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Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge from Collision Resistance
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we present a constant-round leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system for $$\mathcal {NP}$$ NP under the assumption of the existence of collision-resistant hash function families. That is, using a collision-resistant hash function, we construct a constant-round zero-knowledge argument system that has the following zero-knowledge property: even against any cheating verifier that obtains an arbitrary amount of leakage on the prover’s internal secret state, a simulator can simulate the verifier’s view by obtaining the same amount of leakage on the witness. Previously, leakage-resilient zero-knowledge proofs/arguments for $$\mathcal {NP}$$ NP were constructed only under a relaxed security definition (Garg et al., in: CRYPTO’11, pp 297–315, 2011) or under the DDH assumption (Pandey, in: TCC’14, pp 146–166, 2014). Our leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system satisfies an additional property that it is simultaneously leakage-resilient zero-knowledge, meaning that both zero-knowledge and soundness hold in the presence of leakage. |
BibTeX
@article{jofc-2022-32793,
title={Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge from Collision Resistance},
journal={Journal of Cryptology},
publisher={Springer},
volume={35},
doi={10.1007/s00145-022-09426-2},
author={Susumu Kiyoshima},
year=2022
}