International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks manifest a significant challenge to the security of cryptographic devices. In turn, it is generally quite expensive to protect from SCAs (energy, area, performance etc.). In this work we exhibit a significant change in paradigm for SCA attacks: our proposed attack is quite different from conventional SCA attacks and is able to filter out physical measurement noise, algorithmic noise, as well as thwart various countermeasures, and extract information from the entire leakage waveform as a whole and not only points-of-interest. We demonstrate on measured devices break of masking schemes of orders 2 and 3, supported by a model and also shuffling and dual-rail based countermeasures model; all performed efficiently with the same methodology, and with orders of magnitude less measurements and smaller computation time; underpinning the importance of this form of attack. In essence, in our attack we assume nothing different than a standard side-channel attack, i.e., a known plaintext scenario. However, we further group and classify leakages associated with specific subsets of plaintexts bits. The fact that we group specific (sub-)plaintexts associated leakages, and than in the next stage group or concatenate the associated leakages of these large groups in a predefined ordered sequence (modulation), enables far stronger attacks against SCA protected and unprotected designs. The evaluation-domain or the modulation-domain is the frequency domain in which per frequency it is possible to build a two feature constellation diagrams (amplitude and phase) and construct distinguishers over these diagrams. On top of the methodological contribution of this new SCA, the main observation we push forward is that practically such an attack is devastating for many countermeasures we were used to consider as secure to some level, such as masking or shuffling with large permutation size. As an example, leakage from a third order masked design can be detected with merely 100 leakage traces from the first statistical moment of the leakage as compared to $15\cdot10^6$ traces with conventional SCA leakage detection test from the third statistical order.