International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Almost pairwise independence and resilience to deep learning attacks

Authors:
Rustem Takhanov , Nazarbayev University
Download:
DOI: 10.62056/a3ksa69p1
URL: https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/3/32
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract:

Almost pairwise independence (API) is a quantitative property of a class of functions that is desirable in many cryptographic applications. This property is satisfied by Learning with errors (LWE)-mappings and by special Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN). API block ciphers are known to be resilient to differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks. Recently, security of protocols against neural network-based attacks became a major trend in cryptographic studies. Therefore, it is relevant to study the hardness of learning a target function from an API class of functions by gradient-based methods.

We propose a theoretical analysis based on the study of the variance of the gradient of a general machine learning objective with respect to a random choice of target function from a class. We prove an upper bound and verify that, indeed, such a variance is extremely small for API classes of functions. This implies the resilience of actual LWE-based primitives against deep learning attacks, and to some extent, the security of SPNs. The hardness of learning reveals itself in the form of the barren plateau phenomenon during the training process, or in other words, in a low information content of the gradient about the target function. Yet, we emphasize that our bounds hold for the case of a regular parameterization of a neural network and the gradient may become informative if a class is mildly pairwise independent and a parameterization is non-regular. We demonstrate our theory in experiments on the learnability of LWE mappings.

BibTeX
@article{cic-2024-34843,
  title={Almost pairwise independence and resilience to deep learning attacks},
  journal={cic},
  publisher={International Association for Cryptologic Research},
  volume={1, Issue 3},
  url={https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/3/32},
  doi={10.62056/a3ksa69p1},
  author={Rustem Takhanov},
  year=2024
}