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CHERI-Crypt: Transparent Memory Encryption on Capability Architectures
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| Abstract: | Capability architectures such as CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions) are an emerging technology designed to provide memory safety protection at the hardware level and are equipped to eradicate approximately 70% of the current software vulnerability attack surface. CHERI is an instruction set architecture extension and has been applied to a small number of processors, including various versions of RISC-V. One of the benefits of CHERI is that it inherently provides segregation or compartmentalisation of software, making it suitable for supporting other types of applications such as Trusted Execution Environments, where sensitive data and computation is conducted inside a secure enclave, away from the rest of the untrusted operating system and services. To prevent untrusted software from accessing these compartments or secure regions of memory CHERI uses the mechanism of sealed capabilities. Trusted execution environments however, have been proven vulnerable to not just software-based attacks, but hardware attacks as well. In this paper we present our CHERI-Crypt design, an encryption engine extension to a CHERI-RISC-V 32-bit processor, for transparent memory encryption of sealed CHERI capabilities to additionally protect sensitive data in memory against physical hardware attacks. We show that our CHERI-Crypt design can run an enclave test program within an encrypted CHERI seal and invoke process, requiring 626 additional clock cycles with a batch size of 32 bytes. Adding CHERI-Crypt reduces the maximum frequency of the base CPU by only 6 MHz, and requires approximately 3.5x more flip flops and LUTs. |
BibTeX
@article{tches-2025-35228,
title={CHERI-Crypt: Transparent Memory Encryption on Capability Architectures},
journal={IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
publisher={Ruhr-Universität Bochum},
volume={2025},
pages={268-292},
url={https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/12048},
doi={10.46586/tches.v2025.i2.268-292},
author={Jennifer Jackson and Minmin Jiang and David Oswald},
year=2025
}