International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Paper: Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks

Authors:
Fran├žois-Xavier Standaert
Eric Peeters
Cedric Archambeau
Jean-Jacques Quisquater
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/222
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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a recently introduced framework that investigates physically observable implementations from a theoretical point of view. The model allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. More specifically, we apply our evaluation methodology to an exemplary block cipher. We first consider a Hamming weight leakage function and evaluate the efficiency of two commonly investigated countermeasures, namely noise addition and masking. Then, we show that the proposed methodology allows capturing certain non-trivial intuitions, e.g. about the respective effectiveness of these countermeasures. Finally, we justify the need of combined metrics for the evaluation, comparison and understanding of side-channel attacks.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13503,
  title={Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={implementation /},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/222},
  note={The paper was published in the proceedings of CHES 2006. This eprint version contains corrected notations in order to comply with the updated notations of the model in: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/139. fstandae at uclouvain be 13672 received 8 Jun 2007},
  author={Fran├žois-Xavier Standaert and Eric Peeters and Cedric Archambeau and Jean-Jacques Quisquater},
  year=2007
}