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Integral Cryptanalysis on reduced-round Safer++
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Abstract: | In this paper we describe an integral distinguisher over 2 rounds of Safer++. It allows a practical attack against 3 rounds of Safer++128, as well as attacks on 4 rounds of Safer++128 and Safer++256, under the chosen-plaintext hypothesis. These results achieve much lower complexity than the currently known best attacks on Safer++, namely weak-key linear cryptanalysis by Nakahara. As a side result, we prove that the byte-branch number of the linear transform of Safer++ is 5. We also discuss a way for further research in order to extend integral cryptanalysis. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11751, title={Integral Cryptanalysis on reduced-round Safer++}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / block ciphers, integral cryptanalysis}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/033}, note={ piret@dice.ucl.ac.be 12100 received 16 Feb 2003, last revised 17 Feb 2003}, author={Gilles Piret and Jean-Jacques Quisquater}, year=2003 }