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The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $2^{88.2}$Chosen Plaintexts
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| Abstract: | In this paper we present exchange-equivalence attacks which is a new cryptanalytic attack technique suitable for SPN-like block cipher designs. Our new technique results in the first secret-key chosen plaintext distinguisher for 6-round AES. The complexity of the distinguisher is about $$2^{88.2}$$ in terms of data, memory and computational complexity. The distinguishing attack for AES reduced to six rounds is a straight-forward extension of an exchange attack for 5-round AES that requires $$2^{30}$$ in terms of chosen plaintexts and computation. This is also a new record for AES reduced to five rounds. The main result of this paper is that AES up to at least six rounds is biased when restricted to exchange-invariant sets of plaintexts. |
BibTeX
@article{asiacrypt-2019-30066,
title={The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $$2^{88.2}$$Chosen Plaintexts},
booktitle={Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2019},
series={Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2019},
publisher={Springer},
volume={11923},
pages={347-370},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_12},
author={Navid Ghaedi Bardeh and Sondre Rønjom},
year=2019
}