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A Cryptanalysis of the Original Domingo-Ferrer's Algebraic Privacy Homomophism
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Abstract: | We propose a cryptanalysis of the original Domingo-Ferrer's algebraic privacy homomorphism. We show that the scheme over $\Z_n$ can be broken by $d+1$ known plaintexts in $O(d^3\log^2 n)$ time when it has $d$ times expansion through the encryption. Furthermore even when the public modulus $n$ is kept secret, it can be broken by $d+2$ known plaintexts in time at most $O(d^5\log^2(dn))$. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11934, title={A Cryptanalysis of the Original Domingo-Ferrer's Algebraic Privacy Homomophism}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={Privacy homomorphism, Encrypted Data, Database Security}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/221}, note={ hsnam@math.snu.ac.kr 12338 received 12 Oct 2003, last revised 13 Oct 2003}, author={Jung Hee Cheon and Hyun Soo Nam}, year=2003 }