CryptoDB
Unpacking Needs Protection
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| Abstract: | Most of the previous attacks on Dilithium exploit side-channel information which is leaked during the computation of the polynomial multiplication cs1, where s1 is a small-norm secret and c is a verifier's challenge. In this paper, we present a new attack utilizing leakage during secret key unpacking in the signing algorithm. The unpacking is also used in other post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including Kyber, because inputs and outputs of their API functions are byte arrays. Exploiting leakage during unpacking is more challenging than exploiting leakage during the computation of cs1 since c varies for each signing, while the unpacked secret key remains constant. Therefore, post-processing is required in the latter case to recover a full secret key. We present two variants of post-processing. In the first one, a half of the coefficients of the secret s1 and the error s2 is recovered by profiled deep learning-assisted power analysis and the rest is derived by solving linear equations based on t = As1 + s2, where A and t are parts of the public key. This case assumes knowledge of the least significant bits of t, t0. The second variant uses lattice reduction to derive s1 without the knowledge of t0. However, it needs a larger portion of s1 to be recovered by power analysis. We evaluate both variants on an ARM Cortex-M4 implementation of Dilithium-2. The experiments show that the attack assuming the knowledge of t0 can recover s1 from a single trace captured from a different from profiling device with a non-negligible probability. |
BibTeX
@article{cic-2024-34823,
title={Unpacking Needs Protection},
journal={cic},
publisher={International Association for Cryptologic Research},
volume={1, Issue 3},
url={https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/3/12},
doi={10.62056/a0fh89n4e},
author={Ruize Wang and Kalle Ngo and Joel Gärtner and Elena Dubrova},
year=2024
}