International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Physical attacks pose a major challenge to the secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Although significant progress has been made in countering passive attacks such as side-channel analysis (SCA), protection against fault attacks is still less developed. One reason for this is the broader and more complex nature of fault attacks, which makes it difficult to create standardized fault evaluation methodologies for countermeasures like those used for SCA. This makes it easier to overlook potential vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. RS-Mask, published at HOST 2020, is such a countermeasure that has been affected by the absence of a systematic analysis method. The fundamental concept behind the countermeasure is to maintain a uniform distribution of variables, regardless of whether they are faulty or correct. This property is particularly effective against Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks (SIFA), which exploit the dependency between fault propagation and the secret data.

In this work, we present several fault scenarios involving single fault injections on the AES implementation protected with RS-Mask, where the fault propagation depends on the secret data. This happens because the random space mapping used in RS-Mask countermeasure retains a dependency on the secret data, as it is derived based on the S-box input. To address this, we propose a new countermeasure based on the core concept of RS-Mask, implementing a single mapping for all S-box inputs, involving an intrinsic duplication. Next, we evaluate the effectiveness of the new countermeasure against fault attacks by comparing the fault detection rate across all possible fault locations and values for every input. Additionally, we examine the output differences between faulty and correct outputs for each input. Our results show that the detection rate is uniform for each input, which ensures security against statistical attacks utilizing both effective and ineffective faults. Moreover, the output differences being uniform for each input ensures security against differential fault attacks.