International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Anonymous credentials are cryptographic mechanisms enabling users to authenticate themselves with a fine-grained control on the information they leak in the process. They have been the topic of countless papers which have improved the performance of such mechanisms or proposed new schemes able to prove ever-more complex statements about the attributes certified by those credentials. However, whereas these papers have studied in depth the problem of the information leaked by the credential and/or the attributes, almost all of them have surprisingly overlooked the information one may infer from the knowledge of the credential issuer.

In this paper we address this problem by showing how one can efficiently hide the actual issuer of a credential within a set of potential issuers. The novelty of our work is that we do not resort to zero-knowledge proofs but instead we show how one can tweak Pointcheval-Sanders signatures to achieve this issuer-hiding property at a very low cost. This results in an efficient anonymous credential system that indeed provide a complete control of the information leaked in the authentication process. Our construction is moreover modular and can then fit a wide spectrum of applications, notably for Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) systems.