International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Universal verifiability is a must-to-have for electronic voting schemes. It is essential to ensure honest behavior of all the players during the whole process, together with the eligibility. However, it should not endanger the privacy of the individual votes, which is another major requirement. Whereas the first property prevents attacks during the voting process, privacy of the votes should hold forever, which has been called everlasting privacy.

A classical approach for universal verifiability is to add some proofs together with the encrypted votes, which requires publication of the latter, while eligibility needs a link between the votes and the voters: it definitely excludes long-term privacy. An alternative is the use of perfectly-hiding commitments, on which proofs are published, while ciphertexts are kept private for computing the tally.

In this paper, we show how recent linearly-homomorphic signatures can be exploited for all the proofs, leading to very efficient procedures towards universal verifiability with both strong receipt-freeness and everlasting privacy. Privacy will indeed be unconditional, after the publication of the results and the proofs, whereas the soundness of the proofs holds in the algebraic group model and the random oracle model.