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Cryptanalysis of the Alleged SecurID Hash Function
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Abstract: | The SecurID hash function is used for authenticating users to a corporate computer infrastructure. We analyse an alleged implementation of this hash function. The block cipher at the heart of the function can be broken in few milliseconds on a PC with 70 adaptively chosen plaintexts. The 64-bit secret key of 10$\%$ of the cards can be discovered given two months of token outputs and $2^{48}$ analysis steps. A larger fraction of cards can be covered given more observation time. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11876, title={Cryptanalysis of the Alleged SecurID Hash Function}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / alleged SecurID, cryptanalysis, internal collision, vanishing differential}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/162}, note={Updated version of a paper, which will appear in SAC'03 preproceedings abiryuko@esat.kuleuven.ac.be 12354 received 8 Aug 2003, last revised 29 Oct 2003}, author={Alex Biryukov and Joseph Lano and Bart Preneel}, year=2003 }