International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In 2012, the Tor project expressed the need to upgrade Tor's onion encryption scheme to protect against tagging attacks and thereby strengthen its end-to-end integrity protection. Tor proposal 261, where each encryption layer is processed by a strongly secure, yet relatively expensive tweakable wide-block cipher, is the only concrete candidate replacement to be backed by formal, yet partial, security proofs (Degabriele and Stam, EUROCRYPT 2018, and Rogaway and Zhang, PoPETS 2018).

We propose an alternative onion encryption scheme, called Counter Galois Onion (CGO), that follows a minimalistic, modular design and includes several improvements over proposal 261. CGO's underlying primitive is an updatable tweakable split-domain cipher accompanied with a new security notion, that augments the recently introduced rugged pseudorandom permutation (Degabriele and Karadžić, CRYPTO 2022). Thus, we relax the security compared to a tweakable wide-block cipher, allowing for more efficient designs. We suggest a concrete instantiation for the updatable tweakable split-domain cipher and report on our experiments comparing the performance of CGO with Tor's existing onion encryption scheme.