IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
01 February 2024
TU Wien, Security and Privacy Research Unit
Your profile:
- Master degree in computer science or equivalent (degree completion by employment start)
- Excellent English, communication, and teamwork skills
- Background in formal methods (e.g., automated reasoning, type systems, or proof assistants) or cryptography
- Experience in research is a plus
- A job in an internationally renowned group, which regularly publishes in top security venues, and consists of an international, diverse, and inclusive team with expertise in formal methods, cryptography, security, privacy, and blockchains
- Diverse research topics in formal methods for security and privacy, with a specific focus on cryptographic protocols and blockchains
- An international English-speaking environment (German not required)
- A competitive salary
- Flexible hours
- Motivation letter
- Bachelor/Master’s transcripts
- Publication list (if available)
- Curriculum vitae
- Contact information for two referees
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Matteo Maffei
More information: https://tools.spycode.at/recruiting/call/5
COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Bart.Preneel@kuleuven.be, Vincent.Rijmen@kuleuven.be
University of Surrey, UK
We are looking for a postdoc with expertise on electronic-voting or related topics. The successful post holder is expected to start 1 May 2024 or as soon as possible thereafter and will run until 31st October 2026. The position will be based in the Department of Computer Science and its highly regarded Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS), working with Dr. Cătălin Drăgan.
The Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS) is a widely recognized centre of excellence for cyber security research and teaching. There are approximately 17 permanent academic members and 15 non-academic researchers with expertise on voting, formal modelling and verification, applied cryptography, trust systems, social media, communication and networks, and blockchain and distributed ledger technologies over key sectors such as government, finance, communications, transport and cross-sector technologies.
Qualifications:
- We are looking for applicants that demonstrate strong research and analytical skills, have strong communication skills and enthusiasm for developing their own research ideas.
- Applicants should have expertise in one of the following areas: e-voting, or formal verification of cryptographic protocols, or provable security.
- A PhD in Computer Science, Mathematics, or other closely related area (or be on course of getting one very soon at the time of application).
To apply use https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/Vacancy.aspx?id=13834
For informal enquiries and further information please contact Dr. Cătălin Drăgan.Closing date for applications:
Contact: Dr. Cătălin Drăgan c.dragan@surrey.ac.uk
More information: https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/Vacancy.aspx?id=13834
Input-Output Global
As Cryptographic Engineering Lead you are responsible for defining the roadmap for cryptographic innovation consistent with the requirements of different projects that are developed in the company and delivering of the cryptographic primitives implementation.
Duties
Key Competencies
Education / Experience
Closing date for applications:
Contact: marios.nicolaides@iohk.io
More information: https://apply.workable.com/io-global/j/A7EE304D9F/
SUTD, Singapore
* A PhD degree in computer science or related fields
* Good background in cybersecurity and digital forensics.
* Experience in biometric-based authentication for smartphone users.
* Practical experience in machine learning and AI.
* Strong analytical skill.
* Publication records in *top* cybersecurity conferences/journals.
* Good programming skill in C/C++ and Python/Java.
* Excellent communication and writing skills in English.
* Great team player.
Only short-listed candidates will be contacted for interview. Successful candidates will be offered internationally competitive remuneration. Interested candidates please send your CV to Prof. Jianying Zhou [jianying_zhou@sutd.edu.sg].
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Jianying Zhou [jianying_zhou@sutd.edu.sg].
More information: http://jianying.space/
31 January 2024
Elisabeth Krahmer, Peter Pessl, Georg Land, Tim Güneysu
Chenxu Wang, Sisi Duan, Minghui Xu, Feng Li, Xiuzhen Cheng
Jiawen Zhang, Jian Liu, Xinpeng Yang, Yinghao Wang, Kejia Chen, Xiaoyang Hou, Kui Ren, Xiaohu Yang
In this paper, we propose NEXUS the first non-interactive protocol for secure transformer inference, where the client is only required to submit an encrypted input and await the encrypted result from the server. Central to NEXUS are two innovative techniques: SIMD ciphertext compression/decompression, and SIMD slots folding. Consequently, our approach achieves a speedup of 2.8$\times$ and a remarkable bandwidth reduction of 368.6$\times$, compared to the state-of-the-art solution presented in S&P '24.
A Closer Look at the Belief Propagation Algorithm in Side-Channel-Assisted Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
Kexin Qiao, Siwei Sun, Zhaoyang Wang, Zehan Wu, Junjie Cheng, An Wang, Liehuang Zhu
Sisi Duan, Yue Huang
Meltem Sonmez Turan
Rui Hao, Chenglong Yi, Weiqi Dai, Zhaonan Zhang
Sven Argo, Tim Güneysu, Corentin Jeudy, Georg Land, Adeline Roux-Langlois, Olivier Sanders
In this work, we propose a construction of so-called signature with efficient protocols (SEP), which is the core of such privacy-preserving solutions. By revisiting the approach by Jeudy et al. (Crypto 2023) we manage to get the best of the two alternatives mentioned above, namely short sizes with no compromise on security. To demonstrate this, we plug our SEP in an anonymous credential system, achieving credentials of less than 80 KB. In parallel, we fully implemented our system, and in particular the complex zero-knowledge framework of Lyubashevsky et al. (Crypto'22), which has, to our knowledge, not be done so far. Our work thus not only improves the state-of-the-art on privacy-preserving solutions, but also significantly improves the understanding of efficiency and implications for deployment in real-world systems.
30 January 2024
Fabian Buschkowski, Georg Land, Jan Richter-Brockmann, Pascal Sasdrich, Tim Güneysu
This immediately raises the necessity for tool-assisted Design Space Exploration (DSE) for efficient and secure cryptographic hardware. For this, we present the progressive HADES framework, offering a customizable, extendable, and streamlined DSE for efficient and secure cryptographic hardware accelerators. This tool exhaustively traverses the design space driven by security requirements, rapidly predicts user-defined performance metrics, e.g., area footprint or cycle-accurate latency, and instantiates the most suitable candidate in a synthesizable Hardware Description Language (HDL).
We demonstrate the capabilities of our framework by applying our proof-of-concept implementation to a wide-range selection of state-of-the-art symmetric and PQC schemes, including the ChaCha20 stream cipher and the designated PQC standard Kyber, for which we provide the first set of arbitrary-order masked hardware implementations.
Gideon Samid
Ehsan Ebrahimi
Jung Hee Cheon, Hyeongmin Choe, Alain Passelègue, Damien Stehlé, Elias Suvanto
We correct the widespread belief according to which INDCPA-D attacks are specific to approximate homomorphic computations. Indeed, the equivalency formally proved by Li and Micciancio assumes that the schemes are not only exact but have a negligible probability of incorrect decryption. However, almost all competitive implementations of exact FHE schemes give away strong correctness by analyzing correctness heuristically and allowing noticeable probabilities of incorrect decryption.
We exploit this imperfect correctness to mount efficient indistinguishability and key-recovery attacks against all major exact FHE schemes. We illustrate their strength by concretely breaking the default BFV implementation of OpenFHE and simulating an attack for the default parameter set of the CGGI implementation of TFHE-rs (the attack is too expensive to be run on commodity desktops, because of the cost of CGGI bootstrapping). Our attacks extend to threshold versions of the exact FHE schemes, when the correctness is similarly loose.
Emanuele Bellini, David Gerault, Matteo Protopapa, Matteo Rossi
Nominations for the 2024 Test-of-Time award (for papers published in 2009) will be accepted until Feb 28, 2024.
Details for the nomination process can be found here: https://www.iacr.org/testoftime/nomination.html