International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Cap Gemini funds a chair « blockchains and B2B platforms » fostering research and teaching at École Polytechnique. The Departments of Computer Science and Economics at École Polytechnique thus welcome applications for a post-doctoral research position in the blockchain domain.

Depending on her/his profile, the chosen candidate will become a member of the cryptography team («Grace», joint with INRIA) at the Department of Computer Science, or of the Department of Economics. Candidates must hold a Ph.D. in computer science or in Economics, and have demonstrated great ability in research and teaching. Candidates must present a scientific research project in relation to blockchains.

The mission of the accepted candidate will be to develop research, coordinate with PhD students and researchers, and also support the activities of the chair, by outreaching to the blockchain network in the Paris area, but also worldwide, and by supporting the communication and PR of the chair. If she/he wishes to, the candidate will be able to complement his or her activity by doing lectures, labs and student projects about blockchain platforms.

Through a fast and lightweight process the candidate will be hired from Winter 2020 for two years, which could be extended for two more years after a further review process. The complementary teaching activity, if any, may complement the base salary. Successful candidates will work at Ecole Polytechnique located in Palaiseau, Paris area, France.

Deadline for Application: July 23rd, 2020

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Daniel Augot, Senior researcher, INRIA and École polytechnique. Daniel.Augot@inria.fr

More information: https://blockchain-chair.io/

The CryptoLux group of the University of Luxembourg invites applications from Ph.D. holders in the general area of applied cryptography. CryptoLux is a group of cryptographers and security researchers interested in applied cryptography, cryptanalysis, privacy, network security, cryptographic blockchains and is led by Prof. Alex Biryukov. Candidates with interest in the following topics are welcome to apply:

• Design and cryptanalysis of symmetric cryptographic primitives
• Cryptocurrencies, blockchain
• Privacy enhancing technologies, Tor
• Side-channel attacks and countermeasures
• White-box cryptography

Candidates must have a Ph.D. degree in Computer Science, Applied Mathematics or a related field; competitive research record in applied cryptography or information security (at least one paper in top 10 IT security conferences); strong mathematical and algorithmic CS background; fluent written and verbal communication skills in English.

The University offers a two-year employment contract, which may be extended up to five years. The University of Luxembourg offers excellent working conditions and a highly competitive salary. Interested candidates are invited to send their application by email to Alex Biryukov before August 1, 2020. The application should contain a brief cover letter explaining the candidate's research interests, CV with photo, a list of publications and the names and contacts of 3 references.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Alex Biryukov

More information: https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Vacancies

The Department of Computer Science at New Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT) seeks candidates to fill a University Lecturer/Senior University Lecturer position. Successful candidates must have an MS in Computer Science or a related computing area and will have demonstrated an expert grasp of knowledge of the Cybersecurity field at all levels, either through a demonstrated record of teaching excellence, or through industrial experience.

Candidates are expected to mainly teach courses under the umbrella of Cybersecurity in support of our graduate and undergraduate programs. The successful candidate will also be involved in creating course content and materials with a focus on experiential and project-based learning.

Interested applicants should submit their CV and the names of at least two references by applying as soon as possible at https://njit.csod.com/ats/careersite/JobDetails.aspx?site=1&id=1961. Applications will be reviewed on a rolling basis until the position is filled.

Work environment and location:
The Computer Science department, part of the Ying Wu College of Computing Sciences, is the largest at NJIT, comprising one tenth of the student population. It is also the largest computer science department among all research universities in the New York metropolitan area.​ Located in Northern New Jersey, within the greater New York Metropolitan area, NJIT is part of a vibrant ecosystem of research universities and corporate research centers.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Reza Curtmola

More information: https://njit.csod.com/ats/careersite/JobDetails.aspx?site=1&id=1961

The Privacy & Security group at University of Luebeck seeks to hire doctoral students for research in the one or more of the following areas:

• enhancing or attacking training-data-privacy in machine learning algorithms
• ensuring or attacking the robustness of machine learning algorithms
• privacy-preserving health applications (including epidemiological applications)
• privacy-preserving Smart Grid, Smart City applications
• anonymous communication

The ideal candidate is enthusiastic and has a strong background and interest in one or more of the following areas:

• information security, differential privacy, or cryptography
• mathematical statistics and probability theory
• machine learning

Candidates with a strong theoretical background in related areas are also encouraged to apply. Formal requirements for doctoral students are a master's or equivalent degree. The doctoral student will be a paid employee of University of Lübeck according to standard collective labour agreement regulations (TV-L E13, 100%), which compared to the local cost of living provides an attractive salary and attractive working conditions.

Applications should include a curriculum vitae, a brief description of research interests, transcripts of grades, 2-3 letters of recommendation from teachers or employers, and, if possible, the Master's or Bachelor's thesis and publications.

• Application deadline: 30 August 2020 (later applications might also be considered)
• Starting date: 1 October 2020 (negotiable)

About our group: The Privacy & Security group at the Institute for IT-security at the University of Lübeck works on researching privacy-preserving and robust methods to perform computations on large datasets such that the system work as expected and privacy of individuals is protected, including privacy-preserving machine learning, and anonymous communication.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Dr. Esfandiar Mohammadi
Privacy & Security group
University of Lübeck
https://mohammadi.eu

More information: https://www.its.uni-luebeck.de/fileadmin/files/jobs/privsec_open_positions.pdf

The PhD students will join Prof. Mitrokotsa's group focusing on security and cryptography, working in the area of privacy-preserving biometric authentication and within the Marie Curie ITN project: "TRESPASS-ETN: Training in Secure and Privacy-preserving biometrics". Privacy-preserving biometric authentication focuses on guaranteeing accurate biometric authentication, while at the same time providing strong privacy guarantees (e.g., avoid tracking, profiling of users and leakage of sensitive information). The focus of one of the PhD positions would be to examine how to guarantee privacy-preservation in biometric authentication systems by employing advanced cryptographic methods such as secure multiparty computation (SMPC) primitives (e.g., homomorphic encryption) and verifiable computation (when biometric authentication is applied in a distributed setting). The second PhD position will focus on employing differentially private mechanisms in the biometric authentication process. The goal is to achieve high accuracy in the authentication process, while at the same time avoid any leakage of information. The PhD student will be supervised by Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa in the area of information security and cryptography.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa

More information: https://www.chalmers.se/en/about-chalmers/Working-at-Chalmers/Vacancies/Pages/default.aspx?rmpage=job&rmjob=p8404

Shor's quantum algorithm, running in quantum computers, can efficiently solve integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time. This poses an urgent and serious threat to long-term security with recent accelerated evolution of quantum computing. However, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) plans to release its standard of post-quantum cryptography between 2022 and 2024. It is crucially important to propose an early solution, which is likely secure against quantum attacks and classical attacks, and likely to comply with the future NIST standard. A robust combiner combines a set of 2 or more cryptography primitives into a new primitive of the same type, and guarantees that if anyone of the ingredient primitive is secure, then the resulting primitive is secure. This work proposes the first construction of robust combiner for Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), with optimal amortized performance. From our robust combiner of KEMs, we construct efficient stateful hybrid Key Exchange Protocol (KEP), which is more suitable for two parties who will communicate with each other frequently.

We present functional encryption schemes for attribute-weighted sums, where encryption takes as input $N$ attribute-value pairs $(x_i,z_i)$ where $x_i$ is public and $z_i$ is private; secret keys are associated with arithmetic branching programs $f$, and decryption returns the weighted sum $\sum_{i=1}^N f(x_i) z_i$ while leaking no additional information about the $z_i$'s. Our main construction achieves

(1) compact public parameters and key sizes that are independent of $N$ and the secret key can decrypt a ciphertext for any a-prior unbounded $N$;

(2) short ciphertexts that grow with $N$ and the size of $z_i$ but not $x_i$;

(3) simulation-based security against unbounded collusions;

(4) relies on the standard $k$-linear assumption in prime-order bilinear groups.

Reputation systems constitute one of the few workable mechanisms for distributed applications in which users can be made accountable for their actions. By collecting user experiences in reputation profiles, participants are encouraged to interact more with well-behaving peers hence better online behavior is motivated.

In this work, we develop a privacy-preserving reputation scheme for collaborative systems such as P2P networks in which peers can represent themselves with different pseudonyms when interacting with others. All these pseudonyms, however, are bound to the same reputation token. This allows honest peers maintain their good record even when switching to a new pseudonym, while preventing malicious peers from making a fresh start. Apart from an initial offline setup phase which is only needed to ensure reputation soundness but not privacy, our system is truly decentralized. Using an append-only distributed ledger such as Bitcoin’s blockchain, we show how participants can make anonymous yet verifiable assertions about their own reputation. Thus the system maintains soundness, peer-pseudonym unlinkability as well as unlinkability among pseudonyms of the same peer. We formally prove these properties, we discuss ways to eliminate the setup phase and we evaluate the efficiency of the various operations.

Pairings are a powerful tool to build advanced cryptographic schemes. The most efficient way to instantiate a pairing scheme is through Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves.

Because a randomly picked elliptic curve will not support an efficient pairing (the embedding degree will usually be too large to make any computation practical), a pairing-friendly curve has to be carefully constructed. This has led to famous curves, e.g. Barreto-Naehrig curves.

However, the computation of the discrete logarithm problem on the finite-field side has received much interest and its complexity has recently decreased. Hence the need to propose new curves has emerged.

In this work, we give one new curve that is specifically tailored to be fast over the first pairing-group, which is well suited for several cryptographic schemes, such as group signatures and their variants (EPID, anonymous attestation, etc) or accumulators.

We provide a construction of chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption from (injective) trapdoor functions. Our construction is black box and assumes no special properties (e.g. ``lossy'', ``correlated product secure'') of the trapdoor function.

This article describes recent progress in realizing verifiable state machines, a primitive that enables untrusted services to provide cryptographic proofs that they operate correctly. Applications of this primitive range from proving the correct operation of distributed and concurrent cloud services to reducing blockchain transaction costs by leveraging inexpensive off-chain computation without trust.

The use of deep learning in side-channel analysis has been more and more prominent recently. In particular, Convolution Neural Networks (CNN) are very efficient tools to extract the secret information from side-channel traces. Previous work regarding the use of CNN in side-channel has been mostly proposed through practical results. Zaid et al. have proposed a theoretical methodology in order to better understand the convolutional part of CNN and to understand how to construct an efficient CNN in the side-channel context [ZBHV19]. The proposal of Zaid et al. has been recently questioned by [WAGP20]. However this revisit is based on wrong assumptions and misinterpretations. Hence, many of the claims of [WAGP20] are unfounded regarding [ZBHV19]. In this paper, we clear out the potential misunderstandings brought by [WAGP20] and explain more thoroughly the contributions of [ZBHV19].

We carry out the first provable security analysis of the new FIDO2 protocols, the promising FIDO Alliance’s proposal for a standard for passwordless user authentication. Our analysis covers the core components of FIDO2: the new Client-to-Authenticator Protocol (CTAP2) and the Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specification.

Our analysis is modular. For CTAP2 and WebAuthn, in turn, we propose appropriate security models that aim to capture their intended security goals and use the models to analyze security. We identify a series of shortcomings and propose stronger protocols designed to withstand stronger yet realistic adversaries. Next, we prove the security guarantees FIDO2 provides based on the security of its components.

We expect that our models and provable security results will help clarify the security guarantees of the FIDO2 protocols. In addition, our proposed constructions should pave the way towards the design and deployment of more secure passwordless user authentication protocols.

Time-release cryptography requires problems that take a long time to solve and take just as long even with significant computational resources. While time-release cryptography originated with the seminal paper of Rivest, Shamir and Wagner ('96), it has gained special visibility recently due to new time-release primitives, like verifiable delay functions (VDFs) and sequential proofs of work, and their novel blockchain applications. In spite of this recent progress, security definitions remain inconsistent and fragile, and foundational treatment of these primitives is scarce. Relationships between the various time-release primitives are elusive, with few connections to standard cryptographic assumptions.

We systematically address these drawbacks. We define formal notions of sequential functions, the building blocks of time-release cryptography. The new definitions are robust against change of machine models, making them more amenable to complexity theoretic treatment. We demonstrate the equivalence of various types of sequential functions under standard cryptographic assumptions. The time-release primitives in the literature (such as those defined by Bitansky et al. (ITCS '16)) imply that these primitives exist, as well as the converse.

However, showing that a given construction is a sequential function is a hard circuit lower bound problem. To our knowledge, no results show that standard cryptographic assumptions imply any sequentiality. For example, repeated squaring over RSA groups is assumed to be sequential, but nothing connects this conjecture to standard hardness assumptions. To circumvent this, we construct a function that we prove is sequential if there exists any sequential function, without needing any specific knowledge of this hypothetical function. Our techniques use universal circuits and fully homomorphic encryption and generalize some of the elegant techniques of the recent work on lattice NIZKs (Canetti et al., STOC '19).

Using our reductions and sequential function constructions, we build VDFs and sequential proofs of work from fully homomorphic encryption, incremental verifiable computation, and the existence of a sequential function. Though our constructions are theoretical in nature and not competitive with existing techniques, they are built from much weaker assumptions than known constructions.

Existing approaches to secure multiparty computation (MPC) require all the participants to commit to the entire duration of the protocol. As interest in MPC continues to grow, it is inevitable that there will be a desire to use it to evaluate increasingly complex functionalities on massive datasets, resulting in computations spanning several hours or days. Such scenarios call for a dynamic participation model for MPC where participants have the flexibility to go offline as needed and (re)join when they have available computational resources. Such a model would also democratize access to privacy-preserving computation by facilitating an ``MPC-as-a-service'' paradigm --- the deployment of MPC in volunteer-operated networks that perform computation on behalf of clients.

In this work, we initiate the study of ``fluid MPC'', where parties can dynamically join and leave the computation. The minimum commitment required from each participant is referred to as ``fluidity'', measured in the number of rounds of communication that it must stay online. Our contributions are threefold:

1) We provide a formal treatment of fluid MPC, exploring various possible modeling choices.

2) We construct information-theoretic fluid MPC protocols in the honest-majority setting. Our protocols achieve ``maximal fluidity'', meaning that a party can exit the computation after receiving and sending messages in one round.

3) We implement our protocol and test it in multiple network settings.

In a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof of partial knowledge, introduced by Cramer, Damgard and Schoenmakers (CRYPTO 1994), a prover claiming knowledge of witnesses for some $k$-subset of $n$ given public statements can convince the verifier without revealing which $k$-subset. The accompanying dedicated solution based on secret sharing achieves linear communication complexity for general $k,n$ and for many natural classes of statements. Especially the case $k=1$ and $n=2$ (``one-out-of-two'') has seen myriad applications during the last decades, e.g., in electronic voting, ring signatures, and confidential transactions systems in general.

In this paper we focus on the discrete logarithms (DL) setting; the prover's claim pertains to knowledge of discrete logarithms of $k$-out-of-$n$ given elements from a group supporting DL-based cryptography. Groth and Kohlweiss (EUROCRYPT 2015) have shown how to solve the special case $k=1$ and general $n$ with logarithmic communication instead of linear. However, their method, which is original, takes explicit advantage of $k=1$ and does not generalize to $k>1$ without losing all advantage over prior work.

Our contributions are as follows. We show a solution with logarithmic communication for general $k,n$ instead of just $k=1$ and general $n$ from prior work. Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform renders a non-interactive logarithmic-size zero-knowledge proof. Our approach deploys a novel twist on a basic primitive from Compressed $\Sigma$-Protocol Theory (CRYPTO 2020) that we then utilize to compress a carefully chosen adaptation of the CRYPTO 1994 approach down to logarithmic size. Interestingly, even for $k=1$ and general $n$ our approach improves prior work as it reduces communication up to almost a factor $1/2$.

We also generalize this to proofs of partial knowledge about compact commitments of long vectors. Optionally, the prover may at the same time demonstrate his secret to satisfy some arbitrary given constraint. Finally, we also generalize from threshold to arbitrary access structures.

A continuous group key agreement (CGKA) protocol allows a long-lived group of parties to agree on a continuous stream of fresh secret key material. The protocol must support constantly changing group membership, make no assumptions about when, if, or for how long members come online, nor rely on any trusted group managers. Due to sessions' long life-time, CGKA protocols must simultaneously ensure both post-compromise security and forward secrecy (PCFS). That is, current key material should be secure despite both past and future compromises.

The work of Alwen et al. (CRYPTO'20), introduced the CGKA primitive and identified it as a crucial component for constructing end-to-end secure group messaging protocols (SGM) (though we believe there are certainly more applications given the fundamental nature of key agreement). The authors analyzed the TreeKEM CGKA, which lies at the heart of the SGM protocol under development by the IETF working group on Messaging Layer Security (MLS).

In this work, we continue the study of CGKA as a stand-alone cryptographic primitive. We present $3$ new security notions with increasingly powerful adversaries. Even the weakest of the 3 (passive security) already permits attacks to which all prior constructions (including all variants of TreeKEM) are vulnerable.

Going further, the 2 stronger (active security) notions additionally allow the adversary to use parties' exposed states (and full network control) to mount attacks. These are closely related to so-called insider attacks, which involve malicious group members actively deviating from the protocol. Insider attacks present a significant challenge in the study of CGKA (and SGM). Indeed, we believe ours to be the first security notions (and constructions) to formulate meaningful guarantees (e.g. PCFS) against such powerful adversaries. They are also the first composable security notions for CGKA of any type at all.

In terms of constructions, for each of the 3 security notions we provide a new CGKA scheme enjoying sub-linear (potentially even logarithmic) communication complexity in the number of group members. We prove each scheme optimally secure, in the sense that the only security violations possible are those necessarily implied by correctness.

Reverse engineering of integrated circuits, i.e., understanding the internals of ICs, is required for many benign and malicious applications. Examples of the former are detection of patent infringements, hardware Trojans or IP theft, as well as interface recovery and defect analysis, while malicious applications include IP theft and finding insertion points for hardware Trojans. However, regardless of the application, the reverse engineer initially starts with a large unstructured netlist, forming an incomprehensible sea of gates.

This work presents DANA, a generic, technology-agnostic, and fully automated dataflow analysis methodology for flattened gate-level netlists. By analyzing the flow of data between individual FFs, DANA recovers high-level registers. The key idea behind DANA is to combine independent metrics based on structural and control information with a powerful automated architecture. Notably, DANA works without any thresholds, scenario-dependent parameters, or other "magic" values that the user must choose. We evaluate DANA on nine modern hardware designs, ranging from cryptographic co-processors, over CPUs, to the OpenTitan, a state-of-the-art SOC, which is maintained by the lowRISC initiative with supporting industry partners like Google and Western Digital. Our results demonstrate almost perfect recovery of registers for all case studies, regardless whether they were synthesized as FPGA or ASIC netlists. Furthermore, we explore two applications for dataflow analysis: we show that the raw output of DANA often already allows to identify crucial components and high-level architecture features and also demonstrate its applicability for detecting simple hardware Trojans.

Hence, DANA can be applied universally as the first step when investigating unknown netlists and provides major guidance for human analysts by structuring and condensing the otherwise incomprehensible sea of gates. The implementation of DANA, synthesized netlists, and detailed results will be released as open source.

Hardware obfuscation is widely used in practice to counteract reverse engineering. In recent years, low-level obfuscation via camouflaged gates has been increasingly discussed in the scientific community and industry. In contrast to classical high-level obfuscation, such gates result in recovery of an erroneous netlist. This technology has so far been regarded as a purely defensive tool. We show that low-level obfuscation is in fact a double-edged sword that can also enable stealthy malicious functionalities.

In this work, we present Doppelganger, the first generic design-level obfuscation technique that is based on low-level camouflaging. Doppelganger obstructs central control modules of digital designs, e.g., FSMs or bus controllers, resulting in two different design functionalities: an apparent one that is recovered during reverse engineering and the actual one that is executed during operation. Notably, both functionalities are under the designer's control.

In two case studies, we apply Doppelganger to a universal cryptographic coprocessor. First, we show the defensive capabilities by presenting the reverse engineer with a different mode of operation than the one that is actually executed at an area overhead of less than 0.6%. Then, for the first time, we demonstrate the considerable threat potential through low-level obfuscation. We show how an invisible, remotely exploitable key-leakage Trojan can be injected into the same cryptographic coprocessor just through obfuscation at an area overhead of mere 0.01%.

Recently, Huang et al. proposed a concept of public key encryption with filtered equality test (PKE-FET) that allows a tester who has a warrant for the selected message set to check equality of messages in ciphertexts that belong to that set (Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2017). They also presented an instantiation of the PKE-FET that was asserted to achieve the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) in the standard model. In this note, we show that Huang et al.’s instantiation does not achieve the IND-CCA2 security by presenting a simple adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.