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Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis
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| Abstract: | We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability/UC which entails that secrecy properties proven by our tool are automatically guaranteed to hold for secure cryptographic implementations of the analyzed protocol, with respect to the more fine-grained cryptographic secrecy definitions and adversary models. Our tool is capable of reasoning about a comprehensive language for expressing protocols, in particular handling symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, and it produces proofs for an unbounded number of sessions in the presence of an active adversary. We have implemented the tool and applied it to a number of common protocols from the literature. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21758,
title={Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols / security analysis, reactive simulatability},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/266},
note={Full version of a paper published in the proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security (CCS 2006) peeter.laud@ut.ee 13370 received 10 Aug 2006},
author={Michael Backes and Peeter Laud},
year=2006
}