKZ which finds the shortest vector in a projected sublattice can be instantiated with enumeration algorithms. The enumeration procedure can be seen as a depth-first search on some ``enumeration tree'' whose nodes denote a partial assignment of the coefficients, corresponding to lattice points as a linear combination of the lattice basis with the coefficients. This work provides a concrete analysis for the cost of quantum lattice enumeration based on Montanaro's quantum tree backtracking algorithm. More precisely, we give a concrete implementation in the quantum circuit model. We also show how to optimize the circuit depth by parallelizing the components. Based on the circuit designed, we discuss the concrete quantum resource estimates required for lattice enumeration.