IACR News
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25 May 2016
Aurore Guillevic, François Morain, Emmanuel Thomé
Ioana-Cristina Panait, Cristian Pop, Alexandru Sirbu, Adelina Vidovici, Emil Simion
24 May 2016
23 May 2016
Marcel Keller, Emmanuela Orsini, Peter Scholl
We present a new protocol that overcomes this limitation by using oblivious transfer to perform secure multiplications in general finite fields with reduced communication and computation. Our protocol is based on an arithmetic view of oblivious transfer, with careful consistency checks and other techniques to obtain malicious security at a cost of less than 6 times that of semi-honest security. We describe a highly optimized implementation together with experimental results for up to five parties. By making extensive use of parallelism and SSE instructions, we improve upon previous runtimes for MPC over arithmetic circuits by more than 200 times.
Patrick Longa, Michael Naehrig
Rachid El Bansarkhani, Mohamed Saied Emam Mohamed, Albrecht Petzoldt
Christina Boura, Avik Chakraborti, Gaëtan Leurent, Goutam Paul, Dhiman Saha, Hadi Soleimany, Valentin Suder
Libo He, Chen Yuan, Hu Xiong, Zhiguang Qin
Jong Hwan Park, Kwangsu Lee, Dong Hoon Lee
Gideon Samid
22 May 2016
Xavier Boyen, Qinyi Li
Our signature construction further extends to give a class of tightly and adaptively secure ``compact" Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes, reducible with constant security loss from Regev's vanilla Learning With Errors (LWE) hardness assumption and the security of a concretely instantiated PRF. Our approach is a novel combination of a number of techniques, including Katz and Wang signature, Agrawal et al. lattice-based secure IBE, and Boneh et al. key-homomorphic encryption.
Our results, at the first time, eliminate the dependency between the number of adversary's queries and the security of short signature/IBE schemes in the context of lattice-based cryptography. They also indicate that tightly secure PRFs (with constant security loss) would imply tightly, adaptively secure short signature and IBE schemes (with constant security loss).
Dakshita Khurana, Hemanta K. Maji, Amit Sahai
In this work, we study a form of unreliable noisy channels where the unreliability is one-sided, that we name elastic noisy channels: thus, in one form of elastic noisy channel, an adversarial receiver can increase the reception reliability unbeknown to the sender, but the sender cannot change the channel characteristic.
Our work shows feasibility results for a large set of parameters for the elastic binary symmetric channel, significantly improving upon the best results obtainable using prior techniques. In a key departure from existing approaches, we use a more elemental correlated private randomness as an intermediate cryptographic primitive that exhibits only a rudimentary essence of oblivious transfer. Toward this direction, we introduce new information-theoretic techniques that are potentially applicable to other cryptographic settings involving unreliable noisy channels.
Daniel Kraschewski, Dakshita Khurana, Hemanta K. Maji, Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai
We show that any functionality that enables general multi-party computation, when used in both directions, is reversible. In fact, we show that any such functionality can securely realize oblivious transfer when used in an a priori fixed direction. This result enables secure computation using physical setups that parties can only use in a particular direction due to inherent asymmetries in them.
Jesper Buus Nielsen, Claudio Orlandi
In this paper we ask a simple question, namely \emph{how many garbled circuits are needed to achieve active security?} and we propose a novel protocol which achieves active security while using only a constant number of garbled circuits per evaluation in the amortized setting.
Bo Yang, Kang Yang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Yu Qin, Dengguo Feng
Arnaud Bannier, Nicolas Bodin, Eric Filiol
Martin Albrecht, Lorenzo Grassi, Christian Rechberger, Arnab Roy, Tyge Tiessen
Surprisingly, albeit many MPC/FHE/ZK-protocols natively support operations in \GF{p} for large $p$, very few primitives, even considering all of symmetric cryptography, natively work in such fields. To that end, our proposal for both block ciphers and cryptographic hash functions is to reconsider and simplify the round function of the Knudsen-Nyberg cipher from 1995. The mapping $F(x) := x^3$ is used as the main component there and is also the main component of our family of proposals called ``MiMC''. We study various attack vectors for this construction and give a new attack vector that outperforms others in relevant settings.
Due to its very low number of multiplications, the design lends itself well to a large class of new applications, especially when the depth does not matter but the total number of multiplications in the circuit dominates all aspects of the implementation. With a number of rounds which we deem secure based on our security analysis, we report on significant performance improvements in a representative use-case involving SNARKs.
Dan Martin, Luke Mather, Elisabeth Oswald, Martijn Stam
21 May 2016
Ruhr-University Bochum, Horst Görtz Institute / UbiCrypt
UbiCrypt – Cryptography in Ubiquitous Computing
The Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security (HGI) at Ruhr-University Bochum is one of Europe’s leading research centers in IT security. The DFG, or German Research Foundation, awarded more than €4 million to the HGI for the establishment of the interdisciplinary research training group “New Challenges for Cryptography in Ubiquitous Computing”. We are looking for candidates with an outstanding Ph.D. in the fields of computer science, electrical engineering, mathematics or related areas.
The research training group will study problems which are fundamental for securing the Internet of Things. The research is structured in three levels: cryptographic primitives, device and system level. The research topics range from cryptographic foundations such as fully homomorphic encryption for privacy in cloud computing, over security for medical implants to internet security solutions involving new national ID cards.
Beside the own research, the main task of the Post-Doc is to work with the UbiCrypt Ph.D. students, and to encourage collaboration between them. Thus, an interest in working with doctoral students and a broad interest in current research are required.
- Start: earliest possible (limitation: March 31, 2017)
- Competitive salary (TV-L 14)
- Application: Send your documents by June 1, 2016, to grako (at) hgi.rub.de
- Required documents: CV, certificates (Bachelor, Master/Diplom, Ph.D.), transcripts , motivation for applying (1 page), names of at least two people who can provide reference letters (email addresses are sufficient)
A group of internationally renowned researchers together with excellent funding provides an extremely interesting scientific environment. The HGI is known for its good working atmosphere.
Closing date for applications: 1 June 2016
More information: http://www.ubicrypt.hgi.rub.de/index.html.de
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
The post holder will contribute to the creation and/or revision, delivery and assessment of postgraduate (MSc) and undergraduate teaching modules across a wide range of topics in the field of information/cyber security.
Applicants should have a Ph.D. in a relevant subject or equivalent and have a sound knowledge of information/cyber security. Applicants should be able to demonstrate an enthusiasm for teaching and communicating with diverse audiences, as well as show an awareness of contemporary issues relating to cyber security.
It should be noted that teaching post holders are permitted to spend 10% of their time following their research interests.
This is a five year teaching post, available from 1st September 2016. This post is based in Egham, Surrey, where the College is situated in a beautiful, leafy campus near to Windsor Great Park and within commuting distance from London.
Closing date for applications: 12 June 2016
Contact: For an informal discussion about the post, please contact Prof. Keith Mayes on keith.mayes (at) rhul.ac.uk .
The Human Resources Department can be contacted with queries by email at: recruitment (at) rhul.ac.uk.
More information: https://jobs.royalholloway.ac.uk/vacancy.aspx?ref=0516-161