IACR News item: 01 December 2023
Jiang Zhang, Yu Chen, Zhenfeng Zhang
ePrint Report
Driven by the open problem raised by Hofheinz and Kiltz
(Journal of Cryptology, 2012), we study the formalization of lattice-based programmable hash function (PHF), and give three types of concrete constructions by using several techniques such as a novel combination of cover-free sets and lattice trapdoors. Under the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS) assumption, we show that any (non-trivial) lattice-based PHF is a collision-resistant hash function, which gives a direct application of this new primitive.
We further demonstrate the power of lattice-based PHF by giving generic constructions of signature and identity-based encryption (IBE) in the standard model, which not only provide a way to unify several previous lattice-based schemes using the partitioning proof techniques, but also allow us to obtain new short signature schemes and IBE schemes from (ideal) lattices. Specifically, by instantiating the generic constructions with our Type-II and Type-III PHF constructions, we immediately obtain two short signatures and two IBE schemes with asymptotically much shorter keys. A major downside which inherits from our Type-II and Type-III PHF constructions is that we can only prove the security of the new signatures and IBEs in the bounded security model that the number Q of the adversary’s queries is required to be known in advance. Another downside is that the computational time of our new signatures and IBEs is a linear function of Q, which is large for typical parameters.
To overcome the above limitations, we also give a refined way of using Type-II and Type-III PHFs to construct lattice-based short signatures with short verification keys in the full security model. In particular, our methods depart from the confined guessing technique of B¨ohl et al. (Eurocrypt’13) that was used to construct previous standard model short signature schemes with short verification keys by Ducas and Micciancio (Crypto’14) and by Alperin-Sheriff (PKC’15), and allow us to achieve much tighter security from weaker hardness assumptions.
We further demonstrate the power of lattice-based PHF by giving generic constructions of signature and identity-based encryption (IBE) in the standard model, which not only provide a way to unify several previous lattice-based schemes using the partitioning proof techniques, but also allow us to obtain new short signature schemes and IBE schemes from (ideal) lattices. Specifically, by instantiating the generic constructions with our Type-II and Type-III PHF constructions, we immediately obtain two short signatures and two IBE schemes with asymptotically much shorter keys. A major downside which inherits from our Type-II and Type-III PHF constructions is that we can only prove the security of the new signatures and IBEs in the bounded security model that the number Q of the adversary’s queries is required to be known in advance. Another downside is that the computational time of our new signatures and IBEs is a linear function of Q, which is large for typical parameters.
To overcome the above limitations, we also give a refined way of using Type-II and Type-III PHFs to construct lattice-based short signatures with short verification keys in the full security model. In particular, our methods depart from the confined guessing technique of B¨ohl et al. (Eurocrypt’13) that was used to construct previous standard model short signature schemes with short verification keys by Ducas and Micciancio (Crypto’14) and by Alperin-Sheriff (PKC’15), and allow us to achieve much tighter security from weaker hardness assumptions.
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