International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Jan-Pieter D'Anvers


Multitarget decryption failure attacks and their application to Saber and Kyber 📺
Jan-Pieter D'Anvers Senne Batsleer
Many lattice-based encryption schemes are subject to a very small probability of decryption failures. It has been shown that an adversary can efficiently recover the secret key using a number of ciphertexts that cause such a decryption failure. In PKC 2019, D'Anvers et al. introduced `failure boosting', a technique to speed up the search for decryption failures. In this work we first improve the state-of-the-art multitarget failure boosting attacks. We then improve the cost calculation of failure boosting and extend the applicability of these calculations to permit cost calculations of real-world schemes. Using our newly developed methodologies we determine the multitarget decryption failure attack cost for all parameter sets of Saber and Kyber, showing among others that the quantum security of Saber can theoretically be reduced from 172 bits to 145 bits in specific circumstances. We then discuss the applicability of decryption failure attacks in real-world scenarios, showing that an attack might not be practical to execute.
Higher-Order Masked Ciphertext Comparison for Lattice-Based Cryptography
Checking the equality of two arrays is a crucial building block of the FO transformation, and as such it is used in several post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms including Kyber and Saber. While this comparison operation is easy to perform in a black box setting, it is hard to efficiently protect against side-channel attacks. For instance, the hash-based method by Oder et al. is limited to first-order masking, a higher-order method by Bache et al. was shown to be flawed, and a very recent higher-order technique by Bos et al. suffers in runtime. In this paper, we first demonstrate that the hash-based approach, and likely many similar first-order techniques, succumb to a relatively simple side-channel collision attack. We can successfully recover a Kyber512 key using just 6000 traces. While this does not break the security guarantees, it does show the need for efficient higher-order methods. We then present a new higher-order masked comparison algorithm based on the (insecure) higher-order method of Bache et al. Our new method is 4.0x, resp. 6.8x, faster than the method of Bos et al. for a 2nd, resp. 3rd, -order masking on the ARM Cortex-M4, and unlike the method of Bache et al., the new technique takes ciphertext compression into account, We prove correctness, security, and masking security in detail and provide performance numbers for 2nd and 3rd-order implementations. Finally, we verify our the side-channel security of our implementation using the test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) methodology.