International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Impossible differential cryptanalysis is a crucial cryptanalytical method for symmetric ciphers. Given an impossible differential, the key recovery attack typically proceeds in two steps: generating pairs of data and then identifying wrong keys using the guess-and-filtering method. At CRYPTO 2023, Boura \etal first proposed a new key recovery technique - the differential meet-in-the-middle attack, which recovers the key in a meet-in-the-middle manner. Inspired by this technique, we incorporate the meet-in-the-middle technique into impossible cryptanalysis and propose a generic impossible differential meet-in-the-middle attack (\idma) framework. We apply \idma to block ciphers \skinny, \skinnye-v2, and \forkskinny and achieve remarkably efficient attacks. We improve the impossible differential attack on \skinny-$n$-$3n$ by 2 rounds in the single-tweakey setting and 1 round in the related-tweakey setting. For \skinnye-v2, the impossible differential attacks now can cover 2 more rounds in the related-tweakey setting and the first 23/24/25-round attacks in the single-tweakey model are given. For \forkskinny-$n$-$3n$, we improve the attacks by 2 rounds in the limited setting specified by the designers and 1 round in relaxed settings. These results confirm that the meet-in-the-middle technique can result in more efficient key recovery, reaching beyond what traditional methods can achieve on certain ciphers.