International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2008
EPRINT
Provably Secure ID-Based Broadcast Signcryption (IBBSC) Scheme
With the advent of mobile and portable devices such as cell phones and PDAs, wireless content distribution has become a major means of communications and entertainment. In such applications, a central authority needs to deliver encrypted data to a large number of recipients in such a way that only a privileged subset of users can decrypt it. A broadcasting news channel may face this problem, for example, when a large number of people subscribe to a daily exclusive news feature. This is exactly the kind of problem that \textit{broadcast encryption} attempts to efficiently solve. On top of this, especially in the current digital era, junk content or spam is a major turn off in almost every Internet application. If all the users who subscribe to the news feed receive meaningless noise or any unwanted content, then the broadcaster is going to lose them. This results in the additional requirement that subscribers have source authentication with respect to their broadcaster. \textit{Broadcast signcryption}, which enables the broadcaster to simultaneously encrypt and sign the content meant for a specific set of users in a single logical step, provides the most efficient solution to the dual problem of confidentiality and authentication. Efficiency is a major concern, because mobile devices have limited memory and computational power and wireless bandwidth is an extremely costly resource. While several alternatives exist in implementing broadcast signcryption schemes, identity-based (ID-based) schemes are arguably the best suited because of the unique advantage that they provide --- any unique, publicly available parameter of a user can be his public key, which eliminates the need for a complex public key infrastructure. In ASIAN 2004, Mu et al. \cite{MSLR04} propose what they call an ID-based authenticated broadcast encryption scheme, which is also a broadcast signcryption scheme, as the security goals are the same. They claim that their scheme provides message authentication and confidentiality and formally prove that the broadcaster's secret is not compromised, but in this paper, we demonstrate that even without knowing the broadcaster's secret, it is possible for a legal user to impersonate the broadcaster. We demonstrate this by mounting a universal forgeability attack --- any valid user, on receiving and decrypting a valid ciphertext from a broadcaster, can generate a valid ciphertext on any message on behalf of that broadcaster for the same set of legal receivers to which the broadcaster signcrypted the earlier message, without knowing any secrets. Following this, we propose a new ID-based broadcast signcryption (IBBSC) scheme, and formally prove its security under the strongest existing security models for broadcast signcryption (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA2).
2008
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of ID-Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receivers
In ATC 2007, an identity-based signcryption scheme for multiple receivers was proposed by Yu et al. They prove confidentiality of their scheme and also claim unforgeability without any proof. In this paper, we show that their signcryption scheme is insecure by demonstrating a universal forgeability attack - anyone can generate a valid signcrypted ciphertext on any message on behalf of any legal user for any set of legal receivers without knowing the secret keys of the legal users. Further, we propose a corrected version of their scheme and formally prove its security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the existing security model for signcryption. We also analyze the efficiency of the corrected scheme by comparing it with existing signcryption schemes for multiple receivers.
2008
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of Bohio et al.'s ID-Based Broadcast Signcryption (IBBSC) Scheme for Wireless Ad-hoc Networks
Broadcast signcryption enables the broadcaster to simultaneously encrypt and sign the content meant for a specific set of users in a single logical step. It provides a very efficient solution to the dual problem of achieving confidentiality and authentication during content distribution. Among other alternatives, ID-based schemes are arguably the best suited for its implementation in wireless ad-hoc networks because of the unique advantage that they provide - any unique, publicly available parameter of a user can be his public key, which eliminates the need for a complex public key infrastructure. In 2004, Bohio et al. [4] proposed an ID-based broadcast signcryption (IBBSC) scheme which achieves constant ciphertext size. They claim that their scheme provides both message authentication and confidentiality, but do not give formal proofs. In this paper, we demonstrate how a legitimate user of the scheme can forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext, as if generated by the broadcaster. Moreover, we show that their scheme is not IND-CCA secure. Following this, we propose a fix for Bohio et al.'s scheme, and formally prove its security under the strongest existing security models for broadcast signcryption (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA). While fixing the scheme, we also improve its efficiency by reducing the ciphertext size to two elements compared to three in [4].
2008
EPRINT
Foundations of Group Key Management – Framework, Security Model and a Generic Construction
Group Key Management (GKM) solves the problem of efficiently establishing and managing secure communication in dynamic groups. Many GKM schemes that have been proposed so far have been broken, as they cite ambiguous arguments and lack formal proofs. In fact, no concrete framework and security model for GKM exists in literature. This paper addresses this serious problem by providing firm foundations for Group Key Management. We provide a generalized framework for centralized GKM along with a formal security model and strong definitions for the security properties that dynamic groups demand. We also show a generic construction of a centralized GKM scheme from any given multi-receiver ID-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (mID-KEM). By doing so, we unify two concepts that are significantly different in terms of what they achieve. Our construction is simple and efficient. We prove that the resulting GKM inherits the security of the underlying mID-KEM up to CCA security. We also illustrate our general conversion using the mID-KEM proposed in 2007 by Delerablée.