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27 March 2023
Benjamin Case, Richa Jain, Alex Koshelev, Andy Leiserson, Daniel Masny, Ben Savage, Erik Taubeneck, Martin Thomson, Taiki Yamaguchi
Measuring people’s interactions that span multiple websites can provide unique insight that enables better products and improves people’s experiences, but directly observing people’s individual journeys creates privacy risks that conflict with the newly emerging privacy model for the web. We propose a protocol that uses the combination of multi-party computation and differential privacy that enables the processing of peoples’ data such that only aggregate measurements are revealed, strictly limiting the information leakage about individual people. Our primary application of this protocol is measuring, in aggregate, the effectiveness of digital advertising without enabling cross-site tracking of individuals. In this paper we formalize our protocol, Interoperable Private Attribution (IPA), and analyze its security. IPA is proposed in the W3C’s Private Advertising Technology Community Group (PATCG) [8]. We have implemented our protocol in the malicious honest majority MPC setting for three parties where network costs dominate compute costs. For processing a query with 1M records it uses around 18GiB of network which at \$0.08 per GiB leads to a network cost of \$1.44.
Pierrick Dartois, Antonin Leroux, Damien Robert, Benjamin Wesolowski
We introduce SQISignHD, a new post-quantum digital signature scheme inspired by SQISign.
SQISignHD exploits the recent algorithmic breakthrough underlying the attack on SIDH, which allows to efficiently represent isogenies of arbitrary degrees as components of a higher dimensional isogeny. SQISignHD overcomes the main drawbacks of SQISign. First, it scales well to high security levels, since the public parameters for SQISignHD are easy to generate: the characteristic of the underlying field needs only be of the form $2^{f}3^{f'}-1$. Second, the signing procedure is simpler and more efficient. Third, the scheme is easier to analyse, allowing for a much more compelling security reduction. Finally, the signature sizes are even more compact than (the already record-breaking) SQISign, with compressed signatures as small as 105 bytes for the post-quantum NIST-1 level of security.
These advantages may come at the expense of the verification, which now requires the computation of an isogeny in dimension $4$, a task whose optimised cost is still uncertain, as it has been the focus of very little attention.
Ky Nguyen, Duong Hieu Phan, David Pointcheval
Research on (Decentralized) Multi-Client Functional Encryption (or (D)MCFE) is very active, with interesting constructions, especially for the class of inner products. However, the security notions have been evolving over the time. While the target of the adversary in distinguishing ciphertexts is clear, legitimate scenarios that do not consist of trivial attacks on the functionality are less obvious. In this paper, we wonder whether only trivial attacks are excluded from previous security games. And, unfortunately, this was not the case.
We then propose a stronger security notion, with a large definition of admissible attacks, and prove it is optimal: any extension of the set of admissible attacks is actually a trivial attack on the functionality, and not against the specific scheme. In addition, we show that all the previous constructions are insecure w.r.t. this new security notion. Eventually, we propose new DMCFE schemes for the class of inner products that provide the new features and achieve this stronger security notion.
Mirek Kutylowski, Giuseppe Persiano, Duong Hieu Phan, Moti Yung, Marcin Zawada
s part of the responses to the ongoing ``crypto wars,'' the notion of {\em Anamorphic Encryption} was put forth [Persiano-Phan-Yung Eurocrypt '22].
The notion allows private communication in spite of a dictator who (in violation of the usual normative conditions under which Cryptography is developed) is engaged in an extreme form of surveillance and/or censorship, where it asks for all private keys and knows and may even dictate all messages.
The original work pointed out efficient ways to use two known schemes in the anamorphic mode, bypassing the draconian censorship and hiding information from the all-powerful dictator.
A question left open was whether these examples are outlier results or whether anamorphic mode is pervasive in existing systems.
Here we answer the above question: we develop new techniques, expand the notion, and show that the notion of Anamorphic Cryptography is, in fact, very much prevalent.
We first refine the notion of Anamorphic Encryption with respect to the nature of covert communication. Specifically, we distinguish {\em Single-Receiver Encryption} for many to one communication, and {\em Multiple-Receiver Encryption} for many to many communication within the group of conspiring (against the dictator) users. We then show that Anamorphic Encryption can be embedded in the randomness used in the encryption, and give families of constructions that can be applied to numerous ciphers. In total the families cover classical encryption schemes, some of which in actual use (RSA-OAEP, Pailler, Goldwasser-Micali, ElGamal schemes, Cramer-Shoup, and Smooth Projective Hash based systems). Among our examples is an anamorphic channel with much higher capacity than the regular channel. In sum, the work shows the very large extent of the potential futility of control and censorship over the use of strong encryption by the dictator (typical for and even stronger than governments engaging in the ongoing ``crypto-wars''): While such limitations obviously hurt utility which encryption typically brings to safety in computing systems, they essentially, are not helping the dictator. The actual implications of what we show here and what does it mean in practice require further policy and legal analyses and perspectives.
Here we answer the above question: we develop new techniques, expand the notion, and show that the notion of Anamorphic Cryptography is, in fact, very much prevalent.
We first refine the notion of Anamorphic Encryption with respect to the nature of covert communication. Specifically, we distinguish {\em Single-Receiver Encryption} for many to one communication, and {\em Multiple-Receiver Encryption} for many to many communication within the group of conspiring (against the dictator) users. We then show that Anamorphic Encryption can be embedded in the randomness used in the encryption, and give families of constructions that can be applied to numerous ciphers. In total the families cover classical encryption schemes, some of which in actual use (RSA-OAEP, Pailler, Goldwasser-Micali, ElGamal schemes, Cramer-Shoup, and Smooth Projective Hash based systems). Among our examples is an anamorphic channel with much higher capacity than the regular channel. In sum, the work shows the very large extent of the potential futility of control and censorship over the use of strong encryption by the dictator (typical for and even stronger than governments engaging in the ongoing ``crypto-wars''): While such limitations obviously hurt utility which encryption typically brings to safety in computing systems, they essentially, are not helping the dictator. The actual implications of what we show here and what does it mean in practice require further policy and legal analyses and perspectives.
Wissam Ghantous, Federico Pintore, Mattia Veroni
In this note we assess the efficiency of a SIDH-based digital
signature built on a diminished variant of a recent identification protocol proposed by Basso et al. Despite the devastating attacks against the mathematical problem underlying SIDH, this identification protocol remains secure, as its security is backed by a different (and more standard) isogeny-finding problem.
We conduct our analysis by applying some known cryptographic techniques to decrease the signature size by about 70% for all parameter sets (obtaining signatures of approximately 21 KB for SIKEp434). Moreover, we propose a minor optimisation to compute many isogenies in parallel from the same starting curve. Our assessment confirms that the problem of designing a practical isogeny-based signature scheme remains largely open. However, concretely determine the current state of the art which future optimisations can compare to appears to be of relevance for a problem which has witnessed only small steps towards a solution.
Thomas Aulbach, Simona Samardjiska, Monika Trimoska
This note describes a polynomial-time key-recovery attack on the UOV-based signature scheme called MQ-Sign. The scheme is a first-round candidate in the Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography Competition. Our attack exploits the sparsity of the secret central polynomials in combination with the specific structure of the secret linear map $S$. We provide a verification script that recovers the secret key in less than seven seconds for security level 5.
Pranav Shriram A, Nishat Koti, Varsha Bhat Kukkala, Arpita Patra, Bhavish Raj Gopal, Somya Sangal
Secure shuffle is an important primitive that finds use in several applications such as secure electronic voting, oblivious RAMs, secure sorting, to name a few. For time-sensitive shuffle-based applications that demand a fast response time, it is essential to design a fast and efficient shuffle protocol. In this work, we design secure and fast shuffle protocols relying on the techniques of secure multiparty computation. We make several design choices that aid in achieving highly efficient protocols. Specifically, we consider malicious 3-party computation setting with an honest majority and design robust ring-based protocols. Our shuffle protocols provide a fast online (i.e., input-dependent) phase compared to the state-of-the-art for the considered setting.
To showcase the efficiency improvements brought in by our shuffle protocols, we consider two distinct applications of anonymous broadcast and secure graph computation via the GraphSC paradigm. In both cases, multiple shuffle invocations are required. Hence, going beyond standalone shuffle invocation, we identify two distinct scenarios of multiple invocations and provide customised protocols for the same. Further, we showcase that our customized protocols not only provide a fast response time, but also provide improved overall run time for multiple shuffle invocations. With respect to the applications, we not only improve in terms of efficiency, but also work towards providing improved security guarantees, thereby outperforming the respective state-of-the-art works. We benchmark our shuffle protocols and the considered applications to analyze the efficiency improvements with respect to various parameters.
To showcase the efficiency improvements brought in by our shuffle protocols, we consider two distinct applications of anonymous broadcast and secure graph computation via the GraphSC paradigm. In both cases, multiple shuffle invocations are required. Hence, going beyond standalone shuffle invocation, we identify two distinct scenarios of multiple invocations and provide customised protocols for the same. Further, we showcase that our customized protocols not only provide a fast response time, but also provide improved overall run time for multiple shuffle invocations. With respect to the applications, we not only improve in terms of efficiency, but also work towards providing improved security guarantees, thereby outperforming the respective state-of-the-art works. We benchmark our shuffle protocols and the considered applications to analyze the efficiency improvements with respect to various parameters.
Dustin Kern, Christoph Krauß, Timm Lauser, Nouri Alnahawi, Alexander Wiesmaier, Ruben Niederhagen
ISO 15118 enables charging and billing of Electric Vehicles
(EVs) without user interaction by using locally installed cryptographic credentials that must be secure over the long lifetime of vehicles. In the dawn of quantum computers, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) needs to be integrated into the EV charging infrastructure. In this paper, we propose QuantumCharge, a PQC extension for ISO 15118, which includes concepts for migration, crypto-agility, verifiable security, and the use of PQC-enabled hardware security modules. Our prototypical implementation and the practical evaluation demonstrate the feasibility, and our formal analysis shows the security of QuantumCharge, which thus paves the way for secure EV charging infrastructures of the future.
26 March 2023
University of Surrey
We are looking for a research/senior research fellow for 2 years in the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security. The post is to conduct research in secure systems. The area of focus will be systems architectures and formal verification and the application area of interest is primarily systems that require the provision of authentication and attestation.
The centre is renowned for its security, distributed systems and verification research with leading publications, excellent links with industry and international standard bodies. It is an exiting time to join the centre as we are already working on research in the areas of passwordless authentication, swarm attestation and much more.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Professor Helen Treharne (h.treharne@surrey.ac.uk)
More information: https://www.jobs.ac.uk/job/CYF414/research-fellow-senior-research-fellow-in-secure-systems
24 March 2023
Mathieu Gross, Robert Kunzelmann, Georg Sigl
FPGA-SoCs are a popular platform for accelerating a wide
range of applications due to their performance and flexibility. From a
security point of view, these systems have been shown to be vulnerable
to various attacks, especially side-channel attacks where an attacker can
obtain the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm via laboratory mea-
surement equipment or even remotely with sensors implemented inside
the FPGA logic itself. Fortunately, a variety of countermeasures on the
algorithmic level have been proposed to mitigate this threat. Beyond side-
channel attacks, covert channels constitute another threat which enables
communication through a hidden channel. In this work, we demonstrate
the possibility of implementing a covert channel between the CPU and
an FPGA by modulating the usage of the Power Distribution Network.
We show that this resource is especially vulnerable since it can be easily
controlled and observed, resulting in a stealthy communication and a
high transmission data rate. The power usage is modulated using simple
and inconspicuous instructions executed on the CPU. Additionally, we
use Time-to-Digital Converter sensors to observe these power variations.
The sensor circuits are programmed into the FPGA fabric using only
standard logic components. Our covert channel achieves a transmission
rate of up to 16.7 kbit/s combined with an error rate of 2.3%. Besides
a good transmission quality, our covert channel is also stealthy and can
be used as an activation function for a hardware trojan.
Yu Li, Li-Ping Wang
With the advancement of NIST PQC standardization, three of the four candidates in Round 4 are code-based schemes, namely Classic McEliece, HQC and BIKE. Currently, one of the most important tasks is to further analyze their security levels for the suggested parameter sets. At PKC 2022 Esser and Bellini restated the major information set decoding (ISD) algorithms by using nearest neighbor search and then applied these ISD algorithms to estimate the bit security of Classic McEliece, HQC and BIKE under the suggested parameter sets. However, all major ISD algorithms consume a large amount of memory, which in turn affects their time complexities. In this paper, we reestimate the bit-security levels of the parameter sets suggested by these three schemes in low memory by applying $K$-list sum algorithms to ISD algorithms. Compared with Esser-Bellini's results, our results achieve the best gains for Classic McEliece, HQC, and BIKE, with reductions in bit-security levels of $11.09$, $12.64$, and $12.19$ bits, respectively.
Fabrice Benhamouda, Shai Halevi, Hugo Krawczyk, Tal Rabin, Yiping Ma
We describe high-throughput threshold protocols with guaranteed output delivery for generating Schnorr-type signatures. The protocols run a single message-independent interactive ephemeral randomness generation procedure (e.g., DKG) followed by a \emph{non-interactive} multi-message signature generation procedure. The protocols offer significant increase in throughput already for as few as ten parties while remaining highly-efficient for many hundreds of parties with thousands of signatures generated per minute (and over 10,000 in normal optimistic case).
These protocols extend seamlessly to the dynamic/proactive setting, where each run of the protocol uses a new committee, and they support sub-sampling the committees from among an effectively unbounded number of nodes. The protocols work over a broadcast channel in both synchronous and asynchronous networks.
The combination of these features makes our protocols a good match for implementing a signature service over an (asynchronous) public blockchain with many validators, where guaranteed output delivery is an absolute must. In that setting, there is a system-wide public key, where the corresponding secret signature key is distributed among the validators. Clients can submit messages (under suitable controls, e.g. smart contracts), and authorized messages are signed relative to the global public key.
Asymptotically, when running with committees of $n$ parties, our protocols can generate $\Omega(n^2)$ signatures per run, while providing resilience against $\Omega(n)$ corrupted nodes, and using broadcast bandwidth of only $O(n^2)$ group elements and scalars. For example, we can sign about $n^2/16$ messages using just under $2n^2$ total bandwidth while supporting resilience against $n/4$ corrupted parties, or sign $n^2/8$ messages using just over $2n^2$ total bandwidth with resilience against $n/5$ corrupted parties.
We prove security of our protocols by reduction to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in the random-oracle model.
These protocols extend seamlessly to the dynamic/proactive setting, where each run of the protocol uses a new committee, and they support sub-sampling the committees from among an effectively unbounded number of nodes. The protocols work over a broadcast channel in both synchronous and asynchronous networks.
The combination of these features makes our protocols a good match for implementing a signature service over an (asynchronous) public blockchain with many validators, where guaranteed output delivery is an absolute must. In that setting, there is a system-wide public key, where the corresponding secret signature key is distributed among the validators. Clients can submit messages (under suitable controls, e.g. smart contracts), and authorized messages are signed relative to the global public key.
Asymptotically, when running with committees of $n$ parties, our protocols can generate $\Omega(n^2)$ signatures per run, while providing resilience against $\Omega(n)$ corrupted nodes, and using broadcast bandwidth of only $O(n^2)$ group elements and scalars. For example, we can sign about $n^2/16$ messages using just under $2n^2$ total bandwidth while supporting resilience against $n/4$ corrupted parties, or sign $n^2/8$ messages using just over $2n^2$ total bandwidth with resilience against $n/5$ corrupted parties.
We prove security of our protocols by reduction to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in the random-oracle model.
Hyungrok Jo, Shingo Sato, Junji Shikata
We present a tightly secure identity-based signature (IBS) scheme based on the supersingular isogeny problems. Although Shaw and Dutta proposed an isogeny-based IBS scheme with provable security, the security reduction is non-tight. For an IBS scheme with concrete security, the tightness of its security reduction affects the key size and signature size. Hence, it is reasonable to focus on a tight security proof for an isogeny-based IBS scheme. In this paper, we propose an isogeny-based IBS scheme based on the lossy CSI-FiSh signature scheme and give a tight security reduction for this scheme. While the existing isogeny-based IBS has the square-root advantage loss in the security proof, the security proof for our IBS scheme avoids such advantage loss, due to the properties of lossy CSI-FiSh.
Keita Emura
Chen et al. (IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing 2022) introduced dual-server public key authenticated encryption with keyword search (DS-PAEKS), and proposed a DS-PAEKS scheme under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of DS-PAEKS from PAEKS, public key encryption, and signatures. By providing a concrete attack, we show that the DS-PAEKS scheme of Chen et al. is vulnerable. That is, the proposed generic construction yields the first DS-PAEKS schemes. Our attack with a slight modification works against the Chen et al. dual-server public key encryption with keyword search (DS-PEKS) scheme (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2016). Moreover, we demonstrate that the Tso et al. generic construction of DS-PEKS from public key encryption (IEEE Access 2020) is also vulnerable. We also analyze other pairing-free PAEKS schemes (Du et al., Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2022 and Lu and Li, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 2022). Though we did not find any attack against these schemes, we show that at least their security proofs are wrong.
Shuichi Hirahara, Rahul Ilango, Zhenjian Lu, Mikito Nanashima, Igor C. Oliveira
Symmetry of Information (SoI) is a fundamental property of Kolmogorov complexity that relates the complexity of a pair of strings and their conditional complexities. Understanding if this property holds in the time-bounded setting is a longstanding open problem. In the nineties, Longpré and Mocas (1993) and Longpré and Watanabe (1995) established that if SoI holds for time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity then cryptographic one-way functions do not exist, and asked if a converse holds.
We show that one-way functions exist if and only if (probabilistic) time-bounded SoI fails on average, i.e., if there is a samplable distribution of pairs (x,y) of strings such that SoI for pK$^t$ complexity fails for many of these pairs. Our techniques rely on recent perspectives offered by probabilistic Kolmogorov complexity and meta-complexity, and reveal further equivalences between inverting one-way functions and the validity of key properties of Kolmogorov complexity in the time-bounded setting: (average-case) language compression and (average-case) conditional coding.
Motivated by these results, we investigate correspondences of this form for the worst-case hardness of NP (i.e., NP ⊄ BPP) and for the average-case hardness of NP (i.e., DistNP ⊄ HeurBPP), respectively. Our results establish the existence of similar dualities between these computational assumptions and the failure of results from Kolmogorov complexity in the time-bounded setting. In particular, these characterizations offer a novel way to investigate the main hardness conjectures of complexity theory (and the relationships among them) through the lens of Kolmogorov complexity and its properties.
We show that one-way functions exist if and only if (probabilistic) time-bounded SoI fails on average, i.e., if there is a samplable distribution of pairs (x,y) of strings such that SoI for pK$^t$ complexity fails for many of these pairs. Our techniques rely on recent perspectives offered by probabilistic Kolmogorov complexity and meta-complexity, and reveal further equivalences between inverting one-way functions and the validity of key properties of Kolmogorov complexity in the time-bounded setting: (average-case) language compression and (average-case) conditional coding.
Motivated by these results, we investigate correspondences of this form for the worst-case hardness of NP (i.e., NP ⊄ BPP) and for the average-case hardness of NP (i.e., DistNP ⊄ HeurBPP), respectively. Our results establish the existence of similar dualities between these computational assumptions and the failure of results from Kolmogorov complexity in the time-bounded setting. In particular, these characterizations offer a novel way to investigate the main hardness conjectures of complexity theory (and the relationships among them) through the lens of Kolmogorov complexity and its properties.
Nina Bindel, Britta Hale
This draft presents work-in-progress concerning hybrid/composite signature schemes. More concretely, we give several tailored combinations of Fiat-Shamir based signature schemes (such as Dilithium) or Falcon with RSA or DSA. We observe that there are a number of signature hybridization goals, few of which are not achieved through parallel signing or concatenation approaches. These include proof composability (that the post-quantum hybrid signature security can easily be linked to the component algorithms), weak separability, strong separability, backwards compatibility, hybrid generality (i.e., hybrid compositions that can be instantiated with different algorithms once proven to be secure), and simultaneous verification. We do not consider backwards compatibility in this work, but aim in our constructions to show the feasibility of achieving all other properties. As a work-in-progress, the constructions are presented without the accompanying formal security analysis, to be included in an update.
Sven Bauer, Fabrizio De Santis
We describe a fault attack against the deterministic variant of the Falcon signature scheme. It is the first fault attack that exploits specific properties of deterministic Falcon. The attack works under a very liberal and realistic single fault random model. The main idea is to inject a fault into the pseudo-random generator of the pre-image trapdoor sampler, generate different signatures for the same input, find reasonably short lattice vectors this way, and finally use lattice reduction techniques to obtain the private key. We investigate the relationship between fault location, the number of faults, computational effort for a possibly remaining exhaustive search step and success probability.
Islam Faisal
This work is motivated by the following question: can an untrusted quantum server convince a classical verifier of the answer to an efficient quantum computation using only polylogarithmic communication? We show how to achieve this in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), after a non-succinct instance-independent setup phase.
We introduce and formalize the notion of post-quantum interactive oracle arguments for languages in QMA, a generalization of interactive oracle proofs (Ben-Sasson-Chiesa-Spooner). We then show how to compile any non-adaptive public-coin interactive oracle argument (with private setup) into a succinct argument (with setup) in the QROM.
To conditionally answer our motivating question via this framework under the post-quantum hardness assumption of LWE, we show that the XZ local Hamiltonian problem with at least inverse-polylogarithmic relative promise gap has an interactive oracle argument with instance-independent setup, which we can then compile.
Assuming a variant of the quantum PCP conjecture that we introduce called the weak XZ quantum PCP conjecture, we obtain a succinct argument for QMA (and consequently the verification of quantum computation) in the QROM (with non-succinct instance-independent setup) which makes only black-box use of the underlying cryptographic primitives.
We introduce and formalize the notion of post-quantum interactive oracle arguments for languages in QMA, a generalization of interactive oracle proofs (Ben-Sasson-Chiesa-Spooner). We then show how to compile any non-adaptive public-coin interactive oracle argument (with private setup) into a succinct argument (with setup) in the QROM.
To conditionally answer our motivating question via this framework under the post-quantum hardness assumption of LWE, we show that the XZ local Hamiltonian problem with at least inverse-polylogarithmic relative promise gap has an interactive oracle argument with instance-independent setup, which we can then compile.
Assuming a variant of the quantum PCP conjecture that we introduce called the weak XZ quantum PCP conjecture, we obtain a succinct argument for QMA (and consequently the verification of quantum computation) in the QROM (with non-succinct instance-independent setup) which makes only black-box use of the underlying cryptographic primitives.
Laurane Marco, Abdullah Talayhan, Serge Vaudenay
The Bitcoin architecture heavily relies on the ECDSA signature scheme which is broken by quantum adversaries as the secret key can be computed from the public key in quantum polynomial time. To mitigate this attack, bitcoins can be paid to the hash of a public key (P2PKH). However, the first payment reveals the public key so all bitcoins attached to it must be spent at the same time (i.e. the remaining amount must be transferred to a new wallet). Some problems remain with this approach: the owners are vulnerable against rushing adversaries between the time the signature is made public and the time it is committed to the blockchain. Additionally, there is no equivalent mechanism for threshold signatures. Finally, no formal analysis of P2PKH has been done.
In this paper, we formalize the security notion of a digital signature with a hidden public key and we propose and prove the security of a generic transformation that converts a classical signature to a post-quantum one that can be used only once. We compare it with P2PKH. Namely, our proposal relies on pre-image resistance instead of collision resistance as for P2PKH, so allows for shorter hashes. Additionally, we propose the notion of a delay signature to address the problem of the rushing adversary when used with a public ledger and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our approach. We further extend our results to threshold signatures.
Nick Frymann, Daniel Gardham, Mark Manulis
Asynchronous Remote Key Generation (ARKG), introduced by Frymann et al. at CCS 2020, allows for the generation of unlinkable public keys by third parties, for which corresponding private keys may be later learned only by the key pair's legitimate owner. These key pairs can then be used in common public-key cryptosystems, including signatures, PKE, KEMs, and schemes supporting delegation, such as proxy signatures. The only known instance of ARKG generates discrete-log-based keys.
In this paper, we introduce new ARKG constructions for lattice-based cryptosystems. The key pairs generated using our ARKG scheme can be applied to lattice-based signatures and KEMs, which have recently been selected for standardisation in the NIST PQ process, or as alternative candidates.
In particular, we address challenges associated with the noisiness of lattice hardness assumptions, which requires a new generalised definition of ARKG correctness, whilst preserving the security and privacy properties of the former instantiation. Our ARKG construction uses key encapsulation techniques by Brendel et al. (SAC 2020) coined Split KEMs. As an additional contribution, we also show that Kyber (Bos et al., EuroS&P 2018) can be used to construct a Split KEM. The security of our protocol is based on standard LWE assumptions. We also discuss its use with selected candidates from the NIST process and provide an implementation and benchmarks.
In this paper, we introduce new ARKG constructions for lattice-based cryptosystems. The key pairs generated using our ARKG scheme can be applied to lattice-based signatures and KEMs, which have recently been selected for standardisation in the NIST PQ process, or as alternative candidates.
In particular, we address challenges associated with the noisiness of lattice hardness assumptions, which requires a new generalised definition of ARKG correctness, whilst preserving the security and privacy properties of the former instantiation. Our ARKG construction uses key encapsulation techniques by Brendel et al. (SAC 2020) coined Split KEMs. As an additional contribution, we also show that Kyber (Bos et al., EuroS&P 2018) can be used to construct a Split KEM. The security of our protocol is based on standard LWE assumptions. We also discuss its use with selected candidates from the NIST process and provide an implementation and benchmarks.