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Inductive Proof Method for Computational Secrecy
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Abstract: | We investigate inductive methods for proving secrecy properties of network protocols, in a ``computational" setting applying a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. As in cryptographic studies, our secrecy properties assert that no probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher can win a suitable game presented by a challenger. Our method for establishing secrecy properties uses inductive proofs of computational trace-based properties, and axioms and inference rules for relating trace-based properties to non-trace-based properties. We illustrate the method, which is formalized in a logical setting that does not require explicit reasoning about computational complexity, probability, or the possible actions of the attacker, by giving a modular proof of computational authentication and secrecy properties of the Kerberos V5 protocol. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13447, title={Inductive Proof Method for Computational Secrecy}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols /}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/165}, note={ arnab@stanford.edu 13637 received 4 May 2007}, author={Arnab Roy and Anupam Datta and Ante Derek and John C. Mitchell}, year=2007 }