CryptoDB
Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
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Abstract: | In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol and prove its security under the random oracle assumption and the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption. In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, there has been no known AKE protocol based on the CDH assumption. Our protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin. We establish a formal security proof of NAXOS+ in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model using as a main tool the trapdoor test presented by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-18021, title={Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / authenticated key exchange, trapdoor test}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/344}, note={ jlee05@ensec.re.kr 14097 received 5 Aug 2008}, author={Jooyoung Lee and Je Hong Park}, year=2008 }