International Association
for Cryptologic Research

The parallel broadcast (PBC) problem generalises the classic Byzantine broadcast problem to the setting where all $n$ nodes broadcast a message and deliver $O(n)$ messages. PBC arises naturally in many settings including multi-party computation. Recently, Tsimos, Loss, and Papamanthou (CRYPTO 2022) showed PBC protocols with improved communication, against an adaptive adversary who can corrupt all but a constant fraction $\epsilon$ of nodes (i.e., $f < (1 - \epsilon)n$). However, their study is limited to single-bit messages, and their protocols have large polynomial overhead in the security parameter $\kappa$: their TrustedPBC protocol achieves $\tilde{O}(n^2 \kappa^4)$ communication and $O(\kappa\log n)$ rounds. Since these factors of $\kappa$ are in practice often close (or at least polynomially related) to $n$, they add a significant overhead. In this work, we propose three parallel broadcast protocols for $L$-bit messages, for any size $L$, that significantly improve the communication efficiency of the state-of-the-art.

We first propose a new extension protocol that uses a $\kappa$-bit PBC as a black box and achieves i) communication complexity of $O(L n^2 + \mathcal{P}(\kappa))$, where $\mathcal{P}(\kappa)$ is the communication complexity of the $\kappa$-bit PBC, and ii) round complexity same as the $\kappa$-bit PBC. By comparison, the state-of-the-art extension protocol for regular broadcast (Nayak et al., DISC 2020) incurs $O(n)$ additional rounds of communication. Next, we propose a protocol that is secure against a static adversary, for $\kappa$-bit messages with $O(n^2 \kappa^{1+K} + n\kappa^3 + \kappa^4)$ communication and $O(\kappa)$ round complexity, where $K$ is an arbitrarily small constant such that $0