International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Paper: Direct Anonymous Attestation

Authors:
Ernie Brickell
Jan Camenisch
Liqun Chen
Download:
URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/205
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract: This paper describes the direct anonymous attestation scheme (DAA). This scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group as the method for remote authentication of a hardware module, called trusted platform module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. Direct anonymous attestation can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. Moreover, DAA allows for pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of ``known'' keys: if the DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12177,
  title={Direct Anonymous Attestation},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={cryptographic protocols / digital signatures, privacy, group signatures},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/205},
  note={Full version of ACM CCS 04 paper. jca@zurich.ibm.com 12650 received 20 Aug 2004},
  author={Ernie Brickell and Jan Camenisch and Liqun Chen},
  year=2004
}