IACR News
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28 January 2019
Hayo Baan, Sauvik Bhattacharya, Scott Fluhrer, Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Thijs Laarhoven, Ronald Rietman, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen, Ludo Tolhuizen, Zhenfei Zhang
Martin R. Albrecht, Léo Ducas, Gottfried Herold, Elena Kirshanova, Eamonn W. Postlethwaite, Marc Stevens
Moreover, we provide a highly optimised, multi-threaded and tweakable implementation of this machine which we make open-source. We then illustrate the performance of this implementation of our sieving strategies by applying G6K to various lattice challenges. In particular, our approach allows us to solve previously unsolved instances of the Darmstadt SVP (151, 153, 155) and LWE (e.g. (75, 0.005)) challenges. Our solution for the SVP-151 challenge was found 400 times faster than the time reported for the SVP-150 challenge, the previous record. For exact SVP, we observe a performance crossover between G6K and FPLLL's state of the art implementation of enumeration at dimension 70.
Nir Drucker, Shay Gueron
Laltu Sardar, Sushmita Ruj
We study the link prediction problem on encrypted graphs. To the best of our knowledge, this secure link prediction problem has not been studied before. We use the number of common neighbors for prediction. We present three algorithms for the secure link prediction problem. We design prototypes of the schemes and formally prove their security. We execute our algorithms in real-life datasets.
George Teseleanu
Erdem Alkim, Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Nina Bindel, Patrick Longa, Jefferson E. Ricardini
Peter T. Breuer
Zhen Liu, Yanbin Pan, Zhenfei Zhang
Nils Fleischhacker, Giulio Malavolta, Dominique Schröder
Stephan Krenn, Kai Samelin, Christoph Striecks
Aner Ben Efraim, Eran Omri
One of the most popular and efficient protocols for secure multiparty computation working in this model is the SPDZ protocol (Damgaard et al., CRYPTO 2012). The SPDZ offline phase is function independent, i.e., does not requires knowledge of the computed function at the offline phase. Thus, a natural question is: can the efficiency of the SPDZ protocol be improved if the function is known at the offline phase?
In this work, we answer the above question affirmatively. We show that by using a function dependent preprocessing protocol, the online communication of the SPDZ protocol can be brought down significantly, almost by a factor of 2, and the online computation is often also significantly reduced. In scenarios where communication is the bottleneck, such as strong computers on low bandwidth networks, this could potentially almost double the online throughput of the SPDZ protocol, when securely computing the same circuit many times in parallel (on different inputs).
We present two versions of our protocol: Our first version uses the SPDZ offline phase protocol as a black-box, which achieves the improved online communication at the cost of slightly increasing the offline communication. Our second version works by modifying the state-of-the-art SPDZ preprocessing protocol, Overdrive (Keller et al., Eurocrypt 2018). This version improves the overall communication over the state-of-the-art SPDZ when the function is known at the offline phase.
Kangquan Li, Longjiang Qu, Bing Sun, Chao Li
Alan Kaminsky
Michael Scott
Matthieu Rivain, Junwei Wang
In this work, we provide an in-depth analysis of when and why DCA works. We pinpoint the properties of the target variables and the encodings that make the attack (in)feasible. In particular, we show that DCA can break encodings wider than 4-bit, such as byte encodings. Additionally, we propose new DCA-like attacks inspired from side-channel analysis techniques. Specifically, we describe a collision attack particularly effective against the internal encoding countermeasure. We also investigate mutual information analysis (MIA) which naturally applies in this context. Compared to the original DCA, these attacks are also passive and they require very limited knowledge of the attacked implementation, but they achieve significant improvements in terms of trace complexity. All the analyses of our work are experimentally backed up with various attack simulation results. We also verified the practicability of our analyses and attack techniques against a publicly available white-box AES implementation protected with byte encodings --which DCA has failed to break before-- and against a ``masked'' white-box AES implementation --which intends to resist DCA.
27 January 2019
Rabat, Morocco, 9 July - 11 July 2019
Submission deadline: 10 March 2019
Notification: 15 April 2019
25 January 2019
Microsoft Redmond, WA USA
The researchers and engineers in the MSR Security and Cryptography team pursue both theoretical and applied research in our field that will have impact for Microsoft, Microsoft’s customers, and the industry at large. Our current projects include the design and development of quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms and protocols, high-performance post-quantum cryptographic libraries, quantum cryptanalysis, and end-to-end verifiable election technology.
We are interested in applicants with expertise in one or more of the following: isogeny-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, classical and quantum cryptanalysis, and the design of key exchange and digital signature primitives with post-quantum security.
Closing date for applications: 30 June 2019
Contact: Dr. Brian LaMacchia, CryptoIntern (at) microsoft.com
More information: https://careers.microsoft.com/us/en/job/573172/Research-Intern-MSR-Security-and-Cryptography
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security (Saarbrücken, Germany)
The Elite Research Career Program intends to offer the very best postdoctoral cybersecurity researchers a unique career path at two of the leading cybersecurity institutes in the world. The program consists of three consecutive phases:
- a preparatory 1-2 year postdoctoral phase (Phase P) at CISPA, followed by
- a 2-year appointment at Stanford University (Phase I) as a visiting assistant professor, followed by
- a 3-year position at CISPA as an independent research group leader (Phase II).
Applicants to the program must have completed a distinguished PhD and demonstrated their potential to become future leaders in their field of research. After their return from Stanford candidates are invited to apply for CISPA Tenure Track Faculty Positions and will be considered for fast track.
Closing date for applications: 31 January 2019
Contact: Dr. Sandra Strohbach, Mail: application (at) cispa-stanford.org
More information: https://www.cispa-stanford.org/application.html
DEDIS Lab at EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
The ideal candidate is ready to scale their code from proof-of-concept to production, likes to build real software for real people to use, and believes their code can change the world for the better. A deep understanding of distributed systems, networking, and applied cryptography is a major bonus.
Closing date for applications: 28 February 2019
Contact: Jeff R. Allen
More information: https://stackoverflow.com/jobs/232489/security-privacy-software-engineer-dedis-lab-at-epfl