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Secure Software Leasing Without Assumptions
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| Abstract: | Quantum cryptography is known for enabling functionalities that are unattainable using classical information alone. Recently, Secure Software Leasing (SSL) has emerged as one of these areas of interest. Given a target circuit C from a circuit class, SSL produces an encoding of C that enables a recipient to evaluate C, and also enables the originator of the software to verify that the software has been returned --- meaning that the recipient has relinquished the possibility of any further use of the software. Clearly, such a functionality is unachievable using classical information alone, since it is impossible to prevent a user from keeping a copy of the software. Recent results have shown the achievability of SSL using quantum information for a class of functions called compute-and-compare (these are a generalization of the well-known point functions). These prior works, however all make use of setup or computational assumptions. Here, we show that SSL is achievable for compute-and-compare circuits without any assumptions. Our technique involves the study of quantum copy protection, which is a notion related to SSL, but where the encoding procedure inherently prevents a would-be quantum software pirate from splitting a single copy of an encoding for C into two parts, each of which enables a user to evaluate C. We show that point functions can be copy-protected without any assumptions, for a novel security definition involving one honest and one malicious evaluator; this is achieved by showing that from any quantum message authentication code, we can derive such an honest-malicious copy protection scheme. We then show that a generic honest-malicious copy protection scheme implies SSL; by prior work, this yields SSL for compute-and-compare functions. |
Video from TCC 2021
BibTeX
@article{tcc-2021-31530,
title={Secure Software Leasing Without Assumptions},
booktitle={Theory of Cryptography;19th International Conference},
publisher={Springer},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-90459-3_4},
author={Anne Broadbent and Stacey Jeffery and Sébastien Lord and Supartha Podder and Aarthi Sundaram},
year=2021
}