International Association
for Cryptologic Research

We address the black-box complexity of constructing pseudorandom functions (PRF) from pseudorandom generators (PRG). The celebrated GGM construction of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (Crypto 1984) provides such a construction, which (even when combined with Levin's domain-extension trick) has super-logarithmic depth. Despite many years and much effort, this remains essentially the best construction we have to date. On the negative side, one step is provided by the work of Miles and Viola (TCC 2011), which shows that a black-box construction which just calls the PRG once and outputs one of its output bits, cannot be a PRF.

In this work, we make significant further progress: we rule out black-box constructions of PRF from PRG that follow certain structural constraints, but may call the PRG adaptively polynomially many times. In particular, we define ``tree constructions" which generalize the GGM structure: they apply the PRG $G$ along a tree path, but allow for different choices of functions to compute the children of a node on the tree and to compute the next node on the computation path down the tree. We prove that a tree construction of logarithmic depth cannot be a PRF (while GGM is a tree construction of super-logarithmic depth). We also show several other results and discuss the special case of one-call constructions.

Our main results in fact rule out even weak PRF constructions with one output bit. We use the oracle separation methodology introduced by Gertner, Malkin, and Reingold (FOCS 2001), and show that for any candidate black-box construction $F^G$ from $G$, there exists an oracle relative to which $G$ is a PRG, but $F^G$ is not a PRF.