CryptoDB
Indifferentiable Security Analysis of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP, chopWPH, chopNI, chopEMD, chopCS, and chopESh Hash Domain Extensions
Authors: |
- Donghoon Chang
- Jaechul Sung
- Seokhie Hong
- Sangjin Lee
|
Download: |
- URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/407
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Abstract: |
We provide simple and unified indifferentiable security analyses of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP (where the permutation $P$ is to be xored with any non-zero constant.), chopWPH (the chopped version of Wide-Pipe Hash proposed in \cite{Lucks05}), chopEMD, chopNI, chopCS, chopESh hash domain extensions. Even though there are security analysis of them in the case of no-bit chopping (i.e., $s=0$), there is no unified way to give security proofs. All our proofs in this paper follow the technique introduced in \cite{BeDaPeAs08}. These proofs are simple and easy to follow. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-18102,
title={Indifferentiable Security Analysis of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP, chopWPH, chopNI, chopEMD, chopCS, and chopESh Hash Domain Extensions},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={Hash Function, Domain Extension, Random Oracle, Indifferentiability},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/407},
note={ pointchang@gmail.com 14225 received 23 Sep 2008, last revised 12 Dec 2008},
author={Donghoon Chang and Jaechul Sung and Seokhie Hong and Sangjin Lee},
year=2008
}