International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Equivalence class signatures allow a controlled form of malleability based on equivalence classes defined over the message space. As a result, signatures can be publicly randomized and adapted to a new message representative in the same equivalence class. Notably, security requires that an adapted signature-message pair looks indistinguishable from a random signature-message pair in the space of valid signatures for the new message representative. Together with the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, this yields an unlinkability notion (class-hiding), making them a very attractive building block for privacy-preserving primitives.

Mercurial signatures are an extension of equivalence class signatures that allow malleability for the key space. Unfortunately, the most efficient construction to date suffers a severe limitation that limits their application: only a weak form of public key class-hiding is supported. In other words, given knowledge of the original signing key and randomization of the corresponding public key, it is possible to identify whether they are related.

In this work, we put forth the notion of interactive threshold mercurial signatures and show how they help to overcome the above-mentioned limitation. Moreover, we present constructions in the two-party and multi-party settings, assuming at least one honest signer. We also discuss related applications, including blind signatures, multi-signatures, and threshold ring signatures. To showcase the practicality of our approach, we implement the proposed constructions, comparing them against related alternatives.

We introduce a new framework, POKE, to build cryptographic protocols from irrational isogenies using higher-dimensional representations. The framework enables two parties to manipulate higher-dimensional representations of isogenies to efficiently compute their pushforwards, and ultimately to obtain a shared secret.

We provide three constructions based on POKE: the first is a PKE protocol, which is one of the most compact post-quantum PKEs and possibly the most efficient isogeny-based PKE to date. We then introduce a validation technique to ensure the correctness of uniSIDH public keys: by combining the validation method with a POKE-based construction, we obtain a split KEM, a primitive that generalizes NIKEs and can be used to instantiate a post-quantum version of the Signal's X3DH protocol. The third construction builds upon the split KEM and its validation method to obtain a round-optimal verifiable OPRF. It is the first such construction that does not require more than $\lambda$ isogeny computations, and it is significantly more compact and more efficient than all other isogeny-based OPRFs.

This manuscript provides complete, inversion-free, and explicit group law formulas in Jacobian coordinates for the genus 2 hyperelliptic curves of the form $y^2 = x^5 + a_3 x^3 + a_2 x^2 + a_1 x + a_0$ over a field $K$ with $char(K) \ne 2$. The formulas do not require the use of polynomial arithmetic operations such as resultant, mod, or gcd computations but only operations in $K$.

It has been shown that the selfish mining attack enables a miner to achieve an unfair relative revenue, posing a threat to the progress of longest-chain blockchains. Although selfish mining is a well-studied attack in the context of Proof-of-Work blockchains, its impact on the longest-chain Proof-of-Stake (LC-PoS) protocols needs yet to be addressed. This paper involves both theoretical and implementation-based approaches to analyze the selfish proposing attack in the LC-PoS protocols. We discuss how factors such as the nothing-at-stake phenomenon and the proposer predictability in PoS protocols can make the selfish proposing attack in LC-PoS protocols more destructive compared to selfish mining in PoW. In the first part of the paper, we use combinatorial tools to theoretically assess the selfish proposer’s block ratio in simplistic LC-PoS environments and under simplified network connection. However, these theoretical tools or classical MDP-based approaches cannot be applied to analyze the selfish proposing attack in real-world and more complicated LC-PoS environments. To overcome this issue, in the second part of the paper, we employ deep reinforcement learning techniques to find the near-optimal strategy of selfish proposing in more sophisticated protocols. The tool implemented in the paper can help us analyze the selfish proposing attack across diverse blockchain protocols with different reward mechanisms, predictability levels, and network conditions.

We study the hardness of the Syndrome Decoding problem, the base of most code-based cryptographic schemes, such as Classic McEliece, in the presence of side-channel information. We use ChipWhisperer equipment to perform a template attack on Classic McEliece running on an ARM Cortex-M4, and accurately classify the Hamming weights of consecutive 32-bit blocks of the secret error vector. With these weights at hand, we optimize Information Set Decoding algorithms. Technically, we show how to speed up information set decoding via a dimension reduction, additional parity-check equations, and an improved information set search, all derived from the Hamming weight information.

Consequently, using our template attack, we can practically recover an error vector in dimension n=2197 in a matter of seconds. Without side-channel information, such an instance has a complexity of around 88 bit. We also estimate how our template attack affects the security of the proposed McEliece parameter sets. Roughly speaking, even an error-prone leak of our Hamming weight information leads for n=3488 to a security drop of 89 bits.

In recent years, quantum technology has been rapidly developed. As security analyses for symmetric ciphers continue to emerge, many require an evaluation of the resources needed for the quantum circuit implementation of the encryption algorithm. In this regard, we propose the quantum circuit decision problem, which requires us to determine whether there exists a quantum circuit for a given permutation f using M ancilla qubits and no more than K quantum gates within the circuit depth D. Firstly, we investigate heuristic algorithms and classical SAT-based models in previous works, revealing their limitations in solving the problem. Hence, we innovatively propose an improved SAT-based model incorporating three metrics of quantum circuits. The model enables us to find the optimal quantum circuit of an arbitrary 3 or 4-bit S-box under a given optimization goal based on SAT solvers, which has proved the optimality of circuits constructed by the tool, LIGHTER-R. Then, by combining different criteria in the model, we find more compact quantum circuit implementations of S-boxes such as RECTANGLE and GIFT. For GIFT S-box, our model provides the optimal quantum circuit that only requires 8 gates with a depth of 31. Furthermore, our model can be generalized to linear layers and improve the previous SAT-based model proposed by Huang et al. in ASIACRYPT 2022 by adding the criteria on the number of qubits and the circuit depth.

Machine learning as a service requires the client to trust the server and provide its own private information to use this service. Usually, clients may worry that their private data is being collected by server without effective supervision, the server aims to ensure proper management of the user data, thereby fostering the advancement of its services. In this work, we focus on private decision tree evaluation (PDTE) which can alleviates the privacy concerns associated with classification tasks using decision tree. After the evaluation, except for some hyperparameters, the client only receives the classification results of their private data from server, while the server learns nothing.

Firstly, we propose three amortized efficient private comparison algorithms: TECMP, RDCMP and CDCMP, which are based on leveled homomorphic encryption. They are non-interactive, high precision (up to 26624-bit), many-to-many, and output expressive, achieving an amortized cost of less than 1 ms under 32-bit, which is an order of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art. Secondly, we propose three batch PDTE schemes using our private comparison: TECMP-PDTE, RDCMP-PDTE and CDCMP-PDTE. Due to the batch operations, we utilized a clear rows relation (CRR) algorithm, which obfuscates the position and classification results of the different row data. Finally, in decision tree exceeding 1000 nodes with 16-bit each, the amortized runtime of TECMP-PDTE and RDCMP-PDTE both more than 56$\times$ faster than state-of-the-art, while the TECMP-PDTE with CRR still achieves 14$\times$ speedup. Even in a single row and a tree of fewer than 100 nodes with 64-bit, and the TECMP-PDTE maintains a comparable performance with the current work.

We propose a novel KZG-based sum-check scheme, dubbed $\mathsf{Losum}$, with optimal efficiency. Particularly, its proving cost is one multi-scalar-multiplication of size $k$---the number of non-zero entries in the vector, its verification cost is one pairing plus one group scalar multiplication, and the proof consists of only one group element.

Using $\mathsf{Losum}$ as a component, we then construct a new lookup argument, named $\mathsf{Locq}$, which enjoys a smaller proof size and a lower verification cost compared to the state of the arts $\mathsf{cq}$, $\mathsf{cq}$+ and $\mathsf{cq}$++. Specifically, the proving cost of $\mathsf{Locq}$ is comparable to $\mathsf{cq}$, keeping the advantage that the proving cost is independent of the table size after preprocessing. For verification, $\mathsf{Locq}$ costs four pairings, while $\mathsf{cq}$, $\mathsf{cq}$+ and $\mathsf{cq}$++ require five, five and six pairings, respectively. For proof size, a $\mathsf{Locq}$ proof consists of four $\mathbb{G}_1$ elements and one $\mathbb{G}_2$ element; when instantiated with the BLS12-381 curve, the proof size of $\mathsf{Locq}$ is $2304$ bits, while $\mathsf{cq}$, $\mathsf{cq}$+ and $\mathsf{cq}$++ have $3840$, $3328$ and $2944$ bits, respectively. Moreover, $\mathsf{Locq}$ is zero-knowledge as $\mathsf{cq}$+ and $\mathsf{cq}$++, whereas $\mathsf{cq}$ is not. $\mathsf{Locq}$ is more efficient even compared to the non-zero-knowledge (and more efficient) versions of $\mathsf{cq}$+ and $\mathsf{cq}$++.

Vector commitments gain a lot of attention because of their wide usage in applications such as blockchain and accumulator. Mercurial vector commitments and mercurial functional commitments (MFC), as significant variants of VC, are the central techniques to construct more advanced cryptographic primitives such as zero-knowledge set and zero-knowledge functional elementary database (ZK-FEDB). However, the current MFC only supports linear functions, limiting its application, i.e. building the ZK-FEDB that only supports linear function queries. Besides, to our best knowledge, the existing MFC and ZK-FEDBs, including the one proposed by Zhang and Deng (ASIACRYPT '23) using RSA accumulators, are all in the group model and cannot resist the attack of quantum computers.

To break these limitations, we formalize the first system model and security model of MFC for circuits. Then, we target some specific properties of a new falsifiable assumption, i.e. the $\mathsf{BASIS}$ assumption proposed by Wee and Wu (EUROCRYPT '23) to construct the first lattice-based succinct mercurial functional commitment for circuits. To the application, we show that our constructions can be used to build the first lattice-based ZK-FEDB directly within the existing generic framework.

An inner product argument (IPA) is a cryptographic primitive used to construct a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) system, which is a notable privacy-enhancing technology. We propose a novel efficient IPA called $\mathsf{Cougar}$. $\mathsf{Cougar}$ features cubic root verifier and logarithmic communication under the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption. At Asiacrypt2022, Kim et al. proposed two square root verifier IPAs under the DL assumption. Our main objective is to overcome the limitation of square root complexity in the DL setting. To achieve this, we combine two distinct square root IPAs from Kim et al.: one with pairing ($\mathsf{Protocol3}$) and one without pairing ($\mathsf{Protocol4}$). To construct $\mathsf{Cougar}$, we first revisit $\mathsf{Protocol4}$ and reconstruct it to make it compatible with the proof system for the homomorphic commitment scheme. Next, we utilize $\mathsf{Protocol3}$ as the proof system for the reconstructed $\mathsf{Protocol4}$. Furthermore, we provide a soundness proof for $\mathsf{Cougar}$ in the DL assumption.

The revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 rekindled concerns within the cryptographic community regarding the potential subversion of cryptographic systems. Bellare et al. (CRYPTO'14) introduced the notion of Algorithm Substitution Attacks (ASAs), which aim to covertly leak sensitive information by undermining individual cryptographic primitives. In this work, we delve deeply into the realm of ASAs against protocols built upon cryptographic primitives. In particular, we revisit the existing ASA model proposed by Berndt et al. (AsiaCCS'22), providing a more fine-grained perspective. We introduce a novel ASA model tailored for protocols, capable of capturing a wide spectrum of subversion attacks. Our model features a modular representation of subverted parties within protocols, along with fine-grained definitions of undetectability. To illustrate the practicality of our model, we applied it to Lindell's two-party ECDSA protocol (CRYPTO'17), unveiling a range of ASAs targeting the protocol's parties with the objective of extracting secret key shares. Our work offers a comprehensive ASA model suited to cryptographic protocols, providing a useful framework for understanding ASAs against protocols.

Blind signatures enable a receiver to obtain signatures on messages of its choice without revealing any message to the signer. Round-optimal blind signatures are designed as a two-round interactive protocol between a signer and receiver. Coincidentally, the choice of message is not important in many applications, and is routinely set as a random (unstructured) message by a receiver. With the goal of designing more efficient blind signatures for such applications, Hanzlik (Eurocrypt '23) introduced a new variant called non-interactive blind signatures (NIBS). These allow a signer to asynchronously generate partial signatures for any recipient such that only the intended recipient can extract a blinded signature for a random message. This bypasses the two-round barrier for traditional blind signatures, yet enables many known applications. Hanzlik provided new practical designs for NIBS from bilinear pairings. In this work, we investigate efficient NIBS with post-quantum security. We design the first practical NIBS, as well as non-interactive partially blind signatures called tagged NIBS, from lattice-based assumptions. We also propose a new generic paradigm for NIBS from circuit-private leveled homomorphic encryption achieving optimal-sized signatures (i.e., same as any non-blind signature). Finally, we propose new enhanced security properties for NIBS, that could be of practical and theoretical interest.

A PhD position is available at IIIT Bangalore under Prof Ashish Choudhury. Prof Ashish’s research addresses all aspects of security and privacy in distributed systems, especially cryptographic protocols and fault-tolerant distributed consensus. He is particularly interested in secure multiparty computation and classical consensus protocols. Please explore https://sites.google.com/view/ashish-choudhury to learn more about his research topics. The candidate should have a reasonable background in computer science and its mathematical foundations. The applicant must hold a master’s degree in the relevant research field. The position is available for starting in August 2024. The candidate has to appear for a written exam followed by an interview, which will be typically conducted sometime in June 2024. If you are interested, please apply against the formal advertisement for the PhD admissions for the August 2024 cycle whose details are available at https://www.iiitb.ac.in/courses/master-of-science-by-researchdoctor-of-philosophy

Closing date for applications:

Contact: ashish.choudhury@iiitb.ac.in

More information: https://www.iiitb.ac.in/courses/master-of-science-by-researchdoctor-of-philosophy

Event date: 14 July to 19 July 2024

Salary: 36,024 to 41,732 GBP
Closing Date: 13th May 2024

We are looking for a postdoc with expertise on electronic-voting or related topics. The successful post holder is expected to start 1 July 2024 or as soon as possible thereafter and will run until 31st October 2026. The position will be based in the Department of Computer Science and its highly regarded Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS), working with Dr. Cătălin Drăgan.

The Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS) is a widely recognized centre of excellence for cyber security research and teaching. There are approximately 17 permanent academic members and 15 non-academic researchers with expertise on voting, formal modelling and verification, applied cryptography, trust systems, social media, communication and networks, and blockchain and distributed ledger technologies over key sectors such as government, finance, communications, transport and cross-sector technologies.

Qualifications:

• We are looking for applicants that demonstrate strong research and analytical skills, have strong communication skills and enthusiasm for developing their own research ideas.
• Applicants should have expertise in one of the following areas: e-voting, or formal verification of cryptographic protocols, or provable security.
• A PhD in Computer Science, Mathematics, or other closely related area (or be on course of getting one very soon at the time of application).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Cătălin Drăgan c.dragan@surrey.ac.uk

More information: https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/Vacancy.aspx?id=13834&forced=2

Bosch Research is developing an open source cloud platform (https://carbynestack.io) for computing on encrypted data using Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC). Potential use cases include, but are not limited to, Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning and Privacy-Preserving Data Analytics. For such large computations on big data, active secure MPC becomes quite expensive. Bosch Research is therefore trying to reduce the computational and communication costs of MPC by optimizing the underlying cryptographic primitives and protocols.

Thus, we are looking for a highly motivated PhD candidate with a strong background in applied cryptography and preferably also MPC. The candidates should meet the following requirements:

• Education: Hold an M.Sc. degree (or equivalent) with excellent grades in IT security or computer science.
• Experience and Knowledge: Strong background in (applied) cryptography with a particular focus on cryptographic protocols/MPC, including security models and basic security proof techniques. Good software development/programming skills.
• Personality and Working Practice: Self-motivated and enthusiastic, independent, reliable, creative, and able to work in an international team with diverse background.
• Language: Fluent English language skills

If the above requirements apply to you, you are welcome to read on. The successful candidate will:

• become a part of the team and advance research on MPC,
• develop novel approaches to improve the practical efficiency of actively secure MPC protocols,
• design efficient MPC protocols for diverse use-cases, and
• publish and present your results in top-tier journals and at conferences.

The position is based at the Bosch Research Campus in Renningen, Germany, fully funded for three years, no teaching duties, with 30 days annual leave, and the usual benefits.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Please submit your application, including your CV, transcripts of records from your Master studies, and a cover letter including your research background and research interest, via: https://smrtr.io/hmG3C

More information: https://youtu.be/OctvCi2pHJY

Event date: 3 December to 4 December 2024
Submission deadline: 30 July 2024
Notification: 5 September 2024

Event date: 7 March to 9 March 2026

Event date: 26 March to 28 March 2025

Event date: 18 December to 21 December 2024
Submission deadline: 8 September 2024
Notification: 18 October 2024