IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
22 May 2024
Andreea B. Alexandru, Julian Loss, Charalampos Papamanthou, Giorgos Tsimos, Benedikt Wagner
Damiano Abram, Lawrence Roy, Mark Simkin
Denis Firsov, Benjamin Livshits
21 May 2024
The Test-of-Time award for Eurocrypt 2009 is awarded to the following paper:
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks, by François-Xavier Standaert, Tal G. Malkin and Moti Yung.
For introducing a structured approach for evaluation of side-channel attacks and countermeasures and for inspiring further connections between the theory of leakage-resilient cryptography and the practice of defending implementations against side-channels attacks.
For more information, see https://www.iacr.org/testoftime.
Congratulations to the winners!
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Closing date for applications:
Contact: dr. Zhiming Zhao
More information: https://vacatures.uva.nl/UvA/job/Assistant-Professor-in-Security-and-Network-Engineering-%2850-teaching%29/794986702/
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
The School of Computer Science is looking to strengthen the existing Security and Privacy Research group. The available positions are linked to the chair in Applied Cryptography (held by Elisabeth Oswald): were are thus looking for applicants with a specific interest in applied cryptography in the context of hardware and embedded systems security (e.g. pre-silicon leakage and fault analysis, secure embedded software development, statistical side channel and fault evaluation techniques, machine and deep learning for side channels).
Further information about the duties that come with the role, as well as salary information, and information about the School, are available via the link provided. For further questions please contact Prof. Elisabeth Oswald in the first instance. The closing date for applications is June 16th 2024.Closing date for applications:
Contact: Elisabeth Oswald m.e.oswald@bham.ac.uk
More information: https://edzz.fa.em3.oraclecloud.com/hcmUI/CandidateExperience/en/sites/CX_6001/job/4653/?utm_medium=jobshare
Copper.co
Key Responsibilities of the role
Your experience, skills and knowledge
This role is right for you if:
Essential
Desirable
Closing date for applications:
Contact:
Clara Luna
clara.luna@copper.co
More information: https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/3922104775
20 May 2024
Youngjin Bae, Jung Hee Cheon, Jaehyung Kim, Damien Stehlé
In this work, we introduce several CKKS bootstrapping algorithms designed specifically for ciphertexts encoding binary data. Crucially, the new CKKS bootstrapping algorithms enable to bootstrap ciphertexts containing the binary data in the most significant bits. First, this allows to decrease the moduli used in bootstrapping, saving a larger share of the modulus budget for non-bootstrapping operations.
In particular, we obtain full-slot bootstrapping in ring degree $2^{14}$ for the first time. Second, the ciphertext format is compatible with the one used in the DM/CGGI fully homomorphic encryption schemes. Interestingly, we may combine our CKKS bootstrapping algorithms for bits with the fast ring packing technique from Bae et al. [CRYPTO'23]. This leads to a new bootstrapping algorithm for DM/CGGI that outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches when the number of bootstraps to be performed simultaneously is in the low hundreds.
Ziyi Guan, Artur Riazanov, Weiqiang Yuan
Mahmoody, Smith and Wu (ICALP 2020) prove that VDFs satisfying both perfect completeness and adaptive perfect uniqueness do not exist in the random oracle model. Moreover, Ephraim, Freitag, Komargodski, and Pass (EUROCRYPT 2020) construct a VDF with perfect completeness and computational uniqueness, a much weaker guarantee compare to perfect uniqueness, in the random oracle model under the repeated squaring assumption.
In this work, we close the gap between existing constructions and known lower bounds by showing that VDFs with imperfect completeness and non-adaptive computational uniqueness cannot be constructed in the pure random oracle model (without additional computational assumptions).
Ashrujit Ghoshal, Baitian Li, Yaohua Ma, Chenxin Dai, Elaine Shi
Ky Nguyen, David Pointcheval, Robert Schädlich
In this paper, we provide new proof techniques to analyze a new concrete construction of function-hiding DMCFE for inner products, with strong security guarantees in the random oracle model: the adversary can adaptively query multiple challenge ciphertexts and multiple challenge keys, with unbounded repetitions of the same message tags in the ciphertext-queries and a fixed polynomially-large number of repetitions of the same key tags in the key-queries, allowing static corruption of the secret encryption keys. Previous constructions were proven secure in the selective setting only.
Yu Morishima, Masahiro Kaminaga
Sora Suegami
Yibo Cao, Shiyuan Xu, Xiu-Bo Chen, Gang Xu, Siu-Ming Yiu
Andrea Basso, Luca De Feo, Pierrick Dartois, Antonin Leroux, Luciano Maino, Giacomo Pope, Damien Robert, Benjamin Wesolowski
Aloni Cohen, Alexander Hoover, Gabe Schoenbach
We introduce multi-user watermarks, which allow tracing model-generated text to individual users or to groups of colluding users. We construct multi-user watermarking schemes from undetectable zero-bit watermarking schemes. Importantly, our schemes provide both zero-bit and multi-user assurances at the same time: detecting shorter snippets just as well as the original scheme, and tracing longer excerpts to individuals. Along the way, we give a generic construction of a watermarking scheme that embeds long messages into generated text.
Ours are the first black-box reductions between watermarking schemes for language models. A major challenge for black-box reductions is the lack of a unified abstraction for robustness — that marked text is detectable even after edits. Existing works give incomparable robustness guarantees, based on bespoke requirements on the language model's outputs and the users' edits. We introduce a new abstraction to overcome this challenge, called AEB-robustness. AEB-robustness provides that the watermark is detectable whenever the edited text "approximates enough blocks" of model-generated output. Specifying the robustness condition amounts to defining approximates, enough, and blocks. Using our new abstraction, we relate the robustness properties of our message-embedding and multi-user schemes to that of the underlying zero-bit scheme, in a black-box way. Whereas prior works only guarantee robustness for a single text generated in response to a single prompt, our schemes are robust against adaptive prompting, a stronger and more natural adversarial model.
John Baena, Daniel Cabarcas, Sharwan K. Tiwari, Javier Verbel, Luis Villota
Sonia Belaid, Jakob Feldtkeller, Tim Güneysu, Anna Guinet, Jan Richter-Brockmann, Matthieu Rivain, Pascal Sasdrich, Abdul Rahman Taleb
In this work, we extend probabilistic security models for physical attacks, by introducing a general random probing model and a general random fault model to capture arbitrary leakage and fault distributions, as well as the combination of these models. Our aim is to enable a more accurate modeling of low-level physical effects. We then analyze important properties, such as the impact of adversarial knowledge on faults and compositions, and provide tool-based formal verification methods that allow the security assessment of design components. These methods are introduced as extension of previous tools VERICA and IronMask which are implemented, evaluated and compared.