IACR News item: 21 September 2019
Ulrich Haböck, Stephan KrennePrint Report
In an attribute-based credential (ABC) system, users obtain a digital certificate on their personal attributes, and can later prove possession of such a certificate in an unlinkable way, thereby selectively disclosing chosen attributes to the service provider. Recently, the concept of encrypted ABCs (EABCs) was introduced by Krenn et al. at CANS 2017, where virtually all computation is outsourced to a semi-trusted cloud-provider called wallet, thereby overcoming existing efficiency limitations on the users side, and for the first time enabling privacy-preserving identity management as a service. While their approach is highly relevant for bringing ABCs into the real world, we present a simple attack fully breaking privacy of their construction if the wallet colludes with other users a scenario which is not excluded in their analysis and needs to be considered in any realistic modeling. We then revise the construction of Krenn et al. in various ways, such that the above attack is no longer possible. Furthermore, we also remove existing non-collusion assumptions between wallet and service provider or issuer from their construction. Our protocols are still highly efficient in the sense that the computational effort on the end user side consists of a single exponentiation only, and otherwise efficiency is comparable to the original work of Krenn et al.
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