International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Multi-user (mu) security considers large-scale attackers that, given access to a number of cryptosystem in stances, attempt to compromise at least one of them. We initiate the study of mu security of the so-called GGMtree that stems from the PRG-to-PRF transformation of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali, with a goal to provide references for its recently popularized use in applied cryptography. We propose a generalized model for GGM trees and analyze its mu prefix-constrained PRF security in the random oracle model. Our model allows to derive concrete bounds and improvements for various protocols, and we showcase on the Bitcoin-Improvement-Proposal standard Bip32 hierarchical wallets and function secret sharing (FSS) proto cols. In both scenarios, we propose improvements with better performance and concrete security bounds at the same time. Compared with the state-of-the-art designs, our SHACAL3- and KeccaK-?-based Bip32 vari ants reduce the communication cost of MPC-based implementations by 73.3%∼93.8%, while our AES-based FSS substantially improves mu security while reducing computations by 50%.