CryptoDB
On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks
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Abstract: | Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec'07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA ^ IND -> IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-18137, title={On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / Provable security, Side-channel attack, Symmetric encryption}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/497}, note={ wp@is.ac.cn 14209 received 26 Nov 2008}, author={Peng Wang and Dengguo Feng and Wenling Wu and Liting Zhang}, year=2008 }