IACR News
Updates on the COVID-19 situation are on the
Announcement channel.
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
06 April 2024
Marina Blanton, Dennis Murphy
Biometric authentication eliminates the need for users to remember secrets and serves as a convenient mechanism for user authentication. Traditional implementations of biometric-based authentication store sensitive user biometry on the server and the server becomes an attractive target of attack and a source of large-scale unintended disclosure of biometric data. To mitigate the problem, we can resort to privacy-preserving computation and store only protected biometrics on the server. While a variety of secure computation techniques is available, our analysis of privacy-preserving biometric computation and biometric authentication constructions revealed that available solutions fall short of addressing the challenges of privacy-preserving biometric authentication. Thus, in this work we put forward new constructions to address the challenges.
Our solutions employ a helper server and use strong threat models, where a client is always assumed to be malicious, while the helper server can be semi-honest or malicious. We also determined that standard secure multi-party computation security definitions are insufficient to properly demonstrate security in the two-phase (enrollment and authentication) entity authentication application. We thus extend the model and formally show security in the multi-phase setting, where information can flow from one phase to another and the set of participants can change between the phases. We implement our constructions and show that they exhibit practical performance for authentication in real time.
Our solutions employ a helper server and use strong threat models, where a client is always assumed to be malicious, while the helper server can be semi-honest or malicious. We also determined that standard secure multi-party computation security definitions are insufficient to properly demonstrate security in the two-phase (enrollment and authentication) entity authentication application. We thus extend the model and formally show security in the multi-phase setting, where information can flow from one phase to another and the set of participants can change between the phases. We implement our constructions and show that they exhibit practical performance for authentication in real time.
Alessandro Chiesa, Elisabetta Fedele, Giacomo Fenzi, Andrew Zitek-Estrada
The sumcheck protocol is an interactive protocol for verifying the sum of a low-degree polynomial over a hypercube. This protocol is widely used in practice, where an efficient implementation of the (honest) prover algorithm is paramount. Prior work contributes highly-efficient prover algorithms for the notable special case of multilinear polynomials (and related settings): [CTY11] uses logarithmic space but runs in superlinear time; in contrast, [VSBW13] runs in linear time but uses linear space.
In this short note, we present a family of prover algorithms for the multilinear sumcheck protocol that offer new time-space tradeoffs. In particular, we recover the aforementioned algorithms as special cases. Moreover, we provide an efficient implementation of the new algorithms, and our experiments show that the asymptotics translate into new concrete efficiency tradeoffs.
Sophie Schmieg
In "Keeping up with the KEMs" Cremers et al. introduced various binding models for KEMs. The authors show that ML-KEM is LEAK-BIND-K-CT and LEAK-BIND-K-PK, i.e. binding the ciphertext and the public key in the case of an adversary having access, but not being able to manipulate the key material. They further conjecture that ML-KEM also has MAL-BIND-K-PK, but not MAL-BIND-K-CT, the binding of public key or ciphertext to the shared secret in the case of an attacker with the ability to manipulate the key material.
This short paper demonstrates that ML-KEM does neither have MALBIND-K-CT nor MAL-BIND-K-PK, due to the attacker being able to produce mal-formed private keys, giving concrete examples for both. We also suggest mitigations, and sketch a proof for binding both ciphertext and public key when the attacker is not able to manipulate the private key as liberally.
Mahender Kumar
In their paper, Wei et al. proposed a lightweight protocol for conditional privacy-preserving authentication in VANET. The protocol aims to achieve ultra-low transmission delay and efficient system secret key (SSK) updating. Their protocol uses a signature scheme with message recovery to authenticate messages. This scheme provides security against adaptively chosen message attacks. However, our analysis reveals a critical vulnerability in the scheme. It is susceptible to replay attacks, meaning a malicious vehicle can replay a message multiple times at different timestamps. This action undermines the overall effectiveness of conditional privacy. We suggest possible solutions to address these vulnerabilities and enhance the security of VANET communication.
Tomoki Moriya
In this paper, we propose a novel isogeny-based public key encryption (PKE) scheme named LIT-SiGamal. This is based on a LIT diagram and SiGamal. SiGamal is an isogeny-based PKE scheme that uses a commutative diagram with an auxiliary point. LIT-SiGamal uses a LIT diagram which is a commutative diagram consisting of large-degree horizontal isogenies and relatively small-degree vertical isogenies, while the original SiGamal uses a CSIDH diagram.
A strength of LIT-SiGamal is efficient encryption and decryption. QFESTA is an isogeny-based PKE scheme proposed by Nakagawa and Onuki, which is a relatively efficient scheme in isogeny-based PKE schemes. In our experimentation with our proof-of-concept implementation, the computational time of the encryption of LIT-SiGamal is as efficient as that of QFESTA, and that of the decryption of LIT-SiGamal is about $5$x faster than that of QFESTA.
A strength of LIT-SiGamal is efficient encryption and decryption. QFESTA is an isogeny-based PKE scheme proposed by Nakagawa and Onuki, which is a relatively efficient scheme in isogeny-based PKE schemes. In our experimentation with our proof-of-concept implementation, the computational time of the encryption of LIT-SiGamal is as efficient as that of QFESTA, and that of the decryption of LIT-SiGamal is about $5$x faster than that of QFESTA.
Fernando Virdia, Mia Filić
We describe a small tweak to Cuckoo filters that allows securing them under insertions using the techniques from Filić et al. (ACM CCS 2022), without the need for an outer PRF call.
Sulaiman Alhussaini, Serge˘ı Sergeev
Given that the tropical Stickel protocol and its variants are all vulnerable to the generalized Kotov-Ushakov attack, we suggest employing the max-min semiring and, more generally, max-$T$ semiring where the multiplication is based on a $T-$norm, as a framework to implement the Stickel protocol. While the Stickel protocol over max-min semiring or max-$T$ semiring remains susceptible to a form of Kotov-Ushakov attack, we demonstrate that it exhibits significantly increased resistance against this attack when compared to the tropical (max-plus) implementation.
Jihoon Cho, Changhoon Lee, Eunkyung Kim, Jieun Lee, Beumjin Cho
Cryptographic agility, or crypto-agility, is a design feature that enables agile updates to new cryptographic algorithms and standards without the need to modify or replace the surrounding infrastructure. This paper examines the prerequisites for crypto-agility and proposes its desired design feature. More specifically, we investigate the design characteristics of widely deployed cybersecurity paradigms, i.e., zero trust, and apply its design feature to crypto-agility, achieving greater visibility and automation in cryptographic management.
Damien Robert
Biextensions associated to line bundles on abelian varieties allows to reinterpret the usual Weil, Tate, Ate, optimal Ate, \ldots, pairings as monodromy pairings. We introduce a cubical arithmetic, derived from the canonical cubical torsor structure of these line bundles, to obtain an efficient arithmetic of these biextensions.
This unifies and extends Miller's standard algorithm to compute pairings along with other algorithms like elliptic nets and theta functions, and allows to adapt these algorithms to pairings on any model of abelian varieties with a polarisation $\Phi_D$, as long as we have an explicit theorem of the square for $D$.
In particular, we give explicit formulas for the arithmetic of the biextension (and cubical torsor structure) associated to the divisor $D=2(0_E)$ on an elliptic curve. We derive very efficient pairing formulas on elliptic curves and Kummer lines. Notably for generic pairings on Montgomery curves, our cubical biextension ladder algorithm to compute pairings costs only $15M$ by bits, which as far as I know is faster than any pairing doubling formula in the literature.
This unifies and extends Miller's standard algorithm to compute pairings along with other algorithms like elliptic nets and theta functions, and allows to adapt these algorithms to pairings on any model of abelian varieties with a polarisation $\Phi_D$, as long as we have an explicit theorem of the square for $D$.
In particular, we give explicit formulas for the arithmetic of the biextension (and cubical torsor structure) associated to the divisor $D=2(0_E)$ on an elliptic curve. We derive very efficient pairing formulas on elliptic curves and Kummer lines. Notably for generic pairings on Montgomery curves, our cubical biextension ladder algorithm to compute pairings costs only $15M$ by bits, which as far as I know is faster than any pairing doubling formula in the literature.
Björn Ho, Huanhuan Chen, Zeshun Shi, Kaitai Liang
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes provide users with the ability to perform keyword searches on encrypted databases without the need for decryption. While this functionality is advantageous, it introduces the potential for inadvertent information disclosure, thereby exposing SSE systems to various types of attacks. In this work, we introduce a new inference attack aimed at enhancing the query recovery accuracy of RefScore (presented at USENIX 2021). The proposed approach capitalizes on both similar data knowledge and an additional volume leakage as auxiliary information, facilitating the extraction of keyword matches from leaked data. Empirical evaluations conducted on multiple real-world datasets demonstrate a notable enhancement in query recovery accuracy, up to 19.5%. We also analyze the performance of the proposed attack in the presence of diverse countermeasures.
Manning Zhang, Zeshun Shi, Huanhuan Chen, Kaitai Liang
Searchable symmetric encryption has been vulnerable to inference attacks that rely on uniqueness in leakage patterns. However, many keywords in datasets lack distinctive leakage patterns, limiting the effectiveness of such attacks. The file injection attacks, initially proposed by Cash et al. (CCS 2015), have shown impressive performance with 100% accuracy and no prior knowledge requirement. Nevertheless, this attack fails to recover queries with underlying keywords not present in the injected files. To address these limitations, our research introduces a novel attack strategy called LEAP-Hierarchical Fusion Attack (LHFA) that combines the strengths of both file injection attacks and inference attacks. Before initiating keyword injection, we introduce a new approach for inert/active keyword selection. In the phase of selecting injected keywords, we focus on keywords without unique leakage patterns and recover them, leveraging their presence for document recovery. Our goal is to achieve an amplified effect in query recovery. We demonstrate a minimum query recovery rate of 1.3 queries per injected keyword with a 10% data leakage of a real-life dataset, and initiate further research to overcome challenges associated with non-distinctive keywords.
Xueyan Tang, Lingzhi Shi, Xun Wang, Kyle Charbonnet, Shixiang Tang, Shixiao Sun
Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) technology marks a revolutionary advancement in the field of cryptography, enabling the verification of certain information ownership without revealing any specific details. This technology, with its paradoxical yet powerful characteristics, provides a solid foundation for a wide range of applications, especially in enhancing the privacy and security of blockchain technology and other cryptographic systems. As ZKP technology increasingly becomes a part of the blockchain infrastructure, its importance for security and integrity becomes more pronounced. However, the complexity of ZKP implementation and the rapid iteration of the technology introduce various vulnerabilities, challenging the privacy and security it aims to offer.
This study bases on the integrity, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties of ZKP to meticulously classify existing vulnerabilities and deeply explores multiple categories of vulnerabilities, including integrity issues, soundness problems, information leakage, and non-standardized cryptographic implementations. Furthermore, we propose a set of defense strategies that include a rigorous security audit process and a robust distributed network security ecosystem. This audit strategy employs a divide-and-conquer approach, segmenting the project into different levels, from the application layer to the platform-nature infrastructure layer, using threat modeling, linear code checking, and internal cross-review, among other means, aimed at comprehensively identifying vulnerabilities in ZKP circuits, revealing design flaws in ZKP applications, and accurately identifying inaccuracies in the integration process of ZKP primitives.
This study bases on the integrity, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties of ZKP to meticulously classify existing vulnerabilities and deeply explores multiple categories of vulnerabilities, including integrity issues, soundness problems, information leakage, and non-standardized cryptographic implementations. Furthermore, we propose a set of defense strategies that include a rigorous security audit process and a robust distributed network security ecosystem. This audit strategy employs a divide-and-conquer approach, segmenting the project into different levels, from the application layer to the platform-nature infrastructure layer, using threat modeling, linear code checking, and internal cross-review, among other means, aimed at comprehensively identifying vulnerabilities in ZKP circuits, revealing design flaws in ZKP applications, and accurately identifying inaccuracies in the integration process of ZKP primitives.
04 April 2024
Kolkata, India, 9 December - 13 December 2024
Event date: 9 December to 13 December 2024
Submission deadline: 28 May 2024
Notification: 25 August 2024
Submission deadline: 28 May 2024
Notification: 25 August 2024
01 April 2024
Riva San Vitale, Switzerland, 1 July - 5 July 2024
Event date: 1 July to 5 July 2024
Kyungbae Jang, Sejin Lim, Yujin Oh, Anubhab Baksi, Sumanta Chakraborty, Hwajeong Seo
Quantum computers have the potential to solve hard problems that are nearly impossible to solve by classical computers, this has sparked a surge of research to apply quantum technology and algorithm against the cryptographic systems to evaluate for its quantum resistance. In the process of selecting post-quantum standards, NIST categorizes security levels based on the complexity that quantum computers would require to crack AES encryption (levels 1, 3, and 5) and SHA-2 or SHA-3 (levels 2 and 4).
In assessing the security strength of cryptographic algorithms against quantum threats, accurate predictions of quantum resources are crucial. Following the work of Jaques et al. in Eurocrypt 2020, NIST estimated security levels 1, 3, and 5, corresponding to quantum circuit size for finding the key for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, respectively. This work has been recently followed-up by Huang et al. (Asiacrypt'22) and Liu et al. (Asiacrypt'23). However, for levels 2 and 4, which relate to the collision finding for the SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions, quantum attack complexities are probably not well-studied.
In this paper, we present novel techniques for optimizing the quantum circuit implementations for SHA-2 and SHA-3 algorithms in all the categories specified by NIST. After that, we evaluate the quantum circuits of target cryptographic hash functions for quantum collision search. Finally, we define the optimal quantum attack complexity for levels 2 and 4, and comment on the security strength of the extended level. We present new concepts to optimize the quantum circuits at the component level and the architecture level.
In assessing the security strength of cryptographic algorithms against quantum threats, accurate predictions of quantum resources are crucial. Following the work of Jaques et al. in Eurocrypt 2020, NIST estimated security levels 1, 3, and 5, corresponding to quantum circuit size for finding the key for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, respectively. This work has been recently followed-up by Huang et al. (Asiacrypt'22) and Liu et al. (Asiacrypt'23). However, for levels 2 and 4, which relate to the collision finding for the SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions, quantum attack complexities are probably not well-studied.
In this paper, we present novel techniques for optimizing the quantum circuit implementations for SHA-2 and SHA-3 algorithms in all the categories specified by NIST. After that, we evaluate the quantum circuits of target cryptographic hash functions for quantum collision search. Finally, we define the optimal quantum attack complexity for levels 2 and 4, and comment on the security strength of the extended level. We present new concepts to optimize the quantum circuits at the component level and the architecture level.
Zehua Qiao, Yuejun Liu, Yongbin Zhou, Yuhan Zhao, Shuyi Chen
As the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) concludes its post-quantum cryptography (PQC) competition, the winning algorithm, Dilithium, enters the deployment phase in 2024. This phase underscores the importance of conducting thorough practical security evaluations. Our study offers an in-depth side-channel analysis of Dilithium, showcasing the ability to recover the complete private key, ${s}_1$, within ten minutes using just two signatures and achieving a 60 success rate with a single signature. We focus on analyzing the polynomial addition in Dilithium, $z=y+{cs}_1$, by breaking down the attack into two main phases: the recovery of $y$ and ${cs}_1$ through side-channel attacks, followed by the resolution of a system of error-prone equations related to ${cs}_1$. Employing Linear Regression-based profiled attacks enables the successful recovery of the full $y$ value with a 40% success rate without the necessity for initial filtering. The extraction of ${cs}_1$ is further improved using a CNN model, which boasts an average success rate of 75%. A significant innovation of our research is the development of a constrained optimization-based residual analysis technique. This method efficiently recovers ${s}_1$ from a large set of error-containing equations concerning ${cs}_1$, proving effective even when only 10% of the equations are accurate. We conduct a practical attack on the Dilithium2 implementation on an STM32F4 platform, demonstrating that typically two signatures are sufficient for complete private key recovery, with a single signature sufficing in optimal conditions. Using a general-purpose PC, the full private key can be reconstructed in ten minutes.
Cezary Pilaszewicz, Lea R. Muth, Marian Margraf
We show how fixed-unitary quantum encryption schemes can be attacked in a black-box setting. We use an efficient technique to invert a unitary transformation on a quantum computer to retrieve an encrypted secret quantum state $\ket{\psi}$. This attack has a success rate of 100% and can be executed in constant time. We name a vulnerable scheme and suggest how to improve it to invalidate this attack. The proposed attack highlights the importance of carefully designing quantum encryption schemes to ensure their security against quantum adversaries, even in a black-box setting.
Zeyu Liu, Katerina Sotiraki, Eran Tromer, Yunhao Wang
Oblivious message retrieval (OMR) allows messages resource-limited recipients to outsource the message retrieval process without revealing which messages are pertinent to which recipient. Its realizations in recent works leave an open problem: can an OMR scheme be both practical and provably secure against spamming attacks from malicious senders (i.e., DoS-resistant) under standard assumptions?
In this paper, we first prove that a prior construction OMRp2 is DoS-resistant under a standard LWE assumption, resolving an open conjecture of prior works. Then, we present DoS-PerfOMR: a provably DoS-resistant OMR construction that is 12x faster than OMRp2, and (almost) matches the performance of the state-of-the-art OMR scheme that is not DoS-resistant.
As a building block, we analyze the snake-eye resistance property for general PKE schemes. We construct a new lattice-based PKE scheme, LWEmongrass that is provably snake-eye resistant and has better efficiency than the PVW scheme underlying OMRp2. We also show that the natural candidates (e.g., RingLWE PKE) are not snake-eye resistant.
Of independent interest, we introduce two variants of LWE with side information, as components towards proving the properties of LWEmongrass, and reduce standard LWE to them for the parameters of interest.
Of independent interest, we introduce two variants of LWE with side information, as components towards proving the properties of LWEmongrass, and reduce standard LWE to them for the parameters of interest.
Eli Orvis
Recent work by Arpin, Chen, Lauter, Scheidler, Stange, and Tran counted the number of cycles of length $r$ in supersingular $\ell$-isogeny graphs. In this paper, we extend this work to count the number of cycles that occur along the spine. We provide formulas for both the number of such cycles, and the average number as $p \to \infty$, with $\ell$ and $r$ fixed. In particular, we show that when $r$ is not a power of $2$, cycles of length $r$ are disproportionately likely to occur along the spine. We provide experimental evidence that this result holds in the case that $r$ is a power of $2$ as well.
Jules Maire, Damien Vergnaud
We present new secure multi-party computation protocols for linear algebra over a finite field, which improve the state-of-the-art in terms of security. We look at the case of \emph{unconditional security with perfect correctness}, i.e., information-theoretic security without errors. We notably propose an expected constant-round protocol for solving systems of $m$ linear equations in $n$ variables over $\mathbb{F}_q$ with expected complexity $O(k(n^{2.5} + m^{2.5}+n^2m^{0.5}))$ where $k > m(m+n)+1$ (complexity is measured in terms of the number of secure multiplications required). The previous proposals were not error-free: known protocols can indeed fail and thus reveal information with probability $\Omega(\textsf{poly}(m)/q)$.
Our protocols are simple and rely on existing computer-algebra techniques, notably the Preparata-Sarwate algorithm, a simple but poorly known ``baby-step giant-step'' method for computing the characteristic polynomial of a matrix, and techniques due to Mulmuley for error-free linear algebra in positive characteristic.