IACR News item: 12 June 2024
Aruna Jayasena, Richard Bachmann, Prabhat Mishra
ePrint Report
Software based cryptographic implementations provide flexibility but they face performance limitations. In contrast, hardware based cryptographic accelerators utilize application-specific customization to provide real-time security solutions.
Cryptographic instruction-set extensions (CISE) combine the advantages of both hardware and software based solutions to provide higher performance combined with the flexibility of atomic-level cryptographic operations. While CISE is widely used to develop security solutions, side-channel analysis of CISE-based devices is in its infancy. Specifically, it is important to evaluate whether the power usage and electromagnetic emissions of CISE-based devices have any correlation with its internal operations, which an adversary can exploit to deduce cryptographic secrets.
In this paper, we propose a test vector leakage assessment framework to evaluate the pre-silicon prototypes at the early stages of the design life-cycle. Specifically, we first identify functional units with the potential for leaking information through power side-channel signatures and then evaluate them on system prototypes by generating the necessary firmware to maximize the side-channel signature. Our experimental results on two RISC-V based cryptographic extensions, RISCV-CRYPTO and XCRYPTO, demonstrated that seven out of eight prototype AES- and SHA-related functional units are vulnerable to leaking cryptographic secrets through their power side-channel signature even in full system mode with a statistical significance of $\alpha = 0.05$.
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