CryptoDB
Delegatable Anonymous Credentials From Mercurial Signatures With Stronger Privacy
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| Conference: | ASIACRYPT 2024 |
| Abstract: | Delegatable anonymous credentials (DACs) enable a root issuer to delegate credential-issuing power, allowing a delegatee to take a delegator role. To preserve privacy, credential recipients and verifiers should not learn anything about intermediate issuers in the delegation chain. One particularly efficient approach to constructing DACs is due to Crites and Lysyanskaya (CT-RSA '19). In contrast to previous approaches, it is based on mercurial signatures (a type of equivalence-class signature), offering a conceptually simple design that does not require extensive use of zero-knowledge proofs. Unfortunately, current constructions of ``CL-type'' DACs only offer a weak form of privacy-preserving delegation: if an adversarial issuer (even an honest-but-curious one) is part of a user's delegation chain, they can detect when the user shows its credential. This is because the underlying mercurial signature schemes allows a signer to identify his public key in a delegation chain. We propose CL-type DACs that overcome the above limitation based on a new mercurial signature scheme that provides adversarial public key class hiding which ensures that adversarial signers who participate in a user's delegation chain cannot exploit that fact to trace users. We achieve this introducing structured public parameters for each delegation level. Since the related setup produces critical trapdoors, we discuss techniques from updatable structured reference strings in zero-knowledge proof systems (Groth et al. CRYPTO '18) to guarantee the required privacy needs. In addition, we propose a simple way to realize revocation for CL-type DACs via the concept of revocation tokens. While we showcase this approach to revocation using our DAC scheme, it is generic and can be applied to any CL-type DAC system. Revocation is a vital feature that is largely unexplored and notoriously hard to achieve for DACs, thus providing it can help to make DAC schemes more attractive in practical applications. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2024-34667,
title={Delegatable Anonymous Credentials From Mercurial Signatures With Stronger Privacy},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Scott Griffy and Anna Lysyanskaya and Omid Mir and Octavio Perez Kempner and Daniel Slamanig},
year=2024
}