International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In public key encryption (PKE), anonymity is essential to ensure privacy by preventing the ciphertext from revealing the recipient’s identity. However, the literature has addressed the anonymity of PKE under different attack scenarios to a limited extent. Benhamouda et al. (TCC 2020) introduced the first formal definition of anonymity for PKE under corruption, and Huang et al. (ASIACRYPT 2022) made further extensions and provided a generic framework. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion named enhanced decryption key exposure resistance (En-DKER) for revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE). This notion ensures that the exposure of decryption keys within any time period will not compromise the confidentiality and anonymity of ciphertexts encrypted during different periods. Meanwhile, we construct the first RIBE scheme with En-DKER and prove its security under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Our scheme offers several advantages. Firstly, the periodic workload of the key generation center (KGC) in our scheme is nearly zero. Secondly, the encryptor does not need to handle real-time revocation information of users within the system. Thirdly, the size of user secret keys remains constant in multi-bit encryption. Additionally, we present a novel approach to delegate a lattice basis. Diverging from the work of Cash et al. (J CRYPTOL 2012), our approach allows for the outsourcing of subsequent sampling operations to an untrusted server. Leveraging this approach, our scheme significantly reduces the periodic workload for users to generate decryption keys. Finally, we efficiently implemented our scheme using the number theory library (NTL) and multi-threaded parallel program. The experimental results confirm the advantages of our scheme.