CryptoDB
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
Authors: | |
---|---|
Download: | |
Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21810, title={Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / hash functions, collisions, NMAC, HMAC, message authentication codes}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319}, note={An extended version of a paper to appear in Asiacrypt'06 scott_contini@yahoo.com 13411 received 20 Sep 2006}, author={Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin}, year=2006 }