CryptoDB
Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords
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Abstract: | We present an efficient password-authenticated key exchange protocol which is secure against off-line dictionary attacks even when users choose passwords from a very small space (say, a dictionary of English words). We prove security in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, assuming public parameters generated by a trusted party. Compared to the recent work of Goldreich and Lindell (which was the first to give a secure construction, under general assumptions, in the standard model), our protocol requires only 3 rounds and is efficient enough to be used in practice. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2001-11443, title={Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / key exchange, diffie-hellman, password}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/031}, note={Eurocrypt, 2001. jkatz@cs.columbia.edu 11438 received 23 Apr 2001, last revised 26 Apr 2001}, author={Jonathan Katz and Rafail Ostrovsky and Moti Yung}, year=2001 }