IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
10 February 2017
Yuri Borissov, Peter Boyvalenkov, Robert Tsenkov
Subhamoy Maitra, Akhilesh Siddhanti
Sabyasachi Dey, Santanu Sarkar
Fruit is another cipher in this direction proposed recently where both the key size and state size are 80. So far, there is no attack against this cipher. In this paper, we attack full round Fruit by a divide-and-conquer method. We use several types of sieving to reduce the possible candidates for an internal state. Our attack is equivalent to $2^{74.95}$ many Fruit encryption, which is around $16.95$ times faster than average exhaustive key search. This is the first proposed attack against Fruit.
David Derler, Sebastian Ramacher, Daniel Slamanig
We provide a general model and two modular constructions of our novel primitive, supporting the class of linear functions. On our way, we establish various novel building blocks. Most interestingly, we formally define the notion and present a construction of homomorphic proxy re-encryption, which may be of independent interest. The latter allows users to encrypt messages under their own public keys, and a proxy can re-encrypt them to a receiver's public key (without knowing any secret key), while also being able to evaluate functions on the ciphertexts. The resulting re-encrypted ciphertext then holds an evaluation of the function on the input messages.
Laszlo Hars
Laszlo Hars
09 February 2017
Wroclaw, Poland, 11 May - 12 May 2017
Submission deadline: 3 April 2017
Notification: 10 April 2017
Tokyo, Japan, 22 March - 23 March 2017
Tokyo, Japan, 22 March - 23 March 2017
07 February 2017
Oslo, Norway, 11 September - 15 September 2017
Submission deadline: 9 April 2017
Notification: 16 June 2017
University of Westminster, Department of Computer Science
The Cyber Security (CSec) research group and the Centre for Parallel Computing (CPC) at the University of Westminster are looking for one Research Associate in Cloud Security to carry out research within the EU funded H2020 COLA (Cloud Orchestration at the Level of Application) project. COLA will define and provide a reference implementation of a generic and pluggable framework that supports the optimal and secure deployment and run-time orchestration of cloud applications. The successful candidate will carry out tasks in relation to the design and development of novel secure and privacy-preserving cloud orchestration solutions, specifically targeting and supporting application developers. In addition to that, the successful candidate will be also expected to contribute in writing project deliverables and research papers related to the project.
We expect candidates to have a strong research background in network security and/or applied cryptography. Proven research in areas such as trusted computing, cloud security, safety verification, security verification, data privacy, cyber-physical and internet of things security and cloud or mobile security will be considered as a plus.
The primary objective of the Cyber Security Research Group at the University of Westminster is to bring together expertise in education, research and practice in the field of information security and privacy. The group members conduct research in areas spanning from the theoretical foundations of cryptography to the design and implementation of leading edge efficient and secure communication protocols. To this end, we welcome applications from candidates whose research areas complement the existing research of the group.
- Job reference number: 50046999
- Salary: £33,387 to £38,489 per annum
- Contract: Fixed Term until June 2019
- Closing date: 10th March 2017
- Interviews are likely to be held on: 22nd March 2017
Closing date for applications: 10 March 2017
Contact: For an informal discussion contact Dr Antonis Michalas (a.michalas (at) westminster.ac.uk) or Dr Tamas Kiss (T.Kiss (at) westminster.ac.uk).
More information: https://tinyurl.com/hdawr6e
NEC Laboratories Europe
NEC Laboratories in Heidelberg (Germany) provides an excellent working environment supporting individual creativity as well as strong teamwork. English is the working language in the Laboratories. This position is (initially) limited to two years.
Applicants are sought with experiences /skills in these areas:
- Strong experience in blockchain security, system security, and applied cryptography.
- Strong experience with distributed systems and consensus protocols.
- Experience in software development including proven experience with programming languages, such as Golang, Java, or C/C++.
Candidates with a fresh Ph.D. in Security, Computer Science or a closely related field, and with an excellent publication track record are preferred
Closing date for applications: 1 April 2017
Contact: - Dr. Ghassan Karame, Manager & Chief of Security group at NEC Labs Europe. Email: ghassan.karame (at) neclab.eu
- Amardeo Sarma, General Manager at NEC Labs Europe. Email: amardeo.sarma (at) neclab.eu
More information: http://www.neclab.eu/jobs/openings/staff/NEC-NLE-1701-223-SEC-1-Blockchain_Researcher.pdf
06 February 2017
Anna Johnston
Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther
We are especially interested in the question how replay attacks, enabled through the lack of contribution from the server, affect security in the 0-RTT case. Whereas the first proposal of QUIC uses state on the server side to thwart such attacks, the latest version of QUIC and TLS 1.3 rather accept them as inevitable. We analyze what this means for the key secrecy of both the preshared-key-based 0-RTT handshake in draft-14 of TLS 1.3 as well as the Diffie-Hellman-based 0-RTT handshake in TLS 1.3 draft-12. As part of this we extend previous security models to capture such cases, also shedding light on the limitations and options for 0-RTT security under replay attacks.
Ivo Kubjas, Tiit Pikma, Jan Willemson
Ilan Komargodski, Gil Segev
Recently, Bitansky et al. [TCC '16B] showed that sub-exponentially-secure private-key function encryption bridges from nearly-exponential security in Minicrypt to slightly super-polynomial security in Cryptomania, and from sub-exponential security in Cryptomania to Obfustopia. Specifically, given any sub-exponentially-secure private-key functional encryption scheme and a nearly-exponentially-secure one-way function, they constructed a public-key encryption scheme with slightly super-polynomial security. Assuming, in addition, a sub-exponentially-secure public-key encryption scheme, they then constructed an indistinguishability obfuscator.
We settle the problem of positioning private-key functional encryption within the hierarchy of cryptographic primitives by placing it in Obfustopia. First, given any quasi-polynomially-secure private-key functional encryption scheme, we construct an indistinguishability obfuscator for circuits with inputs of poly-logarithmic length. Then, we observe that such an obfuscator can be used to instantiate many natural applications of indistinguishability obfuscation. Specifically, relying on sub-exponentially-secure one-way functions, we show that quasi-polynomially-secure private-key functional encryption implies not just public-key encryption but leads all the way to public-key functional encryption for circuits with inputs of poly-logarithmic length. Moreover, relying on sub-exponentially-secure injective one-way functions, we show that quasi-polynomially-secure private-key functional encryption implies a hard-on-average distribution over instances of a PPAD-complete problem.
Underlying our constructions is a new transformation from single-input functional encryption to multi-input functional encryption in the private-key setting. The previously known such transformation [Brakerski et al., EUROCRYPT '16] required a sub-exponentially-secure single-input scheme, and obtained a scheme supporting only a slightly super-constant number of inputs. Our transformation both relaxes the underlying assumption and supports more inputs: Given any quasi-polynomially-secure single-input scheme, we obtain a scheme supporting a poly-logarithmic number of inputs.
Jung Hee Cheon, Kyoohyung Han, Duhyeong Kim
Andre Esser, Robert Kübler, Alexander May
Our new algorithms are modifications and extensions of the simple Gaussian elimination algorithm with recent advanced techniques for decoding random linear codes. Moreover, we enhance our algorithms by the dimension reduction technique from Blum, Kalai, Wasserman. This results in a hybrid algorithm that is capable for achieving the best currently known run time for any fixed amount of memory.
On the asymptotic side, we achieve significant improvements for the run time exponents, both classically and quantumly. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first quantum algorithms for LPN.
Due to the small memory consumption of our algorithms, we are able to solve for the first time LPN instances of medium size, e.g. with $k=243, \tau = \frac 1 8$ in only 15 days on 64 threads.
Our algorithms result in bit complexity prediction that require relatively large $k$ for small $\tau$. For instance for small noise LPN with $\tau= \frac 1 {\sqrt k}$, we predict $80$-bit classical and only $64$-bit quantum security for $k~\geq~2048$. For the common cryptographic choice $k=512, \tau = \frac 1 8$, we achieve with limited memory classically $97$-bit and quantumly $70$-bit security.
Martin Ekerå, Johan Håstad
Furthermore, we describe applications of algorithms for computing short discrete logarithms. In particular, we show how other important problems such as those of factoring RSA integers and of finding the order of groups under side information may be recast as short discrete logarithm problems. This immediately gives rise to an algorithm for factoring RSA integers that is less complex than Shors general factoring algorithm in the sense that it imposes smaller requirements on the quantum computer.
In both our algorithm and Shors algorithm, the main hurdle is to compute a modular exponentiation in superposition. When factoring an n bit integer, the exponent is of length 2n bits in Shors algorithm, compared to slightly more than n/2 bits in our algorithm.